Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the New York Legislature enacted Article 8-A of the Workers' Compensation Law to allow both employees and volunteers who participated in rescue, recovery, and cleanup operations at designated sites to seek compensation for health conditions resulting from exposure to hazardous materials. In this case, a volunteer who had received lifetime workers’ compensation benefits for conditions contracted during his service died in July 2016. His spouse filed a claim for death benefits with the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) more than two years after his death.A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge initially awarded death benefits to the claimant. However, after administrative review requested by the Uninsured Employers’ Fund, the WCB disallowed the award, concluding that the death benefits claim was untimely under Workers’ Compensation Law § 28’s two-year statute of limitations. The Board found that Article 8-A did not exempt such claims from the two-year limit, and that the claim was not for an occupational disease. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the statutory extension for filing claims under Article 8-A (Workers’ Compensation Law § 168) applies only to claims filed by “participants” themselves, not by their survivors or beneficiaries. The dissent would have remitted the matter for further proceedings under Workers’ Compensation Law § 163, regarding notice requirements.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that the statutory extension of time for filing certain claims under Workers’ Compensation Law § 168 applies solely to claims brought by statutorily defined “participants,” and not to claims brought by their survivors or beneficiaries. Consequently, the spouse’s claim for death benefits was barred by the two-year limitation period in Workers’ Compensation Law § 28. View "Matter of Garcia v WTC Volunteer" on Justia Law

A passenger at a metro station, who was noticeably intoxicated, accidentally fell from the station platform into a non-public area—a trough housing electrical equipment—after stumbling and attempting to sit on a narrow parapet. The fall resulted in immobilizing injuries that compromised his breathing. Although the station manager was required by operating procedures to perform visual inspections of the platform at set intervals, it is disputed whether those inspections were performed and whether they included checking behind the parapet. The passenger remained undiscovered for four days and died from asphyxiation. Experts opined he would have survived if found and aided promptly.The decedent’s parents and estate sued the transit authority for negligence and wrongful death in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the authority’s failure to discover and aid him aggravated his injuries and led to his death. The district court initially denied summary judgment for the transit authority, but later granted it on the grounds of contributory negligence, finding the decedent’s intoxication and actions barred recovery as a matter of law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that under District law, common carriers owe passengers a duty of care even where contributory negligence is present, but recognizing uncertainty as to whether this duty applies once a passenger becomes a trespasser by entering a non-public area involuntarily.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, answering a certified question from the D.C. Circuit, held that a passenger who unintentionally enters a non-public area becomes a trespasser. However, if the common carrier knows or has reason to know the trespasser is injured, trapped, or imperiled, it owes a duty of ordinary care—including a reasonable duty to aid—to prevent further injury. This duty is fact-specific and does not arise for undiscovered trespassers. View "Whiteru v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old driver, Elijah Henry, collided with Melanie Gilliland’s vehicle after running a red light, causing her severe injuries. At the time of the accident, Henry was being followed by Officer Matthew Harvey of the City of Pleasanton Police Department. Officer Harvey had entered a parking lot to investigate possible vehicle break-ins and, upon seeing Henry’s car leave the lot, made a U-turn to follow it. Henry, who had smoked marijuana earlier, accelerated away, fearing police interaction but denying any belief that he was being pursued for arrest. Officer Harvey did not activate his lights or siren and testified that he did not initiate a pursuit under the City’s vehicular pursuit policy.Gilliland sued both Henry and the City for negligence. The City asserted immunity under California Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which protects public entities from liability for damages caused by fleeing suspects if the entity has a compliant vehicular pursuit policy and provides regular training. The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding that neither an actual nor perceived pursuit occurred under the City’s policy definition. However, after a bench trial before a different judge, the court found the City immune, interpreting “pursued” in the statute according to its ordinary meaning rather than the policy’s definition, and concluded Henry believed he was being pursued.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that the definition of “pursuit” in the public entity’s vehicular pursuit policy governs both actual and perceived pursuits under section 17004.7. The court found the trial court erred by applying the ordinary meaning of “pursued” and reversed the judgment, remanding for further proceedings using the correct legal standard. The main holding is that statutory immunity under section 17004.7 depends on the policy’s definition of pursuit, not the word’s general meaning. View "Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton" on Justia Law

