Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Mara Lindsey was involved in a car accident where she was rear-ended by Carlos Pantoja, resulting in personal injuries. Lindsey sought compensation for her medical expenses and, after settling with Pantoja’s insurer for his policy limit of $50,000, she filed a claim with her own insurer, State Farm, under her underinsured motorist (UIM) policy. Dissatisfied with State Farm’s settlement offer of $689.58, Lindsey sued State Farm under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) for declarations regarding Pantoja’s liability, her damages, and her entitlement to UIM benefits. She also sued State Farm and its claims adjuster for Insurance Code violations, alleging bad faith in handling her claim.The trial court denied State Farm’s motions to abate the extracontractual claims and to quash the deposition notice of its corporate representative. The court of appeals denied State Farm’s mandamus petitions without substantive explanation. State Farm then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying State Farm’s motions. The court ruled that extracontractual claims must be abated until the insured obtains a favorable judgment on the UIM coverage, as these claims are dependent on the right to receive UIM benefits. The court also held that discovery on extracontractual matters is improper before establishing entitlement to UIM benefits. Additionally, the court found that State Farm had demonstrated that the deposition of its corporate representative was not proportional to the needs of the case, given the lack of personal knowledge and the burden of the proposed discovery.The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted State Farm’s petition for writ of mandamus, ordering the trial court to vacate its previous orders and grant State Farm’s motions to abate the extracontractual claims and to quash the deposition notice. View "IN RE STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

A Colorado real estate investment trust sued a Texas hedge fund and its employees for damages caused by an allegedly defamatory article published under a pseudonym. The claims were dismissed in Colorado federal court for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trust then sued in Texas state court. The defendants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) and for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. The trial court granted both motions.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the trial court lacked authority to grant the TCPA motion after it was overruled by operation of law and that the defendants failed to conclusively establish that collateral estoppel barred the claims. The appellate court determined that the Colorado court's findings on personal jurisdiction did not preclude the Texas claims and that the addition of new defendants in Texas further demonstrated that the issues were not identical.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It agreed with the appellate court that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on their collateral estoppel defense. However, it found that the appellate court erred in holding that the order granting the TCPA motion was void. The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that the trial court's error in granting the TCPA motion outside the statutory deadline was harmless because it occurred within the time frame in which the defendants could have appealed the denial by operation of law. The case was remanded to the appellate court to address the TCPA motion on its merits. View "FIRST SABREPOINT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. v. FARMLAND PARTNERS INC." on Justia Law

A railroad worker, Phillip Morgan, committed suicide after experiencing months of alleged harassment by his supervisor at Union Pacific Railroad Company. His wife, Kera Morgan, acting as the administrator of his estate, filed a lawsuit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), seeking wrongful death damages. She claimed that the harassment and stress from his job led to Phillip's emotional distress and eventual suicide.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, concluding that Phillip's injuries were emotional and not tied to a physical impact or near physical harm, thus falling outside the scope of FELA. The court held that FELA did not cover emotional injuries unless there was a physical impact or the worker was in imminent danger of physical harm.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that under the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail v. Gottshall, FELA incorporates common law limits on compensable injuries. The court concluded that Phillip's emotional injuries, which led to his suicide, did not meet the "zone of danger" test established in Gottshall. This test requires that the worker must have been in immediate risk of physical impact or harm to recover for emotional injuries under FELA. Since Phillip's injuries were purely emotional and not tied to any physical impact or imminent threat of physical harm, the court ruled that FELA did not provide coverage for his case. View "Estate of Morgan v. Union Pacific Railroad Company" on Justia Law

