Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a vehicular collision that occurred in a construction zone on Interstate 10 in LaPlace, Louisiana. The plaintiff, Frank Cushenberry, was driving a commercial vehicle when he collided with a truck owned by Barber Brothers Contracting Company, LLC. The truck was partially in the right lane of the highway while backing up to move traffic cones. The collision resulted in significant injuries to Mr. Cushenberry, including a traumatic brain injury.The case was initially heard in a lower court, where the jury found Barber Brothers 100% at fault for the accident and awarded substantial damages to Mr. Cushenberry, his wife, and their two minor children. Barber Brothers appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and that the jury erred in finding Barber Brothers solely at fault.The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the trial court did err in its jury instructions, but that this error was not reversible. The court also found that the jury erred in finding Barber Brothers solely at fault for the accident. The court determined that Barber Brothers was 80% at fault and Mr. Cushenberry was 20% at fault.The court also found that the jury abused its discretion in awarding general damages of $10,750,000.00 to Mr. Cushenberry, and loss of consortium damages of $2,500,000.00 to his spouse, Robin Cushenberry, and $1,500,000.00 to each of their minor children. The court reduced these awards to $5,000,000.00 in general damages to Mr. Cushenberry, and loss of consortium damages of $400,000.00 to Mrs. Cushenberry and $100,000.00 to each child.As amended, the trial court judgment was affirmed. View "BARBER BROTHERS CONTRACTING COMPANY, LLC VS. CAPITOL CITY PRODUCE COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Angela Pickard and others who sued Amazon.com, Inc. after a battery charger purchased from Amazon's online marketplace malfunctioned, causing a fire that resulted in the death of Archie Pickard. The charger was sold by a third-party seller, Jisell, not Amazon. However, Jisell used Amazon's optional service, "Fulfillment by Amazon," which meant that the product was stored in an Amazon warehouse and delivered by Amazon. The plaintiffs claimed that Amazon was liable under the Louisiana Products Liability Act and for negligent undertaking.The case was initially heard in the Western District Court of Louisiana. Amazon filed a motion for summary judgment, and in response, the court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana: whether Amazon was a "seller" under Louisiana products-liability law, and under what circumstances Amazon could be liable for injuries sustained by the purchaser of a defective product based on a theory of negligent undertaking.The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, the operator of an online marketplace is a "seller" of third-party products sold in its marketplace when the operator did not hold title to the product but had physical custody of the product in its distribution warehouse and controlled the process of the transaction and delivery. The court also held that an operator may be liable for injuries if, subject to standards established by the court’s precedent, the operator assumed a duty to identify and remove unreasonably dangerous products from its marketplace. The court applied Section 324A of the Restatement of Torts Second to determine if an operator of an online marketplace assumed a duty owed by a third-party seller and is liable for any damages caused by the breach of that duty. View "ANGELA PICKARD VS. AMAZON.COM, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a products liability action against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) for an alleged negligent design of a seat-belt system in a 2011 Honda Odyssey. The plaintiff, Sarah Milburn, was severely injured in a car accident while riding in an Uber vehicle, a 2011 Honda Odyssey. Milburn was seated in the third-row middle seat, which had a ceiling-mounted detachable Type 2 anchor system for the seat belt. Milburn fastened her seat belt incorrectly, leaving her lap unbelted. The accident resulted in Milburn becoming a quadriplegic.The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Milburn based on the jury's verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals held that legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings that the presumption of nonliability applied and that the presumption was rebutted.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals’ judgment. The court held that the presumption of nonliability applied as a matter of law because the 2011 Odyssey’s design complied with mandatory federal safety standards that were applicable to the Odyssey at the time of manufacture and governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm. The court further held that the presumption was not rebutted, as no evidence supports the jury’s finding that the federal safety standards failed to adequately protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury. Therefore, the court rendered a take-nothing judgment for Honda. View "AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. v. MILBURN" on Justia Law

