Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Six women who were formerly incarcerated at the Jasper City Jail in Alabama alleged that they suffered repeated sexual abuse by jailers, primarily by one officer, while serving as inmates. The plaintiffs described a range of sexual assaults and harassment, with one plaintiff also alleging abuse by a second jailer. The jail operated under the authority of the City of Jasper’s police chief, with a chief jailer and other supervisory staff responsible for daily operations. Jail policies expressly prohibited sexual contact between staff and inmates, and there were procedures for reporting grievances, but the plaintiffs claimed these mechanisms were ineffective or inaccessible.After the alleged abuse, the Alabama State Bureau of Investigation began an inquiry, leading to the resignation of the primary alleged abuser and, later, his indictment on state charges. The plaintiffs filed six separate lawsuits, later consolidated, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth Amendment violations against the police chief, chief jailer, and the City, as well as claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). One plaintiff also brought claims against a second jailer. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding insufficient evidence that the supervisory officials or the City had knowledge of, or were deliberately indifferent to, the alleged abuse, and that the claims against one jailer failed for lack of proper service.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between the actions or inactions of the supervisory officials or the City and the alleged constitutional violations, as there was no evidence of a widespread custom or policy of tolerating sexual abuse, nor of deliberate indifference or failure to train. The court also found that certain claims were time-barred and that the TVPRA claims failed due to lack of evidence that the City knowingly benefited from or had knowledge of the alleged trafficking. View "Bridges v. Poe" on Justia Law

An 84-year-old man with a history of dementia was admitted to a hospital after several falls and subsequently transferred to a nursing home for rehabilitation. His wife, acting as his “Authorized Representative,” signed an optional arbitration agreement as part of his admission paperwork. During his stay, the man developed a pressure wound that became septic, leading to his removal from the facility and subsequent death. The wife, as personal representative of his estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home and its administrator, alleging medical negligence and asserting that the man was incompetent and unable to make decisions for himself at the time of admission.The Mobile Circuit Court reviewed the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, which was based on the signed agreement. The wife opposed the motion, arguing she lacked authority to bind her husband to arbitration because he was permanently incapacitated due to dementia. She provided medical records and her own affidavit to support her claim of his incapacity. The defendants countered with evidence suggesting the man had periods of lucidity and was not permanently incapacitated. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration and later denied a postjudgment motion by the defendants that included additional medical records.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It held that the wife did not meet her burden to prove the man was permanently incapacitated or temporarily incapacitated at the time the arbitration agreement was executed. The Court found that the evidence showed the man had lucid intervals and was at times alert and able to communicate, and that no contemporaneous evidence established incapacity at the time of signing. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case, holding that the arbitration agreement was enforceable. View "Mobile Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Sliman" on Justia Law

A young man named Marques stole a car from his grandmother’s auto body shop after she briefly left him unattended inside the locked premises. The car, a rental vehicle managed through a partnership with Hertz, was taken without permission. Several days later, Marques crashed the car while driving with a passenger, Jalen, who suffered a traumatic brain injury. Over two years later, Jalen died from a fentanyl overdose. His parents filed wrongful death lawsuits, alleging that the brain injury led to Jalen’s death and seeking to hold Marques’s grandmother and her business liable for both vicarious and direct negligence.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of fact. The court determined that Marques was not an employee or agent of the auto body shop at the time of the incident, based on the grandmother’s declaration and deposition testimony. The court also found that the defendants owed no duty to protect Jalen from the theft and subsequent accident, as there were no “special circumstances” that would create such a duty under California law. The court excluded certain hearsay evidence offered by the plaintiffs, ruling it inadmissible.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court properly excluded the hearsay evidence and that there was no triable issue regarding employment or agency. It further held that, absent special circumstances, the owner of a vehicle has no duty to protect third parties from injuries caused by a thief’s use of a stolen vehicle, and no such circumstances were present here. The court also found no basis for direct negligence liability. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Murphy v. Pina" on Justia Law