Shannon Reed arrived at Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle's emergency room with severe chest pain, nausea, shortness of breath, and numbness in his left arm. Dr. Keith McCoy ordered several tests, including EKGs and Troponin measurements. Despite Reed's fluctuating pain levels, he was discharged with a diagnosis of unspecified chest pain and instructions to follow up with a cardiologist. Reed died later that night. Oliver Miller, on behalf of Reed's wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed medical negligence claims against the hospital, United Emergency Services, and Dr. McCoy.The Lowndes County Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact for the jury to determine. The defendants argued that Miller's claims failed due to lack of causation, as affidavits from cardiologists indicated they would not have admitted Reed even if consulted. The court found that Miller's experts provided sufficient evidence of breaches in the standard of care that could have contributed to Reed's death.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's denial of summary judgment in part, while reversing and rendering in part. The court held that Miller failed to establish causation for the claim that Dr. McCoy should have admitted Reed to the hospital, as the on-call cardiologists would not have admitted him. However, the court found that Miller's other claims, including improper discharge and failure to report pain increase, presented genuine issues of material fact. The case was remanded to the Lowndes County Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "United Emergency Services of Mississippi, Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

Dr. William Partin filed a lawsuit against Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. and Dr. Daniel Eichenberger after he resigned from his position. Partin alleged that Baptist and Eichenberger retaliated against him in violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) and brought claims under Indiana law for breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, and defamation. The dispute arose from Partin's treatment of a suicidal patient, J.C., in Baptist's emergency department, where Partin ordered procedures against J.C.'s will, leading to complaints from hospital staff.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of Baptist and Eichenberger. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that Partin engaged in EMTALA-protected activity or that he was retaliated against for such activity. The court also determined that Partin's breach of contract claim failed because the bylaws did not create a contractual relationship between Partin and Baptist, and his resignation was not under duress. Additionally, the court found no evidence to support Partin's claims of tortious interference with contract or defamation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Partin did not engage in EMTALA-protected activity and that his belief in reporting a potential EMTALA violation was not objectively reasonable. The court also agreed that the bylaws did not create a contract between Partin and Baptist and that Partin's resignation was voluntary. Furthermore, the court found that Baptist's actions were justified and not malicious, and that the statements made by Eichenberger and Marksbury were protected by qualified privilege and not made in bad faith. View "Partin v Baptist Healthcare System, Inc." on Justia Law

Sydney Walton, a fourteen-year-old, suffered a concussion and other head injuries during an indoor soccer practice at a Baltimore County-owned facility. The plaintiffs, her family, alleged that the defendants, including Premier Soccer Club, Inc., its coach, and several Baltimore County employees, were negligent in violating a Maryland statute designed to ensure that parents, players, and coaches in youth sports are informed about the risks of concussions and best practices for preventing and handling them.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the negligence claim based on the statutory violation. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the alleged statutory violations proximately caused Sydney's injuries. The plaintiffs appealed, but the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not establish the necessary causation-in-fact.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. The court held that to establish a prima facie case of negligence based on a statutory violation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a statute designed to protect a specific class of persons that includes the plaintiff and that the violation proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. The court emphasized that proximate cause requires evidence of both causation-in-fact and legal causation. The plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the statutory violations were the cause-in-fact of Sydney's injuries, and thus, the summary judgment in favor of the defendants was upheld. View "Walton v. Premier Soccer Club" on Justia Law

In 2003, Sarah Ramey underwent a urethral dilation performed by Dr. Edward Dunne, which resulted in severe pain and subsequent debilitating medical conditions. Over the next fourteen years, Ramey sought medical advice from numerous doctors to determine the cause of her ailments. In 2017, Drs. Mario Castellanos and Lee Arnold Dellon linked her symptoms to the 2003 procedure. Ramey filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dunne and Foxhall Urology in 2019.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bifurcated trial to determine if Ramey’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The jury found that Ramey failed to file her suit within the three-year statute of limitations. Ramey then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in its rulings and jury instructions. The trial court denied her motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ramey’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Ramey had received medical opinions linking her symptoms to the urethral dilation before 2017. The court also found that Ramey waived her claim regarding the jury instructions by affirmatively agreeing to them during the trial.However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based on the improper invocation of inquiry notice by appellees’ counsel during rebuttal closing arguments. The court found that the trial court’s corrective instruction was insufficient to mitigate the prejudicial impact of the improper argument. Consequently, the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Ramey v. Foxhall Urology, Chartered" on Justia Law

