Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Catherine Kuo was killed while volunteering at a food distribution event organized by the Dublin Unified School District (DUSD). Her family and estate sued DUSD for negligence and premises liability, alleging failure to implement and communicate safety protocols. DUSD moved for summary judgment, arguing that Labor Code section 3364.5, which deems school volunteers as employees entitled to workers' compensation benefits, barred the plaintiffs' claims.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, granted DUSD’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that section 3364.5 applied, providing that workers' compensation was the sole remedy for any injury, including death, sustained by volunteers while performing their duties. The court found that the statute's plain language and legislative history supported this interpretation, and thus, it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the term "any injury" in section 3364.5 unambiguously includes fatal injuries. The court also determined that DUSD’s resolution, which declared volunteers entitled to workers' compensation benefits, satisfied the statutory requirement, even though it did not explicitly use the word "deemed." The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the statute did not apply because DUSD did not treat its volunteers as employees in practice, noting that the statute did not require such conduct.The appellate court concluded that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of DUSD, affirming that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs' claims. View "Kuo v. Dublin Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Roxanne Perez was shopping at a Circle K convenience store when she tripped over a store display of bottled water and injured herself. She sued Circle K for negligence and premises liability, claiming that the store had notice of the dangerous condition and failed to remedy it or warn her. Perez argued that Circle K owed her a duty of care as a business invitee to keep the store in a reasonably safe condition.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Circle K, finding that the store did not owe Perez a duty because the water display was an open and obvious condition. The court reasoned that Perez would have seen the display had she looked down, and therefore, it did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. The Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the Superior Court's decision in a divided opinion.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and concluded that whether the store display was an unreasonably dangerous condition is not relevant to the issue of duty. The court held that Circle K owed Perez a duty of care as a business invitee to keep the store in a reasonably safe condition. The determination of whether the display was unreasonably dangerous pertains to whether Circle K breached its duty, not whether a duty existed. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion in part, reversed the Superior Court's summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perez v. Circle K" on Justia Law

Judy Brown, a biracial woman, was hired by Conagra Brands, Inc. in October 1997. After a workplace injury in 2015, she became disabled and filed a workers' compensation claim in 2017. Conagra temporarily transferred her to a different position as an accommodation and continued paying her at the higher rate until July 2020, when her work restrictions became permanent, and her pay was reduced. Following the death of a colleague, Conagra posted job openings, and Brown applied for a position but was not selected. She was assigned to less favorable shifts and subsequently filed discrimination charges. Brown was fired in December 2021 and sued Conagra, alleging race and disability discrimination, retaliation, and violation of Nebraska common law.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted Conagra’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Brown did not challenge the district court’s finding that her race and disability discrimination claims based on the July 2020 pay reduction were time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal, finding that Brown failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claims. Specifically, she did not provide enough details to infer race discrimination, did not plausibly allege a disability under the ADA or NFEPA, and did not establish a causal connection for her retaliation claims. Additionally, the court found that Brown did not state a plausible claim for common law unlawful retaliation, as she did not allege any immediate precipitating events or facts that could infer a causal nexus between her workers' compensation claim and the adverse employment actions. View "Brown v. Conagra Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

Cedric Galette initiated a negligence action against Julie McCrey and New Jersey Transit (NJ Transit) in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Galette alleged that he was injured when a vehicle operated by McCrey, in which he was a passenger, was struck by an NJ Transit vehicle. NJ Transit, an instrumentality of the State of New Jersey, filed a motion to dismiss the suit, invoking interstate sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion.NJ Transit appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. The Superior Court held that NJ Transit is not an instrumentality or arm of the State of New Jersey and, therefore, is not entitled to sovereign immunity protections. The court applied a six-factor test from Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority to determine NJ Transit's status and concluded that the factors did not support NJ Transit's claim to sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (Hyatt III) compels a conclusion that interstate sovereign immunity bars Galette’s suit against NJ Transit. The court held that NJ Transit is indeed an arm of the State of New Jersey, emphasizing the statutory classification of NJ Transit as an instrumentality of the state, the degree of control the state exercises over it, and its core function of providing public transportation, which is a governmental function. Consequently, the court reversed the Superior Court's judgment, resulting in the dismissal of Galette’s suit against NJ Transit. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings regarding Galette’s claims against McCrey. View "Galette v. New Jersey Transit" on Justia Law

Karrie and Howard Gurwood filed a lawsuit against GCA Services Group, Inc. after Karrie slipped and fell on a freshly waxed floor at her workplace, resulting in serious injuries. The Gurwoods claimed negligence on the part of GCA and sought damages, including punitive damages. At trial, the court granted GCA's motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages, and the jury found both Karrie and GCA each fifty percent at fault. The jury awarded Karrie the exact amount of her past medical expenses but found in favor of GCA on Howard's loss of consortium claim.The Gurwoods appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict on punitive damages and raised five other issues. The Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict on punitive damages, finding it dispositive of the appeal, and remanded for a new trial. GCA then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the directed verdict on punitive damages but modified the remand instructions. The Supreme Court held that requiring a retrial on all issues would be contrary to law and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the other five grounds raised by the Gurwoods. The Supreme Court clarified that if the Court of Appeals finds no error on the other grounds, the case should proceed to a new trial on punitive damages only, unless GCA requests a new trial on all issues under subsection 15-32-520(A) of the South Carolina Code. View "Gurwood v. GCA Services Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff K.C. alleged that she was sexually abused while in foster care under the custody of the County of Merced. The abuse occurred in two separate foster homes between 1971 and 1977. K.C. claimed that she reported the abuse to her social worker, but no corrective action was taken, resulting in continued abuse. She filed a complaint citing negligent acts and omissions by the County and its employees, which she argued proximately caused her injuries.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the County's demurrer without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of K.C.'s complaint with prejudice. The court found that the County and its employees were protected by discretionary immunity under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.2, which shield public employees and entities from liability for discretionary acts.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the social workers' decisions regarding the investigation of child abuse and the continuation of foster home placements were discretionary acts protected by immunity. The court emphasized that these decisions involved the exercise of judgment and policy considerations, which are shielded from liability to ensure that public employees can perform their duties without fear of civil suits. Consequently, the County was also immune from liability under the derivative immunity provided by Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b). View "K.C. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law