The case concerns a lawsuit brought by the executor of an estate against a city, alleging that the city’s negligence in failing to address a hazardous tree led to a fatal accident. The estate claimed that the city owned the tree and had ignored repeated warnings about its dangerous condition, resulting in the decedent’s severe injury and subsequent death after a tree fell on him while he was riding a motorcycle on a city street.After the complaint was filed, the city submitted an answer denying the allegations and raising several defenses, including a general assertion that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. However, the city did not specifically assert political-subdivision immunity as a defense. The case experienced delays due to a judge’s recusal and the COVID-19 pandemic. As the case progressed, the estate pursued discovery and moved for partial summary judgment. The city failed to timely respond to discovery and only raised the political-subdivision immunity defense for the first time in an untimely motion for summary judgment, after the deadlines for dispositive motions had passed. The trial court struck the city’s motion and later denied the city’s request for leave to amend its answer to add the immunity defense, finding the delay unjustified and prejudicial.The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the city’s general assertion of failure to state a claim did not preserve the specific defense of political-subdivision immunity, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the answer. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed, holding that a party does not preserve the defense of political-subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 by merely asserting failure to state a claim, and that unjustified and prejudicial inaction supported the denial of leave to amend the answer. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Durig v. Youngstown" on Justia Law

A former school administrator, who frequently attended and commented at public school board meetings, was removed from a meeting by police after refusing to leave. She later sued the school board and officials for violations of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) and prevailed. Subsequently, a school board member filed an internal disciplinary complaint against another board member, attaching a narrative that included statements accusing the former administrator of perjury in the prior VFOIA litigation. Another board member, then chairperson, circulated this narrative and a related notice to the school board and superintendent. The former administrator obtained these documents and filed a civil complaint for defamation and defamation per se against the two board members.The Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk overruled the board members’ demurrers, which argued that they were immune from the defamation claims based on legislative, sovereign, and statutory immunity. The court found that the allegations in the amended complaint did not establish immunity at this stage. The board members sought interlocutory review of this decision.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo. It held that while disciplining a fellow board member is a legislative act protected by common law legislative immunity, the immunity does not necessarily extend to allegedly defamatory statements about a third party, such as the plaintiff, when those statements may not be integral to the legislative process. The Court also held that the board members, sued in their individual capacities, were not entitled to sovereign immunity for intentional torts like defamation. Finally, the Court found that statutory immunity under Code § 8.01-223.2 did not apply because the complaint sufficiently alleged that the statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brooks-Buck v. Wahlstrom" on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by a priest while attending a summer camp in the mid-1970s, which was managed by the defendants. At the time of the alleged abuse, New Hampshire law required minors to bring personal actions within two years after reaching the age of majority. The plaintiff, born in 1966, did not file his complaint before the limitations period expired in 1986. Decades later, the legislature amended the relevant statute, RSA 508:4-g, first to extend and then, in 2020, to remove the statute of limitations for personal actions based on sexual assault. The plaintiff filed his complaint in 2023, seeking to take advantage of the amended law.The Superior Court (Leonard, J.) dismissed the complaint, holding that the claim was time-barred because the statute of limitations had expired in 1986. The court further ruled that applying the 2020 amendment to revive the plaintiff’s claim would violate Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which prohibits retrospective laws. The plaintiff’s motion to reconsider was denied, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It assumed, without deciding, that the legislature intended the 2020 amendment to apply retroactively, but held that doing so would be unconstitutional. The court reaffirmed longstanding precedent that a defendant acquires a vested right to a statute of limitations defense once the limitations period has expired, and that this right cannot be abrogated by subsequent legislation. The court declined to overrule this precedent or to adopt a balancing test weighing the plaintiff’s right to recover against the defendants’ vested right. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the dismissal, holding that the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws precludes application of the amended statute to revive the plaintiff’s time-barred claim. View "Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester" on Justia Law

