Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and three affiliates, historically involved in the manufacture and distribution of asbestos-containing talc, faced thousands of personal injury and environmental claims. Over the years, the companies divested their operating assets, notably selling them to Brenntag North America in 2004 while expressly excluding pre-sale asbestos and environmental liabilities. As liabilities mounted, one plaintiff obtained a large jury verdict in South Carolina and successfully moved to put Whittaker into receivership, with a receiver appointed to administer its assets.Following the South Carolina receivership, Whittaker's board authorized a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey without consulting the receiver. The receiver moved to dismiss the bankruptcy, arguing that under the receivership order, only he had authority to file such a petition. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, finding that the receivership order did not displace the board’s authority. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed this ruling. While bankruptcy proceedings moved forward, the Debtors negotiated a $535 million settlement with Brenntag to resolve successor liability claims. However, the Official Committee of Talc Claimants argued that certain product-line successor liability claims belonged exclusively to talc creditors and not to the bankruptcy estate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed two central issues. First, it held that the propriety of Whittaker’s bankruptcy petition did not affect the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction and that, under New Jersey law, the board retained authority to file for bankruptcy because the South Carolina receiver had not obtained recognition or ancillary receivership in New Jersey. Second, the court held that product-line successor liability claims, like other derivative claims based on injury to the debtor and available to all creditors, are property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ judgments. View "In re: Whittaker Clark & Daniels" on Justia Law

An employee of a Minnesota company purchased a third-party replacement battery for her cellphone through an online marketplace. The battery, sold by a Chinese company and shipped via the marketplace’s fulfillment program, malfunctioned and caused a fire, resulting in significant property damage. The employer’s insurer covered the loss and then pursued recovery from the online marketplace, the battery’s seller, and the manufacturer. The insurer’s claims against all parties except the online marketplace were eventually dropped.After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the insurer sought to have the court certify to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question of whether the online marketplace could be strictly liable for the defect under Minnesota law. The district court, however, declined to certify the question and instead made its own prediction (“Erie guess”) that Minnesota law would not hold the marketplace strictly liable for third-party goods it fulfills but does not sell.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the issue presented is novel, unsettled under Minnesota law, and implicates significant public policy concerns. The appellate court decided it was appropriate to certify the legal question to the Minnesota Supreme Court, rather than attempt its own prediction. The court certified the question of whether, under Minnesota law, an e-commerce company that allows an unrelated party to sell a defective product through its website and provides order-fulfillment services is strictly liable for harm caused by the defect. The Eighth Circuit stayed further proceedings pending the Minnesota Supreme Court’s response. The holding is that the court will certify this question to the Minnesota Supreme Court and not decide the merits of strict liability itself. View "Berkley Regional Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a decedent who developed and died from mesothelioma, a disease linked to asbestos exposure. The decedent encountered asbestos both during his employment with a state agency and the town of Manchester, as well as outside of work in various settings. After his death, his wife, acting as executrix of his estate, pursued and settled multiple product liability suits against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products. The settlement allocated a percentage of damages to the estate for personal injuries and death, and a portion to the spouse for loss of consortium. Subsequently, the plaintiff also sought and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, based on findings that occupational asbestos exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease.Before the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Commission, the administrative law judge determined that the decedent’s employers were entitled to a statutory lien under General Statutes § 31-293 (a) on the net settlement proceeds attributable to both occupational and nonoccupational asbestos exposure. The Compensation Review Board affirmed this decision. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the portion of the settlement related to nonoccupational exposure should not be subject to the employer’s lien because this exposure was not a work-related injury under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the lower board’s ruling. The court held that, because the decedent suffered a single occupational disease—mesothelioma—that was caused in substantial part by occupational exposure, the disease was fully compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, regardless of nonoccupational contributions. Thus, the employers’ lien under § 31-293 (a) extended to the net settlement proceeds from both occupational and nonoccupational exposures. The court also rejected the argument that a tortfeasor’s lack of an employment relationship with the decedent precluded application of the lien. View "Dodge v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