Philip Sanders filed a petition in the District Court for Creek County, alleging that Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC caused the wrongful death of his wife, Brenda Jean Sanders, during her confinement in the Creek County Jail. Brenda Sanders was booked into the jail on October 17, 2016, and her health deteriorated over four weeks. She was transported to a hospital on November 20, 2016, diagnosed with severe sepsis and other conditions, and died the next day.The District Court granted Turn Key's motion to dismiss Sanders' petition, citing immunity under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, and allowed Sanders thirty days to amend his petition. Sanders did not amend and appealed the dismissal. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the District Court's order, but Turn Key filed a petition for certiorari to review the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that Sanders' appeal was premature as it challenged an interlocutory order, and appellate jurisdiction was absent. The Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and withdrew it from publication. The Court recast Sanders' petition in error as an application to assume original jurisdiction and a petition for prohibition. The Court concluded that the Governmental Tort Claims Act makes licensed medical professionals "employees" of the state when under contract with city, county, or state entities and providing medical care to inmates or detainees. The Court assumed original jurisdiction and denied the petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Sanders v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC" on Justia Law

Kattie Boline sustained injuries from a car accident and sued JKC Trucking and driver Jerzy Syrzyna for negligence. During her jury trial, Boline violated a stipulated order in limine by mentioning insurance, which led the district court to declare a mistrial. The court found her violation intentional and sanctioned her by ordering her to pay $62,074.95 in defense attorneys’ fees and costs. The court also ruled that no new jury trial would be held until the sanction was paid. When Boline failed to pay, the district court dismissed her case with prejudice and entered judgment against her for the sanction amount.The district court of Sweetwater County initially handled the case, where Boline filed her complaint in 2018. The case experienced several delays before being set for trial in August 2022. During the trial, Boline’s mention of insurance, despite a pretrial order prohibiting such testimony, led to the mistrial. The district court then sanctioned her and conditioned a new trial on the payment of the sanction. Boline’s inability to pay the sanction led to the dismissal of her case with prejudice.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Boline and dismissing her case with prejudice. The court found that the district court properly considered Boline’s mental health condition, financial situation, and the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs. The Supreme Court also held that the district court did not violate Boline’s right to open access to the courts under the Wyoming Constitution, as the sanction and subsequent dismissal were appropriate responses to her intentional violation of the court’s order. View "Boline v. JKC Trucking" on Justia Law

Crystal Walcott Spill's estate and beneficiaries filed a wrongful death suit against several doctors, including Dr. Steven Paganessi and his medical group, alleging negligence during a surgical procedure that led to Spill's death. Spill, who had lupus, was under the care of Dr. Jenny Diep, a New York-based rheumatologist, and Dr. Jacob Markovitz, a New Jersey-based gynecologist. Before the surgery, Dr. Diep increased Spill's blood pressure medication dosage and recommended she see a nephrologist. Spill saw Dr. Holly Koncicki, a New York-based nephrologist, who conducted lab tests but did not receive the results before the surgery. Spill suffered a cardiac event during the procedure and died the same day. The lab results, available after her death, showed critically elevated creatinine and potassium levels.The trial court dismissed Dr. Diep from the case due to lack of personal jurisdiction and denied the defendants' motion to include her on the verdict form for fault allocation. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that an out-of-state individual over whom New Jersey courts lack personal jurisdiction cannot be included for fault allocation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, with modifications. The Court held that an individual outside New Jersey's jurisdiction is not a "party" under the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA) for fault allocation purposes. However, such an individual may be considered a joint tortfeasor under the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law (JTCL), allowing defendants to seek contribution in a relevant jurisdiction if a judgment is rendered against them. The Court did not agree with the Appellate Division's view that the model civil jury instruction on causation mitigates any unfairness to the defendants. View "Estate of Spill v. Markovitz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who were allegedly sexually assaulted or harassed by Uber drivers, filed individual lawsuits against Uber Technologies, Inc. across various districts. They claimed Uber failed to take reasonable measures to prevent such misconduct, asserting negligence, misrepresentation, products liability, and vicarious liability. Plaintiffs argued that Uber was aware of the issue since at least 2014 but did not implement adequate safety measures, such as proper background checks, emergency notifications, and effective responses to complaints.The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) centralized these cases in the Northern District of California for coordinated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Uber opposed the centralization, arguing that their terms of use included a collective action waiver that precluded such a transfer and that the cases did not share sufficient common factual questions to warrant centralization. The JPML found that the cases did involve common factual questions and that centralization would eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve resources.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Uber's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the JPML's order. The court held that Uber had not demonstrated that the JPML committed a clear error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. The court found that the JPML acted within its broad discretion in determining that the cases presented common questions of fact and that centralization would promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions. The court also rejected Uber's argument regarding the collective action waiver, stating that Section 1407 grants the JPML the authority to centralize cases regardless of private agreements to the contrary. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Uber's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION" on Justia Law