Daniel Cook, an independent contractor, was injured when he fell from an exposed, unguarded ledge while installing cabinetry in a second-story bathroom at a residential construction site owned by SMG Construction Services. Cook had previously observed the absence of a guardrail on the ledge and acknowledged this hazard in his deposition. At the time of the accident, he was moving backward toward the ledge while working. Cook sued SMG, alleging that the company failed to maintain a safe premises, which led to his injuries.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to SMG, finding that Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard and failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The court concluded that Cook’s knowledge of the exposed ledge was equal to SMG’s, and therefore, SMG owed him no duty to warn or protect against the risk. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that although Cook knew of the ledge, there was evidence that conditions at the site affected his ability to perceive the exact location and risk posed by the ledge. The appellate court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cook’s knowledge of the hazard was equal to or greater than SMG’s.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals had conflated actual and constructive knowledge, erroneously applying standards relevant to constructive knowledge. The Supreme Court held that Cook’s own testimony established his actual knowledge of the specific hazard—the unguarded ledge—that caused his injury. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the remaining elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses in light of Cook’s actual knowledge of the hazard. View "SMG CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC v. COOK" on Justia Law

The plaintiff in this case alleged that she developed uterine fibroids as a result of using chemical hair relaxer products manufactured by two companies over a period spanning from 1995 to 2014. She purchased and used different products from each manufacturer at various times, applying them every six to eight weeks, with a brief pause between 2001 and 2002. She was diagnosed with uterine fibroids in 2018 and filed suit in 2022, claiming that the products contained harmful chemicals that caused her injury.The Superior Court denied the manufacturers’ motions to dismiss her strict products liability claims, which were based on Georgia’s ten-year statute of repose for such actions. The manufacturers argued that the statute of repose began running from the date the plaintiff first purchased any product from each manufacturer, which would bar her claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that the statute of repose for all units sold by each manufacturer to the plaintiff began with the earliest sale to her, and thus her claims were time-barred.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine how the statute of repose under OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2) applies when a plaintiff alleges injury from multiple consumable products sold over time. The Court held that the statute of repose applies on a per-unit basis, meaning the ten-year period begins with the sale of each individual unit as new to the end user. Therefore, claims are not barred for units sold within ten years of the lawsuit, even if earlier units were sold outside that period. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision in part and remanded the case, allowing the strict liability claims to proceed for units sold within the statutory period. View "BURROUGHS v. STRENGTH OF NATURE GLOBAL, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman died after being treated at a hospital and left behind two minor children. Her mother took custody of the children following a juvenile court order that granted her authority over their care. The mother, acting as custodian, sent pre-suit notice to the health care providers she believed responsible for her daughter’s death, identifying herself as the “claimant authorizing the notice” but not mentioning the minor children. She later filed a wrongful death lawsuit, initially on her own behalf and on behalf of the children, but ultimately pursued the claim solely for the children.The Circuit Court for Anderson County first granted, then vacated, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding that the mother had substantially complied with the pre-suit notice requirements and that the omission of the children’s names did not prejudice the defendants. The court also found that while the children held the right to the claim, the mother was the claimant on their behalf. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision, holding that the pre-suit notice was deficient because it failed to identify the children as claimants, and that this failure prejudiced the defendants. The appellate court did agree that the mother had standing to bring the suit on behalf of her grandchildren.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(B), the “claimant authorizing the notice” is the person who asserts the right and formally approves giving pre-suit notice. Since the minor children could not act for themselves, their legal custodian was the proper person to authorize notice and file suit on their behalf. The Court concluded that the mother complied with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements and remanded the case to the circuit court. View "Denson ex rel. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge" on Justia Law

A husband and wife brought a lawsuit after the wife suffered a pelvic fracture during a forceps-assisted delivery performed by a doctor at a women’s health group. They alleged that the doctor failed to obtain the wife’s informed consent by not disclosing the risks associated with the procedure. The plaintiffs claimed that this omission violated Massachusetts law and sought damages for the resulting injury.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts handled the case initially. During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing that the plaintiffs had not made their experts available for deposition as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs did not respond to this motion, and the District Court granted it, excluding the expert testimony. The plaintiffs later failed to appear at a pretrial conference, citing email issues, and only addressed the missed conference, not the exclusion of their experts. The District Court declined to vacate its order striking the experts, finding the plaintiffs’ delay and lack of explanation unjustified. Subsequently, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to support the informed consent claim under Massachusetts law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider the order striking the expert witnesses, given the plaintiffs’ prolonged inaction and failure to address the underlying issues. The First Circuit also held that, under Massachusetts law, expert testimony was required to establish that the risk of pelvic fracture from a forceps-assisted delivery was more than negligible, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Meka v. Haddad" on Justia Law