Derek Mesenbring, an employee of Industrial Fumigant Company, LLC (IFC), died after inhaling a toxic dose of methyl bromide at work. His widow, Melissa Mesenbring, sued IFC and its parent company, Rollins, Inc., for wrongful death. Rollins, as IFC's parent company, had some authority over IFC's revenue goals and certain expenditures, and also leased IFC's facility. However, IFC managed its own day-to-day operations, including safety and regulatory departments, and trained its employees on the safe use of fumigants like methyl bromide.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court but was moved to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Mrs. Mesenbring dismissed IFC from the suit due to workers' compensation benefits she was receiving, leaving Rollins as the sole defendant. Rollins moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for IFC's acts under Illinois law. The district court granted Rollins' motion, ruling that Rollins did not specifically direct an activity that made the accident foreseeable, nor did it control or participate in IFC's use of and training on methyl bromide, thus foreclosing direct participant liability. Mrs. Mesenbring appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that under Illinois law, a parent company is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless it specifically directs an activity where injury is foreseeable. The court found that Rollins did not surpass the level of control typical of a parent-subsidiary relationship and did not specifically direct or authorize IFC's use of or training on methyl bromide. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Rollins foresaw that safety would be compromised as a result of its budgetary restrictions over IFC. Therefore, the court concluded that Rollins could not be held liable for IFC's acts under a theory of direct participant liability. View "Mesenbring v. Rollins, Inc." on Justia Law

Joel Phillip McNinch, Jr., a dementia patient with other serious health issues, was admitted to Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC in June 2019. He was later admitted to Merit Health Rankin due to combative behaviors related to his dementia. He developed a decubitus ulcer and was admitted to St. Dominic Hospital, where he died the next day. His widow, Cheryl McNinch, requested her husband's medical records from Brandon Nursing and Merit Health soon after his death and received them in mid-December 2019. She filed a complaint in January 2022, alleging negligence, medical malpractice, gross negligence, and reckless disregard, claiming that substandard care had accelerated her husband's health deterioration and led to his death.The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Mrs. McNinch argued that the discovery rule operated to toll the statute of limitations until she received the medical records. The trial court converted the defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion without holding a hearing.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Supreme Court held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mrs. McNinch had knowledge of negligent conduct through personal observation or other means prior to or at the time of Mr. McNinch’s death. The court found that the discovery rule could operate to toll the statute of limitations when the medical records are necessary to discover the negligence. The court concluded that Mrs. McNinch exercised reasonable diligence in requesting the medical records promptly, and therefore, the complaint was filed within the statute of limitations. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "McNINCH v. BRANDON NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER" on Justia Law

The case involves Somsak Limprasert, a patient diagnosed with COVID-19 and acute hypoxic respiratory failure, who was transferred to PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas, LLC, for rehabilitation and treatment. While at PAM, Limprasert, who was bedridden and unable to stand without support, was assisted by PAM's workers to rise from his bed. However, they unexpectedly let go of him while he was in a standing position, causing him to fall and suffer injuries. Limprasert filed a complaint against PAM, asserting claims for negligence and abuse of the vulnerable, and alternatively, under Nevada’s medical malpractice statutes. However, he failed to attach a supporting declaration from a medical expert to his complaint.The district court found that Limprasert’s claims were of professional negligence, requiring a supporting declaration from a medical expert. As Limprasert filed his complaint without the supporting declaration and the erratum was not filed at the same time as the complaint, the district court granted PAM’s motion to dismiss. Limprasert appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the decision, finding that the district court erred by dismissing Limprasert’s complaint. PAM petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for judicial review.The Supreme Court of Nevada determined that Limprasert’s claims were of professional negligence, requiring an affidavit under Nevada law. However, the court concluded that Limprasert’s expert declaration complied with the law, and the district court therefore erred by dismissing his complaint for noncompliance. The court reversed the dismissal of Limprasert’s professional negligence claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Dana Cheng, a New York resident and political commentator, against Dan Neumann and Beacon, a Maine news outlet, for characterizing Cheng as "far-right" and a "conspiracy theorist" in an article. Neumann and Beacon sought dismissal of the case under both federal law and a New York anti-SLAPP law, which applies to meritless defamation lawsuits. The district court conducted a choice-of-law analysis, decided that New York law applied, and granted the motion to dismiss under New York's anti-SLAPP statute.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court's ruling but for a different reason: it decided that Cheng's lawsuit had to be dismissed under binding First Amendment principles protecting free speech by the press. Back at the district court, Neumann requested attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of New York's anti-SLAPP law. The district court denied Neumann's request after determining that Maine, not New York, law applied to the specific issue of attorneys' fees.Neumann appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court, noting the lack of clear controlling precedent on the issue, certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine the question of which state's law applies to the attorneys' fees issue. View "Cheng v. Neumann" on Justia Law