A helicopter manufactured in 1997 by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. was involved in a fatal crash in 2017 after an engine cowling came loose and struck the tail rotor. The pilot, working for a later owner, died in the accident. The pilot’s family brought suit against Bell, alleging that the flight manual was defective for failing to include an explicit warning about the dangers of flying with an unsecured engine cowling, even though the manual included a checklist item stating the cowling should be “Secured.” The physical cowling and its fasteners were original to the aircraft and had not been replaced or modified.Bell asserted that the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an 18-year statute of repose, barred the suit. The plaintiffs responded that the repose period had been reset because Bell periodically revised the flight manual in the years before the crash. The 270th District Court of Harris County denied Bell’s summary judgment motion without explanation. Bell then sought mandamus relief from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which denied the petition without a substantive opinion.The Supreme Court of Texas held that GARA’s 18-year clock is only reset when a “new” part or component, including a substantive revision to the flight manual, is added or replaced and is alleged to have caused the accident. Because the engine-cowling instruction in the manual, which was the alleged defect, had not been revised since 1997, and no relevant “new” part was implicated, the rolling provision of GARA did not apply. The court conditionally granted Bell’s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the district court to grant summary judgment for Bell, holding that GARA bars the suit and that mandamus relief was appropriate to prevent litigation Congress has expressly foreclosed. View "IN RE BELL HELICOPTER SERVICES INC." on Justia Law

A political action committee (SMP) created and broadcast a television advertisement during a 2017 Alabama Senate special election. The ad referenced news reports about allegations of sexual misconduct by the Republican nominee. In particular, two key statements appeared in consecutive frames: one stated that the nominee was “banned from the Gadsden Mall . . . for soliciting sex from young girls”; the other noted that “one he approached was 14 and working as Santa’s helper.” The ad ran over 500 times. The nominee, who lost the election, contended that the juxtaposition of these statements created the false and defamatory implication that he had solicited sex from the 14-year-old referenced.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the nominee sued for defamation and false-light invasion of privacy, focusing on the implication created by these two statements together. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found for the plaintiff on both claims and awarded $8.2 million in compensatory damages. The district court denied SMP’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether there was clear and convincing evidence that SMP acted with “actual malice,” as required under New York Times v. Sullivan, for defamation against a public figure. The court held that, in cases of defamation by implication, the plaintiff must show both that the defendant knew of or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the implication and that the defendant intended to communicate, or recklessly disregarded, the defamatory implication. The court found the evidence insufficient to meet this standard and reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for SMP. View "Moore v. Senate Majority PAC" on Justia Law

A hotel guest, who was staying at a lodge as part of a cruise package, fell in his bathroom after tripping over a raised shower ledge situated close to the toilet. He alleged that the bathroom’s configuration was unreasonably dangerous, and that the cruise line and hotel operator were negligent in constructing or maintaining that configuration. The guest asserted both a traditional maritime negligence claim and an alternative theory of negligence per se, arguing that the bathroom violated applicable plumbing codes.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for the defendants on both theories. Regarding the negligence claim, the district court ruled that the plaintiff had not provided evidence that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. On the negligence per se theory, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence that a plumbing code violation caused the plaintiff’s injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, because the defendants owned and constructed the lodge’s bathroom, there was no dispute that they knew or should have known the configuration existed. It found that the plaintiff’s expert evidence created a genuine dispute about whether the defendants knew or should have known that the configuration was unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the maritime negligence claim. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the negligence per se theory, concluding that a movable shower curtain did not violate the cited plumbing code. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on negligence per se and remanded the general negligence claim for further proceedings. View "PETREY V. PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD." on Justia Law

A long-term employee at an automotive manufacturing plant claimed she sustained cumulative trauma to her cervical and lumbar spine, both hands, both knees, and both shoulders from physically demanding and repetitive work over nearly twenty years. When the plant closed and she was laid off, she filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking permanent partial disability benefits. Conflicting medical evidence was presented: one doctor, retained by the claimant, attributed most of her injuries to her work, while two doctors, retained by the employer, found her conditions to be largely degenerative and unrelated to her employment. Ultimately, the administrative law judge found only her neck and bilateral shoulder conditions compensable and awarded her permanent partial disability benefits, enhanced by a statutory three-multiplier, based on a finding that she could not return to her pre-injury work.After the employer sought reconsideration, the administrative law judge clarified that only the shoulder and neck injuries were compensable but declined to further explain the basis for applying the three-multiplier. The employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which affirmed the finding of work-related injury but vacated the award of the enhanced benefits. The Board held that the judge’s findings supporting the three-multiplier lacked adequate evidentiary support and remanded for more detailed findings. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky agreed with the lower courts. It held that the Board did not err or exceed its authority by vacating the enhanced award and remanding for additional findings. The Court determined that the administrative law judge’s application of the three-multiplier was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion because it lacked sufficient support in the record. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "RUSSELL V. INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS" on Justia Law