After a 22-year-old man was killed in a car accident caused by a drunk driver, his parents, who were no longer together, each filed separate wrongful death lawsuits. The mother and father’s cases were consolidated and settled before trial, but they could not agree on how to divide the settlement proceeds. The law firm holding the funds initiated an interpleader action to have the court determine the appropriate division. The parents had a complicated history, including periods of estrangement, custody disputes, and issues related to drug use and financial support.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately awarded 75% of the net settlement proceeds to the mother and 25% to the father. The court based its decision on findings that the father had failed to fulfill his parental and legal obligations, including not paying child support, misusing disability payments intended for the child, and engaging in illegal drug use with his son. The court found that the mother had provided more consistent emotional and financial support. The father appealed, arguing that he was entitled to half of the proceeds and that the court erred by considering his past conduct rather than the proper legal standard for wrongful death damages.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the district court erred by not applying the correct legal standard. The Supreme Court clarified that wrongful death damages are forward-looking and intended to compensate for the loss of future support, companionship, and other benefits the decedent would have provided. The court found that the district court improperly based its apportionment on the parents’ past conduct rather than their respective losses. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Rossman Law Group, PLLC v. Holcomb and Carraway" on Justia Law

Adria Snover, represented by her spouse and guardian ad litem, suffered permanent brain injury and entered a coma following complications during a cesarean section. She sued Dr. Aruna Gupta, Riverside Community Hospital, and another doctor, alleging negligent diagnosis and treatment. Before trial, Snover settled with the hospital for $2.5 million and with the other doctor for $1 million. The hospital’s settlement included $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son for waiving a potential future wrongful death claim. The case proceeded to trial solely against Dr. Gupta.A jury in the Riverside County Superior Court awarded Snover $17,458,474 in total damages: $7,458,474 in economic damages and $10 million in noneconomic damages. The jury found Gupta 15 percent at fault, the other doctor 80 percent, and a nurse 5 percent. After trial, the court applied the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) cap to the noneconomic damages, reducing them to $250,000, and then held Gupta liable for 15 percent of that amount ($37,500). For economic damages, the court used the Mayes rule, first applying the MICRA cap, then calculating the percentage of economic damages and applying that percentage to the settlement amounts, resulting in a setoff of $3,142,750. The court did not exclude the $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son from the setoff calculation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court correctly applied the MICRA cap before apportioning liability for noneconomic damages among health care providers, consistent with Gilman v. Beverly California Corp. and Rashidi v. Moser. The court also affirmed the use of the Mayes rule for calculating the economic damages setoff and found no abuse of discretion in including the $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son. The judgment was affirmed. View "Snover v. Gupta" on Justia Law

A patient underwent a laparoscopic bilateral tubal ligation and endometrial ablation performed by a physician at a women’s clinic. About a week after the procedure, she experienced severe abdominal pain and was hospitalized for sepsis. An exploratory surgery revealed a perforated small bowel, which was surgically repaired. The patient subsequently recovered.The patient filed a medical negligence lawsuit in the Hinds County Circuit Court against the clinic and the physician, attaching the required certificate of expert consultation to her complaint. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supporting their motion with an expert affidavit. The plaintiff did not timely file an expert affidavit or testimony in response. On the day before the scheduled summary judgment hearing, she filed a response without any expert affidavit. The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion and granted her an additional thirty days to obtain an expert affidavit. After she submitted an expert affidavit and a second hearing was held, the circuit court again denied summary judgment, finding that the competing expert affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment de novo and its grant of additional time for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that, in medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff must produce sworn expert testimony to survive summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide such testimony before the initial hearing and that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting additional time without a specific finding of diligence or good faith. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Lakeland Premier Women's Clinic, PLLC v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A woman with COVID-19 and multiple underlying health conditions was admitted to a hospital and then transferred to a skilled nursing facility for ongoing treatment. During her stay at the facility, she was under the care of a physician who prescribed various treatments for her COVID-19 infection. Despite these interventions, her condition deteriorated, and she developed additional complications, including pressure wounds and dehydration. After being discharged from the facility without hospice or home health arrangements, she was readmitted to the hospital, where her condition continued to decline. She was eventually discharged home under hospice care and died shortly thereafter. Her surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the facility and physician were negligent in her care.The District Court of Garfield County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they were immune from liability under both the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act and Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Limited Liability Act. The district court reasoned that the acts and omissions in question were incident to the provision of care for a COVID-19 patient and thus fell within the scope of the immunity statutes. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of immunity. The court found that the defendants failed to provide evidence establishing a causal relationship between the administration or use of covered countermeasures and the plaintiff’s injuries, as required for PREP Act immunity. Additionally, the court determined that the defendants did not meet the evidentiary burden to show the requisite impact under the state COVID-19 Act, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding gross negligence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AUSTBO v. GREENBRIAR" on Justia Law

