Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Vonzell Scott was shot while waiting in his car at a Wendy’s drive-thru in Chicago around 3:00 am on December 31, 2018. Scott had a brief altercation with another driver, but it ended peacefully. Shortly after, two armed individuals approached Scott’s car and opened fire, injuring him. Scott sued Wendy’s, alleging negligence for not providing overnight security guards, which he claimed could have prevented the shooting.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Wendy’s. The court found that while Wendy’s owed a duty to protect Scott from intentional third-party assaults, the specific shooting incident was so aberrant that Wendy’s failure to provide security guards did not proximately cause Scott’s injury. The court concluded that the shooting was unforeseeable and that additional security would not have prevented it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the extreme, isolated, and unprovoked nature of the shooting made it unforeseeable as a matter of law. The court noted that while there was evidence of prior crimes in the area, none were similar to the shooting Scott experienced. The court concluded that Wendy’s could not have reasonably foreseen the attack, and therefore, the lack of security guards did not proximately cause Scott’s injury. The court emphasized that the foreseeability of an injury is context-dependent and that the specific type of violence Scott endured was not reasonably foreseeable based on the prior incidents. View "Scott v Wendy's Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Ms. Rajmonda Mile attended her daughter’s wedding at Kirkbrae Country Club on September 9, 2018, where she allegedly slipped and fell. She filed a lawsuit against Kirkbrae in Providence County Superior Court and requested any photographs or videotapes of the incident. Kirkbrae acknowledged possessing a surveillance video of the incident but claimed it was protected under attorney work product privilege, referencing the case Cabral v. Arruda.The Superior Court denied Ms. Mile’s motion to compel the production of the video, agreeing with Kirkbrae’s assertion that the video was protected under the work product doctrine. Ms. Mile then sought review from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that the video was actual evidence of the incident and not created in anticipation of litigation.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the video was not protected under the work product privilege because it was recorded by Kirkbrae’s surveillance system at the time of the incident and not at the request of an attorney. The court emphasized that the burden of proving the applicability of the work product privilege lies with the party seeking to withhold the evidence. Since Kirkbrae failed to meet this burden, the trial justice’s denial of the motion to compel was deemed an error.The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the lower court to compel the production of the video. View "Mile v. Kirkbrae Country Club" on Justia Law

Judith Clinton filed a complaint in the Superior Court for Washington County against Chad Babcock, Lisa Nelson, Regina Foster Bartlett, and Caryn Sullivan, alleging defamation and other misconduct that caused her reputational damage, emotional distress, and monetary losses. Clinton later amended her complaint to include Maria DiMaggio and Toastmasters International, adding a breach of contract claim against the latter. The Superior Court allowed Clinton to file a second amended complaint but denied her third and fourth motions to amend.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to enforce a dismissal stipulation and vacated a scheduling order. Clinton, who had been representing herself after unsuccessful attempts to secure new counsel, signed a Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal with all defendants, which was filed on December 13, 2022. Subsequently, the defendants filed a Stipulation of Dismissal on December 27, 2022, without notifying Clinton, who then alleged fraudulent conduct. The trial justice initially vacated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal and scheduled a trial date but later reconsidered this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly reinstated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal, noting that the agreement was binding and could not be set aside without the consent of all parties, absent extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or mutual mistake. The court found no evidence of duress or other factors that would justify vacating the agreement. The Supreme Court also upheld the trial justice's decision to treat the defendants' motions as motions to reconsider, given the lack of proper notice to the defendants at the initial hearing. View "Clinton v. Babcock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Perry Spriggs was struck by a U.S. Postal Service vehicle while riding his bicycle on Calliope Street in New Orleans on March 23, 2022. On March 23, 2023, Spriggs faxed his medical records and a signed Standard Form 95 (SF-95) to the Postal Service, addressed to Tara D. Lennix, a Louisiana District Tort Claims/Collections Specialist, at the correct fax number. Spriggs received a fax confirmation stating successful transmission. On March 22, 2024, Spriggs filed a lawsuit against the United States for personal injury and property damage from the accident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Spriggs’s claims with prejudice, granting the United States' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found no affirmative evidence of receipt of the SF-95 by the Postal Service, relying on declarations from Postal Service employees stating they did not receive the fax. The court also dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) due to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for presentment to the agency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in disregarding the fax confirmation sheet as probative evidence of presentment under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The Fifth Circuit held that a fax confirmation sheet indicating successful transmission to the correct recipient is probative evidence that the FTCA’s presentment requirement has been satisfied. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Spriggs v. United States" on Justia Law