The case involves Sherold D. Roaf, who was rear-ended by Francisco Ortiz, an employee of Medstar. Roaf sued Ortiz for negligence and Medstar for both vicarious liability for Ortiz's negligent driving and direct liability for Medstar's negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Ortiz. Roaf sought compensatory and economic damages but did not seek punitive damages. Medstar admitted liability for the incident but did not move to dismiss the negligent hiring claim. Instead, it sought to prevent Roaf from introducing Ortiz’s personnel record and driving history, arguing that such evidence would be irrelevant and could improperly influence the jury. The trial court denied the motion, allowing Roaf to pursue both theories of liability.The Superior Court in Maricopa County allowed the case to proceed to trial, where Roaf's counsel introduced evidence of Ortiz's driving record and Medstar's hiring policy. The jury found Roaf's full damages to be $4.625 million, allocating 40% fault to Ortiz and 60% to Medstar. Medstar moved for a new trial, arguing that the negligent hiring claim was superfluous and had allowed Roaf to put prejudicial evidence before the jury. The court denied the motion, finding that the evidence of Ortiz’s driving history had no unfair influence and that the damage award was supported by other evidence.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, agreeing that the jury’s award was appropriate based on the evidence and that Medstar failed to show that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing the separate claims of negligent hiring and vicarious liability to go to the jury.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that because Medstar admitted liability, it was wholly responsible for Roaf’s damages. Therefore, evidence of liability relating to the negligent hiring claim should have been precluded. The court also found that Medstar suffered prejudice because of the erroneous admission of Ortiz’s personnel record and driving history. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "ROAF v REBUCK CONSULTING" on Justia Law

Ricky Hughes, a railroad employee, was injured twice at work during his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. He did not disclose these potential personal injury lawsuits to the bankruptcy court. About 19 months after his bankruptcy closed, Hughes filed a personal injury lawsuit against his employer and other defendants. The district court granted summary judgment against Hughes based on standing and judicial estoppel, as he had not disclosed the potential lawsuit in his bankruptcy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that Hughes had standing to bring the lawsuit. The court reasoned that the claims vested with Hughes, as per Section 1327 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that estate assets vest with the debtor. The court rejected the defendants' argument that Section 554(d), which provides that undisclosed estate assets that have not been expressly abandoned remain property of the estate, should control.The court also applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which prevents a party from asserting a position in a case that is clearly inconsistent with a position it took in a previous case. The court found that judicial estoppel applied to claims arising from the first incident but not the second. The court reasoned that when Hughes was injured for the second time, he had already made all of the payments required under his five-year plan, and there was no permissible statutory basis to modify the plan. Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not rely on the second nondisclosure, and there was no risk of inconsistent court determinations or threats to judicial integrity. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hughes v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the murder of Sallie Copeland Evans by her grandson, Isaiah Evans Ceasar, a lance corporal in the United States Marine Corps. Sallie's son, Mitchell Garnet Evans, acting as the executor of her estate, filed a wrongful death claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Marine Corps was negligent in its handling of Ceasar, who had previously expressed suicidal intentions and violent tendencies. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the district court had erred in dismissing the claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because the jurisdictional question and the merits of the case were inextricably intertwined. However, the court also found that Evans failed to state a wrongful death claim under North Carolina law. The court concluded that even if the Marine Corps had a duty to Sallie, her murder was not foreseeable under the circumstances. Therefore, while the district court's decision was procedurally incorrect, it was substantively proper. The court affirmed the district court's decision on alternative grounds and dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Evans v. US" on Justia Law