A mother, acting on behalf of her mentally incapacitated adult daughter, brought suit against a hospital, its health partners, and a registered nurse after her daughter suffered an anoxic brain injury. The injury occurred when the nurse, while cleaning the patient, dislodged the patient’s cuffed tracheostomy tube, which had been placed to treat COVID-19 pneumonia. The tube was out for approximately seven minutes, resulting in cardiac arrest and brain injury. The patient had been admitted with COVID-19 and was receiving oxygen through the tracheostomy at the time of the incident.The defendants moved to dismiss the case in the District Court of Oklahoma County, arguing that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act provided them immunity from suit and liability, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court considered documentary evidence submitted by the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the district court, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the defendants were not immune from suit.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the cuffed tracheostomy was a “covered countermeasure” under the PREP Act, the claims had a causal relationship with the administration and use of that countermeasure, and the defendants qualified as “covered persons.” The court found that the PREP Act confers both immunity from liability and suit for such claims, except for willful misconduct, which must be brought exclusively in federal court. Therefore, Oklahoma courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "FRANKLIN v. OU MEDICINE" on Justia Law

The case concerns the medical treatment of a fifty-eight-year-old man who suffered a shoulder injury and subsequently died from septic shock, acute septic arthritis, metabolic acidosis, and renal failure. After his initial visit to the emergency department, he was diagnosed with rotator cuff tendinitis and cellulitis, and discharged with antibiotics. His condition worsened over several weeks, leading to multiple emergency department visits and consultations with various medical providers, including nurse practitioner Michael Collins. Collins attended to the patient on August 4-5, 2020, and discharged him after administering fluids and pain medication, advising follow-up with orthopedics. The patient returned to the hospital two days later in a deteriorated state, was diagnosed with sepsis and septic arthritis, and died shortly thereafter.The plaintiff, acting as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a medical malpractice action in the Massachusetts Superior Court against several providers, including Collins. The plaintiff submitted an offer of proof supported by medical records and expert opinion, alleging that Collins failed to meet the standard of care by not recognizing symptoms of septic arthritis, failing to order appropriate imaging and bloodwork, and not admitting the patient for further treatment. Collins and other defendants requested a medical malpractice tribunal under G. L. c. 231, § 60B. The tribunal found the plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability against Collins, leading to dismissal of the claims after the plaintiff did not post the required bond.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the tribunal’s decision. It held that the tribunal erred in finding the plaintiff’s offer of proof insufficient, as the expert opinion was factually based and rooted in the medical records, and adequately raised a legitimate question of liability and causation. The Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s claims against Collins to proceed without posting a bond. View "Bennett v. Collins" on Justia Law

After a fatal car accident involving a 2008 Lexus ES350, the driver, whose wife died in the crash, sued Toyota, alleging the vehicle was defective due to unintended acceleration. His case was added to a coordinated group of California state court proceedings (JCCP) involving similar claims against Toyota. The coordinated proceedings had established a Common Benefit Fund, requiring all plaintiffs whose cases resolved after a certain date to pay an 8 percent assessment from their recoveries. This fund compensated lead counsel for work that benefited all plaintiffs, such as shared discovery and expert work.The plaintiff’s case was coordinated with the JCCP in 2018. After settling with Toyota, he moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to exempt his case from the 8 percent assessment, arguing he did not use or benefit from the shared work product and that his case was factually distinct. The Committee overseeing the fund opposed, submitting evidence that the plaintiff’s original attorney had relied on common benefit materials and that the issues in his case overlapped with those in the coordinated proceedings. The trial court found the plaintiff had not met his burden to show he was entitled to an exemption and denied his motion for relief from the assessment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the order denying relief was appealable as a collateral order. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that neither he nor his counsel benefited from the common work product. The court found the assessment applied, as the plaintiff’s case fell within the scope of the coordination order and he did not prove entitlement to an exemption. The order requiring the 8 percent assessment was affirmed. View "Pruchnik v. JCCP4621 Common Benefit Committee" on Justia Law