New England Country Foods, LLC (NECF) alleged that VanLaw Food Products, Inc. (VanLaw) intentionally undercut its business by promising to replicate NECF’s popular barbeque sauce and sell it directly to Trader Joe’s. NECF sued VanLaw in federal court, claiming tortious interference and other claims. The district court dismissed the case based on a clause in their manufacturing contract that limited damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court whether a contract clause that substantially limits damages for intentional wrongdoing is invalid under Civil Code section 1668.The district court dismissed NECF’s complaint, reasoning that the contract allowed only for direct damages and injunctive relief, while NECF sought lost profits, attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages. The court rejected NECF’s argument that section 1668 prevents limiting damages for future intentional conduct, stating it only prevents contracts that completely exempt parties from liability. NECF amended its complaint, but the district court dismissed it with prejudice, citing that parties may limit liability for breach of contract and that the contract did not bar all money damages but limited them to specific types NECF did not suffer. NECF appealed, and the Ninth Circuit sought guidance from the California Supreme Court.The California Supreme Court held that limitations on damages for willful injury to the person or property of another are invalid under section 1668. The court reasoned that the statute’s language and purpose, along with the policy against willful tortious conduct, support this interpretation. The court clarified that section 1668 does not preclude parties from limiting liability for pure breaches of contract absent a violation of an independent duty. The court’s decision ensures that parties cannot contractually limit their liability for intentional torts. View "New England Country Foods v. Vanlaw Food Products" on Justia Law

Two former police officers, Mark Zukowski and Joshua Ruggiero, were injured in the line of duty and subsequently awarded both accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits and workers' compensation benefits. The ADR benefits exceeded the workers' compensation benefits, resulting in an offset of the latter. The key issue in this case was whether attorney’s fees should be calculated before or after applying the statutory offset under Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act.The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded Zukowski and Ruggiero workers' compensation benefits, but these were largely offset by their ADR benefits. The Commission calculated attorney’s fees based on the reduced, post-offset amount of workers' compensation benefits. Zukowski and Ruggiero argued that attorney’s fees should be calculated based on the total award before applying the offset, contending that the terms "compensation" and "benefits" in the relevant statutes should be interpreted differently.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County affirmed the Commission’s decision, agreeing that attorney’s fees should be calculated after applying the offset. The court found no distinction between "compensation" and "benefits" in this context and held that attorney’s fees are a lien on the compensation actually payable to the claimant.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the terms "compensation" and "benefits" are interchangeable in this context, meaning that attorney’s fees should be calculated based on the amount of workers' compensation benefits payable after applying the statutory offset. The Court emphasized that the attorney’s fees are a lien on the compensation awarded, which is the amount actually payable to the claimant after the offset. The Court also rejected the argument that this interpretation was unconstitutional, noting that attorneys voluntarily enter into contingency fee arrangements and are aware of the statutory framework governing such fees. View "Zukowski v. Anne Arundel Cnty." on Justia Law

A landlord operated a business renting homes and had a tenant who performed repair, maintenance, and improvement work in exchange for reduced rent and payment. The tenant fell while working on the roof of one of the rental units and filed a workers' compensation claim. The landlord denied an employment relationship and disputed the work-related injury.The Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations ruled in favor of the tenant, finding an employer-employee relationship. The landlord appealed, and the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) reversed the Director's decision, concluding there was no employment relationship under the control and relative nature of work tests. The tenant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which vacated parts of LIRAB's decision, instructing LIRAB to apply the substantial evidence standard instead of the preponderance of the evidence standard.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case. The court held that the landlord did not present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of an employment relationship under the relative nature of the work test. The tenant's work was integral to the landlord's rental business, and the tenant did not have a business of his own. Therefore, the court concluded that an employer-employee relationship existed, and the tenant's injury was covered under Hawai'i's workers' compensation laws. The court vacated LIRAB's decision and the ICA's judgment, remanding the case to LIRAB to compute compensation. The court also held that the landlord was not responsible for the tenant's attorney fees and costs. View "Borrson v. Weeks" on Justia Law