Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries
LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT V. ALBRIGHT
Jennifer Albright, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased son David Albright, filed a lawsuit against the Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) following David's death. David was swept into a drainage pipe in their backyard during a rainstorm and subsequently died from his injuries. The drainage system, including the pipe, was owned by MSD. Albright alleged that MSD was negligent in maintaining the drainage system and failing to warn of its dangers, particularly by not installing a grate over the pipe entrance.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of MSD, finding that MSD was entitled to municipal immunity under the Claims Against Local Governments Act (CALGA). The court reasoned that MSD's decision not to install grates was a discretionary act protected by CALGA. Albright appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that MSD was not entitled to immunity under the facts of the case.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that MSD, while subject to CALGA, was not entitled to immunity because the alleged negligent acts were ministerial in nature, not discretionary. The court emphasized that municipalities have a ministerial duty to non-negligently maintain and repair their sewer systems. The court also found that MSD's decision not to install a grate or warn of the pipe's dangers did not arise from its legislative or quasi-legislative authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT V. ALBRIGHT" on Justia Law
Wright v State of New York
Claimant Chi Bartram Wright filed a claim under the Child Victims Act (CVA) alleging that he was sexually abused by numerous men at a state-owned performing arts center in Albany, New York, between 1986 and 1990. Wright sought seventy-five million dollars in damages, asserting various theories of negligence by the State, including negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and direction. The claim described the abuse in general terms but did not provide specific details about the abusers or the exact dates of the incidents.The Court of Claims dismissed Wright's claim, finding that it did not meet the specificity requirements of section 11 (b) of the Court of Claims Act, which mandates that claims against the State must include specific details to enable prompt investigation and ascertainment of liability. The court concluded that the CVA did not relax these requirements. Wright appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the four-year period alleged in Wright's claim was sufficiently specific given the decades that had passed since the abuse occurred.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the CVA did not alter the substantive pleading requirements of section 11 (b) of the Court of Claims Act. The court found that Wright's claim lacked the necessary specificity to enable the State to promptly investigate and determine its liability. The claim did not provide sufficient details about the abusers, the context of the abuse, or the State's potential responsibility. As a result, the court granted the State's motion to dismiss the claim and answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Wright v State of New York" on Justia Law
Cannon v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc.
Scott Cannon, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Blaise Cannon, filed a wrongful death and punitive damages claim against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBS). Cannon alleged that BCBS's denial of coverage for a specific inhaler led to asthma-related complications that contributed to Blaise's death. Blaise was a beneficiary of his partner's BCBS health insurance policy, which was governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to BCBS on the grounds of ERISA preemption. The court found that Cannon's wrongful death claim was preempted by ERISA because it related to an employee benefit plan and arose from the denial of benefits under that plan. The court also held that the claim conflicted with the remedial scheme established by ERISA, which provides specific civil enforcement mechanisms.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Cannon's claim was statutorily preempted under ERISA because it had a connection with the ERISA-regulated health insurance plan. The court also found that the claim was preempted under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, as it sought remedies for the denial of benefits under the plan. The court rejected Cannon's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association altered the preemption analysis, reaffirming that ERISA preempts state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. The court concluded that Cannon's wrongful death claim was derivative of Blaise's potential claim for benefits, which would have been preempted by ERISA. View "Cannon v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc." on Justia Law
Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group
Plaintiffs Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting claims for negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, alleged that Dr. Panguluri’s mishandling of a syringe containing an HIV patient’s blood caused the blood to splash into his face and eye. The complaint did not claim that Glenn contracted HIV but stated that both plaintiffs suffered harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the plaintiffs' claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The plaintiffs did not amend their complaint but instead filed a voluntary dismissal of their entire action with prejudice, intending to expedite an appeal of the trial court’s adverse rulings.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ appeal. The court held that a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs' request, without a final judicial determination of their claims, is not an appealable order. The court emphasized that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law
State v. Raver
Loren Dean Raver was pulled over while driving a stolen Ford F-150 and subsequently arrested. The truck's owner, Stacie Grandpre, confirmed that she did not know Raver and had not given him permission to drive her truck. Upon searching the vehicle, deputies found syringes, a spoon with a crystalline substance, and stolen copper wire and tools. Raver was charged with multiple counts, including felony theft and misdemeanors. He entered a no contest plea for felony theft and misdemeanor theft of the copper wire, and the other charges were dropped.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, held a sentencing hearing where the State requested $17,470.36 in restitution for Grandpre's losses, including vehicle damage, hunting gear, car rentals, and cleaning costs. The State presented testimony from a State Farm Insurance claims specialist, who attributed the damages to the theft based on Grandpre's statements and the investigation. Raver, a mechanic, contested the amount, claiming the truck had no issues during his possession and proposed a lower restitution amount.The District Court ordered the full restitution amount, finding a reasonable connection between the damage and Raver's theft. The court found the State's evidence credible and Raver's testimony not credible. Raver appealed, arguing insufficient causation and challenging the inclusion of the bumper replacement cost.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court found that the evidence presented, including the State Farm investigation and Grandpre's statements, supported the restitution amount by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also rejected Raver's argument regarding the bumper, as there was insufficient evidence to refute the State Farm conclusion. View "State v. Raver" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. Crane
Scott Frey was injured while riding his bike on the Katy Trail in March 2020. He alleged that his injury occurred when his bike tire became lodged between wooden motor-vehicle reinforcements on a bridge managed by the Department of Natural Resources. Frey had not paid any fee to enter the trail and was using it for recreational purposes. The department had installed the reinforcements shortly before the accident and had posted warning signs about the rough surface.Frey filed a personal injury lawsuit against the department, claiming the bridge's condition was dangerous due to the department's negligence. The department sought summary judgment, arguing it was protected from liability under the Recreational Use Act and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the department's motion, and the department's request for a writ of prohibition was also denied by the court of appeals.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and determined that the Recreational Use Act provided the department with immunity from liability. The court found that the department met all the criteria for immunity under the Act: it owned the land, Frey entered without charge, and his entry was for recreational purposes. The court also concluded that the exceptions to the Act's protections did not apply, as there was no evidence of malicious or gross negligence by the department, nor was the condition of the bridge considered ultrahazardous. Consequently, the court made the preliminary writ of prohibition permanent, effectively barring Frey's claims against the department. View "State ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. Crane" on Justia Law
Moody v. Dynamic Fitness Management, LTD.