Kimberly Montoya filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Aaron Fowler, alleging that he failed to call a "code stroke" when she exhibited signs of a stroke while under his care. As a result, a CT scan was delayed, leading to severe disabilities. Montoya argued that immediate action would have mitigated her damages. She requested a burden-shifting jury instruction, asserting that it was impossible to prove the extent of her damages due to the absence of a timely CT scan.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Montoya's request for the burden-shifting instruction, reasoning that such an instruction was not appropriate in cases involving omissions and that Montoya's ability to establish damages was not significantly impaired. Montoya then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that if Montoya could present evidence that Dr. Fowler was negligent in failing to order a CT scan, that a CT scan followed by a thrombectomy could have mitigated her damages, and that the CT scan was critical to establishing causation, then public policy requires shifting the burden to Dr. Fowler to prove that his negligence did not cause her damages. The court issued a writ of mandate instructing the lower court to vacate its ruling denying the requested jury instruction, allowing the trial court to reconsider the instruction based on the evidence presented at trial. Montoya was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Montoya v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Kathy Ryan was driving northbound on Highland Springs Avenue and attempted to make a left turn into a parking lot across three lanes of oncoming traffic. The first two lanes of traffic had stopped to allow her to turn, but the third lane, where Trisha Drury was driving, had not. Ryan did not see Drury's car and turned without stopping, resulting in a collision. Drury claimed she developed severe pain and lack of mobility in her arm and neck following the accident.Drury filed a lawsuit for motor vehicle negligence against Ryan in the Superior Court of Riverside County. The case went to trial, and the jury found in favor of Ryan, determining she was not negligent. Drury then filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred by not giving a negligence per se instruction based on Vehicle Code section 21801, which requires drivers turning left to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic. The trial court denied the motion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court's refusal to give a negligence per se instruction was prejudicial error. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ryan violated Vehicle Code section 21801 by not stopping to check the third lane before completing her turn. The court concluded that the jury was likely misled by the lack of a negligence per se instruction, which could have changed the outcome of the trial. As a result, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Drury v. Ryan" on Justia Law

William Campbell, a guest at the Windsor Court Hotel in New Orleans, was robbed and injured in the hotel’s courtyard on Christmas Day, 2008. He filed a lawsuit against the hotel and associated entities, alleging negligence and strict liability due to the hotel’s failure to provide adequate security and maintain a safe environment.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Campbell failed to prove the hotel had a legal duty to protect him from the specific criminal act. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, citing genuine issues of material fact regarding the foreseeability of the incident and the hotel’s duty to protect its guests.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and conducted a de novo review. The court reaffirmed that an innkeeper has a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect guests from criminal acts of third parties. However, it found that the scope of this duty did not encompass the specific harm Campbell suffered. The court noted that there had been no prior criminal activity at the hotel in twenty years, and Campbell’s own actions—approaching an unknown vehicle and displaying a large sum of money—were unforeseeable and contributed to the incident.The Supreme Court of Louisiana vacated the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that while the hotel owed a duty to provide a reasonably safe environment, the scope of this duty did not include the risk of harm Campbell encountered due to his own actions. View "CAMPBELL VS. ORIENT-EXPRESS HOTELS LOUISIANA, INC." on Justia Law

In November 2019, Kathleen Welch was admitted to Tulane Medical Center for acute pancreatitis and diabetic ketoacidosis. After her discharge, she was admitted to BridgePoint Healthcare for rehabilitation, where she developed pressure ulcers. She was later transferred to United Medical Physical Rehabilitation Hospital, where her condition persisted. Welch filed a claim for injuries related to her pressure ulcers, naming BridgePoint and United Medical as defendants. United Medical, not being a qualified healthcare provider under the relevant statute, faced a lawsuit alleging negligence.United Medical filed an exception of no cause of action, citing La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i), which limits liability to gross negligence or willful misconduct during a public health emergency. The trial court granted the exception, applying the gross negligence standard but did not rule on the statute's constitutionality. Welch appealed, and the appellate court upheld the trial court's application of the statute but remanded the case for a ruling on its constitutionality. On remand, the trial court found the statute constitutional, and Welch sought supervisory review.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i) is constitutional, as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest in ensuring access to healthcare during a public health emergency. The court found that the statute does not violate the Louisiana Constitution's due process or access to courts provisions and is not a prohibited special law. The statute's application to all healthcare providers equally and its rational basis for limiting liability during emergencies were key factors in the court's decision. View "WELCH VS. UNITED MEDICAL HEALTHWEST-NEW ORLEANS L.L.C." on Justia Law

A fourteen-year-old boy, Tanner Smith, was vaccinated against COVID-19 at his school clinic without his or his mother Emily Happel's consent. The school clinic, operated in partnership with Old North State Medical Society (ONSMS), administered the vaccine despite lacking the required parental consent. Plaintiffs, Smith and Happel, sued the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS for battery and violations of their state constitutional rights.The Superior Court of Guilford County dismissed the case, agreeing with the defendants that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, granting them immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PREP Act's broad immunity shielded the defendants from liability for all of the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the PREP Act's immunity only covers tort injuries and does not bar state constitutional claims. The court concluded that the PREP Act does not preempt claims brought under the state constitution, specifically those related to the right to control a child's upbringing and the right to bodily integrity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the battery claim but reversed the dismissal of the state constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Jahn Patric Kirlin and Sara Louise Kirlin filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Christian William Jones, Dr. Barclay A. Monaster, and Physicians Clinic Inc. d/b/a Methodist Physicians Clinic – Council Bluffs. Jahn Kirlin experienced severe neck pain and headaches, and despite seeking medical help, an MRI was delayed. Dr. Monaster, who had returned from treatment for alcohol abuse, refused to order an MRI, and Kirlin later suffered a stroke after a chiropractic adjustment. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants altered medical records and that Dr. Monaster was intoxicated during treatment.The Pottawattamie County District Court initially dismissed the case due to a defective certificate of merit. The plaintiffs refiled with a new certificate, but the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed this decision, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed.Upon remand, the district court did not set new deadlines, leading to confusion about the applicable expert certification deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment again, arguing the plaintiffs missed the deadline. The district court agreed, finding no good cause to extend the deadline, and granted summary judgment to the defendants.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion by not finding good cause for the plaintiffs' delayed expert certification. The court noted the confusion about deadlines, lack of prejudice to the defendants, the plaintiffs' diligence, and the defendants' actions. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kirlin v. Monaster" on Justia Law