Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this toxic tort action, the plaintiffs claimed they were exposed to a carcinogen emitted from a plant operated by the defendants, Terumo BCT, Inc. and Terumo BCT Sterilization Services, Inc. To support their claim, the plaintiffs' counsel provided an expert with a spreadsheet detailing where each plaintiff lived and worked and when. The defendants demanded that the plaintiffs produce not only the spreadsheet but also any communications between the plaintiffs and their counsel that contained the information used to create the spreadsheet. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that such communications were privileged and beyond the scope of disclosures required by C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2). The district court granted the defendants' request and ordered the plaintiffs to produce the information.The plaintiffs sought relief under C.A.R. 21, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that the district court erred in both respects. The court held that the attorney-client privilege does apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The court made its rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Jordan v. Terumo BCT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over who should pay for the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits of Justin Childers, who was severely injured in a car accident. Initially, Childers' PIP benefits were covered by American Fellowship Mutual Insurance Company, but the company was declared insolvent in 2013. The Michigan Property and Casualty Guaranty Association (MPCGA) then assumed responsibility for Childers' PIP benefits. The MPCGA, after an investigation, concluded that Progressive Marathon Insurance Company was next in line to provide Childers' PIP benefits. However, Progressive denied Childers' claim.The trial court granted summary disposition to Progressive, ruling that while the actions were not time-barred, Progressive was not within statutory priority for Childers' benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the one-year limitations period did not apply because the MPCGA is not generally subject to the no-fault act, and the MPCGA did not bring the action under the no-fault act. Instead, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the MPCGA’s right to proceed against Progressive came from the guaranty act, which allows the MPCGA to claim reimbursement from another insurer in the chain of designated priority insurers.The Michigan Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals. It held that the one-year limitations period in MCL 500.3145(1) applies where either an insured or the MPCGA brings an action for PIP benefits against a lower priority no-fault insurer after the higher priority insurer becomes insolvent. The court concluded that both the action brought by Childers' conservator and the MPCGA's action were time-barred. The court reversed part of the Court of Appeals' opinion, vacated the remainder, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Childers v. Progressive Marathon Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a products-liability claim brought by Jennifer Parks, individually and as the guardian of Samuel Gama, against Ford Motor Company. Gama suffered serious injuries when his 2001 Ford Explorer Sport rolled over. Parks alleged that the Explorer's design made it unstable and prone to rollovers, and that the design of its roof and restraint system increased the risk of injury in a crash. Ford moved for summary judgment, arguing that Parks’ suit is foreclosed by the statute of repose in Section 16.012(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which requires that a products liability action be brought within 15 years of the sale of a product.The trial court's proceedings were protracted and winding, with the court initially granting Ford’s summary-judgment motion, then vacating that order and granting Parks’ motion for new trial, then denying Ford’s renewed summary-judgment motion, then denying Ford’s motion for reconsideration of that order, before finally granting another summary-judgment motion by Ford. The evidence that Ford sold the Explorer to a dealership more than 15 years before Parks filed suit was overwhelming.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Ford did not conclusively establish the 'date of the sale' from which section 16.012(b)’s claimed protection ran. The court reasoned that Ford was required to establish the specific date on which the dealership paid Ford for the Explorer in full and that Ford has not done so.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that the timing of a sale does not turn on the date of payment, and any inconsistency in Ford’s evidence regarding the timing of the dealership’s payment to Ford for the Explorer is immaterial and not a basis for denying or reversing summary judgment. The court concluded that Ford's evidence easily meets the test of proving that the sale must have occurred outside the statutory period, and thus, Ford is entitled to summary judgment. View "FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. PARKS" on Justia Law