Melissa Moody sustained an injury while performing a push press exercise during a group class led by a trainer from Dynamic Fitness Management Ltd. at a gym in St. Louis. Moody, who had been a member of the gym since 2011, was instructed by the trainer to perform the exercise with increasing weights. After successfully completing two repetitions at 85 pounds, she felt pain during the third repetition, leading to a herniated disc and subsequent surgeries. Moody sued Dynamic for negligence, claiming the trainer failed to properly assess her fitness and supervise her during the exercise.The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict in favor of Moody. The jury awarded her $1 million in damages, attributing 70 percent fault to Moody and 30 percent to Dynamic. Consequently, the court entered a judgment for Moody in the amount of $300,000 plus post-judgment interest. Dynamic filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled by operation of law when the court did not rule on it within the required timeframe. Dynamic then appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The court found that Dynamic failed to preserve its claims of error for appellate review, particularly because it did not file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) as required by Rule 72.01(b). Additionally, the court held that Dynamic did not preserve its claim related to spoliation because it failed to object at trial when the adverse inference admissions were read to the jury. The court also determined that the jury instruction given did not constitute a roving commission, as it complied with the applicable Missouri Approved Instructions and was supported by sufficient evidence. View "Moody v. Dynamic Fitness Management, LTD." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Personal Injury, Supreme Court of Missouri
MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.
Plaintiffs MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and Series PMPI filed a lawsuit in September 2018 against Fresenius Medical Care Holdings and related entities, alleging negligence, product liability, and design defect claims related to the GranuFlo product used in hemodialysis treatments. The claims arose from a 2012 public memorandum by Fresenius that GranuFlo could lead to cardiopulmonary arrest. The plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by a putative class action filed in 2013 (the Berzas action) in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which was later transferred to the District of Massachusetts as part of multidistrict litigation (MDL).The District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as time-barred, concluding that the Berzas action ceased to be a class action by June 2014 when the named plaintiffs filed Short Form Complaints or stipulations of dismissal, which did not include class allegations. The court also noted that the Berzas plaintiffs did not pursue class certification actively, and the case was administratively closed in April 2019.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The First Circuit held that the Berzas action lost its class action status by June 2014, and any tolling under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah ended at that time. The court reasoned that allowing indefinite tolling based on an inactive class certification request would contravene the principles of efficiency and economy in litigation. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 2018 complaint was untimely, and the district court's dismissal was upheld. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law
Kisling v. Grosz
Paul Grosz was injured while helping his friend Gregory Kisling hang a crucifix in Kisling’s home. Grosz fell from a homemade scaffolding when the wire holding the crucifix broke, resulting in significant injuries including broken ribs, a spinal fracture, and a traumatic brain injury. Grosz sued Kisling for negligence, and the jury awarded Grosz $1.2 million in noneconomic damages but found Kisling only 25% at fault, attributing 75% of the fault to Grosz.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, presided over by Judge Josie Garton, handled the case. After the jury's verdict, Grosz requested the court to determine if his injuries qualified for a higher statutory cap on noneconomic damages due to severe permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement. The court denied this request, stating it was a jury issue that Grosz had not properly raised during the trial. The court then applied the comparative fault percentages, reducing the $1.2 million award to $300,000 (25% of $1.2 million). The court found this amount was below the $400,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages and did not reduce it further.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the superior court should have first applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages before apportioning fault. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the correct sequence is to first allocate fault and then apply the statutory cap if necessary. The court reasoned that this approach respects the jury’s role in determining the actual loss and aligns with legislative intent to cap a defendant’s exposure without further reducing an already capped amount. Thus, Grosz’s recovery of $300,000 was upheld, as it was below the statutory cap. View "Kisling v. Grosz" on Justia Law
Kazarian v. New London County Mutual Insurance Co.
The plaintiff, Alexandria Kazarian, filed a negligence lawsuit against New London County Mutual Insurance Company after a trip-and-fall accident near property owned by the defendant’s insured, Irene Swiney. Kazarian alleged that Swiney allowed a vehicle to be parked in a manner that obstructed the sidewalk, causing her to walk into the street and trip over an unsecured gas cap, resulting in injury. After Swiney passed away, New London was substituted as the defendant.In the Superior Court, a jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of New London. Kazarian’s motion for a new trial was denied. She argued that Swiney was negligent for allowing the vehicle to obstruct the sidewalk and that a master-servant relationship existed between Swiney and the vehicle owner, making Swiney liable. The trial justice denied the motion, stating it was within the jury’s purview to evaluate the evidence and witness credibility.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. Kazarian contended that the trial justice erred in denying her motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. She also argued that the trial justice’s use of the word “redacted” in response to a jury question was prejudicial. The Supreme Court found that reasonable minds could differ on whether the vehicle obstructed the sidewalk and whether it was a reasonable and necessary use of the sidewalk. The Court also noted that Kazarian failed to object contemporaneously to the alleged golden rule violation and the grass-growth argument during the trial, thus waiving those issues.The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, concluding that the trial justice conducted an appropriate analysis and did not err in his decisions. The case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "Kazarian v. New London County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law