Two business partners were traveling on Interstate 65 in Kentucky when their rental car hydroplaned during a heavy rainstorm, resulting in a crash that killed one partner and seriously injured the other. The decedent’s widow, on behalf of herself, her children, and her husband’s estate, along with the surviving partner, brought suit against the engineering firms responsible for the design of a highway-widening project completed years earlier. The plaintiffs alleged that the engineers negligently designed the widened highway, causing increased water pooling and a greater risk of hydroplaning in the area where the accident occurred.The Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the engineers, holding that they were immune from suit as contractors for a governmental entity and that the claims were preempted by federal law because the design complied with required state and federal standards. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that contractors do not automatically share the immunity of the state, that government approval of the design did not insulate the engineers from potential liability for negligent design, and that the state negligence and wrongful death claims were not preempted by federal law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that private engineering firms hired by a state agency are not entitled to the Commonwealth’s sovereign or derivative immunity simply by virtue of their contract. The court also found that summary judgment was inappropriate on the ground of the engineers’ work being “mandated” by the government because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the design was required or whether the engineers exercised independent judgment. Finally, the court held that Kentucky’s negligence and wrongful death claims were not preempted by federal law, as the state claims did not impose standards more stringent than those required by federal regulations. View "HMB PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, INC. V. IVES" on Justia Law

An employee of a railroad company suffered an ankle injury while descending stairs at her workplace. She claimed the injury occurred due to unsafe conditions maintained by her employer. The employee had a history of a preexisting foot condition and prior ankle surgery, but asserted she was asymptomatic before the workplace incident. After the incident, she underwent multiple surgeries and missed work, for which she received short-term disability payments from her employer’s plan.The District Court for Douglas County presided over a jury trial in July 2024. During trial, the court allowed evidence and argument regarding the employee’s preexisting condition, and permitted the jury to consider whether damages should be apportioned due to that condition. The court also excluded the employee’s expert's specific opinion about the number of work years lost, finding insufficient methodological foundation. Both parties moved for directed verdicts, which were denied. The jury found the railroad 5% at fault and the employee 95% at fault, awarding $287,600 in damages. The employee’s motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting erroneous jury instructions and exclusion of expert testimony, were denied. The railroad’s post-trial motion to reduce the verdict by the employee’s fault percentage and to set off disability payments was also denied.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the jury instructions correctly stated the law under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), and there was sufficient evidence to submit questions of comparative fault and apportionment to the jury. The court found no error in the exclusion of the expert’s specific lost worklife expectancy opinion, due to lack of reliable methodology. The court also concluded that the employer’s disability plan language did not entitle the railroad to a setoff from the jury award. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Cramer v. Union Pacific RR. Co." on Justia Law

The case involved a medical negligence and wrongful death claim arising from care provided to a resident at a county-owned skilled nursing facility in Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the decedent’s personal representative and surviving spouse, alleged that substandard care by the facility’s staff caused fatal injuries. The suit was initiated against several entities purportedly associated with the facility, but only two remained as defendants after some were dismissed for procedural reasons.After the complaint was filed in the District Court for Merrick County, the primary remaining defendant, identified as Litzenberg Memorial Long Term Care, moved to dismiss the case. The defendant argued that the complaint failed to demonstrate compliance with the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act’s presuit notice requirement, claiming that notice was not properly served on the appropriate official. Before the court ruled on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to clarify factual allegations regarding compliance with presuit notice and to correct the defendant’s name. The proposed amendment included details suggesting that the Merrick County clerk was an appropriate recipient for notice, and asserted that the defendant should be estopped from contesting notice due to representations made by the clerk.The district court denied the motion for leave to amend and granted the motion to dismiss, finding the amendment would be futile because the notice had not been properly served. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that under the applicable procedural rule, the plaintiffs were entitled to amend their complaint once as a matter of course prior to any responsive pleading. The court held that filing a motion for leave to amend did not waive this right. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that the plaintiffs be allowed to amend their complaint. View "Cyboron v. Merrick County" on Justia Law