Salvador Garcia, a garbage truck driver, filed a negligence lawsuit against the City of Omaha under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) after his truck fell into a sinkhole on a city street, causing him injuries. The City of Omaha claimed sovereign immunity under a provision of the PSTCA that generally immunizes political subdivisions from liability claims relating to localized defects in public thoroughfares unless they have actual or constructive notice of the defect and a reasonable time to repair it. The City argued that it did not have such notice.The City of Omaha filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting its sovereign immunity. The District Court for Douglas County denied the City's motion, finding that while the City had made a prima facie case that it lacked actual or constructive notice of the defect, Garcia had met his burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment. The City appealed this decision.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the City had met its initial burden by showing that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the defect. However, the court also found that Garcia had met his burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had actual or constructive notice of the defect. The court concluded that the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact whether the City received actual or constructive notice of the defect in a public thoroughfare. If the City had received notice within a reasonable time to allow it to make repairs prior to the incident, it would not be immunized under the relevant provision of the PSTCA. View "Garcia v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Jacob Marion, a minor, was struck and injured by a train operated by Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company while he was walking down the railroad tracks listening to music. The train's conductor and engineer saw Marion walking with his back to the train from a distance of about three-quarters of a mile. They sounded the train's horn when they were approximately 18 seconds away from Marion, but he did not respond. The emergency brake was applied only one second before the train struck Marion. Marion's guardian brought a negligence action against the railroad company and its employees. The defendants argued that the collision was not caused by their negligence but by Marion's failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary disposition, noting that they had attempted to alert Marion of the train's approach and that Marion was old enough to understand the dangers of trains. The plaintiff appealed this decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that a train engineer has a duty to stop or slow down when a person in the train’s path fails to respond to a warning signal. The defendants then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that when a train operator sees a person on the tracks, there is a presumption that the person will move to a place of safety. However, when it becomes apparent that the person will not or cannot get out of the way, that presumption is overcome, and the train operator has a duty to take steps to avoid a collision. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants were negligent, and therefore, summary disposition was not warranted. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Marion V Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a civil dispute arising from an automobile collision. The plaintiff, David Audish, and the defendant, David Macias, were both found negligent in the operation of their vehicles, which resulted in a collision. The jury found that each party's negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to Audish. Audish suffered damages amounting to $65,699.50, including past medical expenses, past non-economic losses, and future medical expenses. The jury assigned each party 50 percent of the responsibility for these losses.The case was initially filed in the Superior Court of San Diego County. The jury returned a special verdict finding both Audish and Macias negligent in the operation of their vehicles. The jury found that Audish had incurred past medical expenses, past non-economic losses, and would have future medical expenses, but did not award any damages for future non-economic losses. Audish moved for a partial new trial on the issue of damages, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's findings that he had no past or future lost earnings. The trial court denied the motion for a partial new trial and entered judgment in accordance with the verdict.The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California. Audish argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he would have Medicare medical insurance at the age of 65. He also contended that the jury returned an impermissible compromise verdict and erred by failing to award him damages for future non-economic losses. The appellate court rejected these claims and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The court found no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings and concluded that the award of zero future non-economic damages was proper. The court also found that Audish had not established an impermissible compromise verdict. View "Audish v. Macias" on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action initiated by Torrey Kath against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms. After the parties filed a "Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice," the district court dismissed the case. Kath then filed a separate declaratory judgment action against Agraria Insurance Company, doing business as Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), seeking an order that FUMIC had a duty to indemnify Prochnow under an insurance policy. While FUMIC's motion in the declaratory judgment action was pending, Kath and Prochnow filed a "Joint Rule 60 Motion to Vacate Dismissal with Prejudice" in the original case, seeking an amended judgment.The district court had previously dismissed the case with prejudice. However, Kath and Prochnow filed a motion to vacate the dismissal, which the court granted. FUMIC then filed a motion to intervene, arguing that Kath and Prochnow were seeking to impair its rights. The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on FUMIC's intervention motion because the case had been dismissed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed with the district court's decision. The court noted that Kath and Prochnow's motion to vacate the dismissal re-invoked the district court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, FUMIC's intervention motion initiated a special proceeding, which also invoked the court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider FUMIC's motion to intervene. The case was remanded for the district court to decide on FUMIC's motion to intervene and, if necessary, to conduct additional proceedings consistent with its disposition of the motion. View "Kath v. Prochnow" on Justia Law

The case involves Potomac Comprehensive Diagnostic & Guidance Center, Inc. (Potomac), a residential behavioral health center in West Virginia, and two former residents, L.K. and D.S., who were represented by their guardian and conservator, Kelly Young. The plaintiffs alleged that they were abused and neglected by Potomac staff members while residing at the facility for approximately five months spanning the years 2013 and 2014. They asserted claims for negligence and unlawful discrimination in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act.The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of Hardy County, where the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. Potomac appealed the decision, arguing that the lower court erred in several ways, including denying its pre-trial motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Potomac is a “place of public accommodations” under the Human Rights Act, and admitting evidence at trial pertaining to the abuse of other children who resided at Potomac and the results of a 2014 investigation of that abuse.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that Potomac is not a “place of public accommodations” under the Human Rights Act and that the lower court erred by not granting summary judgment to Potomac on this issue prior to trial. The court also found that the lower court committed reversible error by admitting the 2014 investigative reports in their entirety into evidence at trial. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court’s final order and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Potomac Comprehensive Diagnostic & Guidance Center, Inc.v. L.K., By Her Guardian and Conservator, Young" on Justia Law

Jake Johnson, an electrician, was injured while working on a construction project in a building owned by Property Reserve, Inc. (PRI) and managed by CBRE. Johnson was employed by PCF Electric, a subcontractor hired by Crew Builders, the general contractor for the project. Johnson filed a complaint against PRI, CBRE, Crew, and PCF for damages. PRI and CBRE moved for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which generally protects entities that hire independent contractors from liability for injuries sustained by the employees of the independent contractor. The trial court denied the motion, finding a triable issue of fact as to when PRI and CBRE hired Crew for the project.The trial court's decision was based on the execution date of the written contract between PRI, CBRE, and Crew. The court found that there was a triable issue of fact as to when PRI and CBRE hired Crew for the project. The court also granted Crew’s and PCF’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that the Privette doctrine barred Johnson’s claims against them.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, disagreed with the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that a written contract is not required to invoke the Privette doctrine, and the undisputed facts established that PRI and CBRE delegated control over the tenant improvements to Crew prior to Johnson’s injury. The court also found that no exception to the Privette doctrine applied. The court concluded that no triable issues of material fact precluded summary judgment and granted PRI and CBRE’s requested relief. View "CBRE v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case involves a personal injury claim and the question of whether an adult child can claim loss of parental consortium when the parent has not died but has entered a persistent vegetative state and will not recover. The plaintiffs, including the adult child of the individual now in a persistent vegetative state, argued that a previous case, Masaki v. General Motors Co., allowed for a parent to recover damages for the loss of filial consortium of an injured adult child, and that this should extend to an adult child's claim for loss of parental consortium. The defendants, a group of healthcare providers, argued that a previous case, Halberg v. Young, held that no action exists in favor of a child for injuries sustained by the parent not resulting in the parent’s death.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the reasoning of Masaki would apply to the loss of parental consortium presented in this case. The court also found that the Halberg case was distinguishable factually from the current case, as it involved a parent who would recover from their injuries, unlike the parent in the current case who was in a persistent vegetative state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the lower court's decision, overruling Halberg to the extent that it held that a child cannot claim loss of parental consortium where a parent is severely injured but not killed. The court held that a child, whether a minor or an adult, may bring a loss of parental consortium claim for severe injury to a parent. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "HELG Administration Services, LLC v. Department of Health" on Justia Law