Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Unity McGill was murdered on the dance floor of The Red Carpet Nightclub in St. Cloud, Minnesota, by three assailants who had previously been removed from the premises following an earlier assault but were permitted to reenter without adequate communication among staff or use of a metal detecting wand. The nightclub, operated by R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc., had policies to remove anyone involved in a fight, yet these protocols were not properly followed. McGill’s brother, Alvin Glay, acting as trustee for the next of kin, brought a wrongful death civil suit against R.C. under an innkeeper negligence theory, arguing that R.C. failed to use reasonable care to protect patrons.The Stearns County District Court denied summary judgment for R.C., finding that whether the attack was foreseeable was a close factual question suitable for a jury. At trial, the jury found R.C. negligent for failing to prevent McGill’s death but determined R.C.’s negligence was not the direct cause, and thus did not hold R.C. liable. Glay’s motion for a new trial was denied as to R.C.’s liability, but granted for damages against the assailants. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of a new trial on R.C.’s liability, finding the jury instructions on superseding intervening cause were confusing and prejudicial.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether the district court’s jury instruction on superseding intervening cause was erroneous and prejudicial. The Court held that Glay did not invite error in the instructions and that it was improper to instruct the jury on superseding intervening cause when the same conduct (the attack) was both the basis for innkeeper negligence and the alleged superseding cause. The jury instructions were found likely to confuse and mislead, and the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and ordered a new trial on R.C.’s liability. View "Glay vs. R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc." on Justia Law

An 11-year-old student, Therese, died by suicide at her father's home during her school’s winter break. Her parents brought claims against the school district, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and training of staff, failure to protect Therese from bullying, and inadequate response to her expressions of suicidal ideation. They argued the district failed to fulfill its duty to supervise students and to inform them of Therese’s condition. The parents also pursued a survival claim for Therese’s pre-death suffering, alleging harm occurred on campus due to the district’s negligence.The Superior Court of Solano County denied the school district’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact as to whether the district exercised reasonable care and whether Therese suffered injury on campus due to the district’s negligence. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District, determining that statutory immunity under Education Code section 44808 did not apply because there were factual questions about on-campus harm and failure to exercise reasonable care.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that under section 44808, the district is immune from liability for harms resulting from Therese’s off-campus suicide, as she was not under the district’s supervision at the time. However, the court determined that this immunity does not extend to the survival claim, which concerns alleged on-campus harm while Therese was under the district’s supervision. The appellate court ordered the trial court to grant summary adjudication in favor of the district on the wrongful death and related claims but allowed the survival claim to proceed. View "Vallejo City Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who was injured in an automobile accident caused by the defendant. More than a year after the accident, the plaintiff fell down a set of stairs at a party, fracturing her leg. She alleged that the injuries from the car accident, including a traumatic brain injury, caused ongoing symptoms such as migraines and episodes of syncope (fainting), which she claimed led to her later fall. The defendant disputed both the extent of injuries from the accident and the claim that those injuries caused the subsequent fall, suggesting instead that the plaintiff’s intoxication at the party was a significant factor.After a jury trial in the Rockingham Superior Court, the jury found the defendant liable for the car accident and awarded damages to the plaintiff for those injuries. However, the jury determined that the accident injuries did not cause or substantially contribute to the plaintiff’s later fall down the stairs. The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that there were errors in evidentiary rulings and in the conduct of defense counsel, but the trial court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court’s admission of the defendant’s expert testimony regarding the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content and its role as a contributing factor in the fall. However, the court reversed the trial court’s decision to limit the plaintiff’s cross-examination of the defense’s medical expert and its refusal to strike or provide a curative instruction for defense counsel’s references to missing witnesses during closing arguments. The Supreme Court held that these errors were prejudicial to the plaintiff. The court remanded the case for a new trial on damages for the automobile accident and on both liability and damages related to the subsequent fall. View "Rivas v. Ciecko" on Justia Law

The appellant brought a defamation action against two individuals, with whom he had prior romantic relationships. After those relationships ended, one defendant told others that the appellant had raped and abused her, while the other engaged in a broad social media campaign accusing the appellant of stalking, rape, threats, and violent behavior. These statements led to significant consequences for the appellant, including being confronted at his home by an armed group, being forced to leave his residence for months, being excluded from a local coffee shop, losing organizational affiliations and a speaking engagement, and being removed from shared office space.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. At the close of the appellant’s evidence, both defendants moved for directed verdicts, arguing that the appellant had failed to present evidence of reputational harm independent of his own testimony. The circuit court sustained the motions and entered judgment for the defendants, apparently on that sole ground. Four counts against one defendant related to agency were also dismissed; the appellant later abandoned those claims on appeal.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. It held that a plaintiff in a defamation action is not required to provide independent evidence of reputational harm, and that credible testimony by the plaintiff may suffice if it establishes actual injury to reputation. The court found that the appellant’s testimony regarding the consequences of the defendants’ statements was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find reputational damage. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed with respect to the abandoned agency-based counts, but was vacated as to all other counts. The case was remanded for a new trial on those remaining claims. View "Apperson v. Kaminsky" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who is a type 1 diabetic, received treatment from the defendants for foot pain following an injury. Over several visits in January 2017, the treating physician diagnosed cellulitis and prescribed antibiotics and pain medication, but did not diagnose a fracture. Subsequent evaluation by a podiatrist revealed a dislocated fracture and other breaks in the foot, which ultimately led to multiple surgeries and the amputation of the plaintiff’s left leg below the knee. The plaintiff alleged that the physician misdiagnosed his condition, causing him to continue using the injured foot and suffer further harm.A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court of Adams County, and after six days of testimony, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict for the defendants. During deliberations, the jury sent several notes to the court, including one from a juror who expressed personal belief in the physician’s negligence but agreed to sign the verdict for the defendants to end deliberations. The plaintiff’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on this note, but the trial court denied the motion, gave the jury a supplemental Prim instruction to guide further deliberations, and subsequently polled the jury after the verdict was reached. All jurors affirmed the verdict. The trial court also denied motions for a new trial and for additional polling of jurors.The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding no abuse of discretion. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial or refusing to conduct additional polling. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, upholding the verdict for the defendants. View "Schilling v. Quincy Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, S.C." on Justia Law

Jack Rose was a resident at Oakland Manor, a skilled nursing facility in Iowa. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Rose was hospitalized and later returned to the facility, where he was placed in precautionary isolation following public health guidance. After attending off-site medical appointments, he was again isolated but was subsequently hospitalized for a suspected stroke and tested positive for COVID-19. Rose died in the hospital, with COVID-19 listed as the immediate cause of death. A federal inspection later found Oakland Manor had failed to fully comply with recommended infection-control protocols, including inconsistent use of personal protective equipment and incomplete isolation measures.The plaintiffs, Rose’s sons, brought wrongful death and other related claims against Oakland Manor, alleging reckless and willful misconduct in failing to follow federal and state COVID-19 prevention guidelines. The Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County granted summary judgment in favor of Oakland Manor, holding that the plaintiffs' evidence—primarily a federal inspection report and an expert witness disclosure—did not establish reckless or willful misconduct as required to overcome statutory immunity provided to health care providers for COVID-19-related injuries. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding insufficient evidence of recklessness and, in addition, lack of qualified evidence regarding causation.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding recklessness or willful misconduct under Iowa Code section 686D.6(2). The Court vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals decision related to causation, holding that the deficiencies at Oakland Manor amounted at most to negligence, not recklessness, and thus statutory immunity applied. View "Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in Van Saun County Park, a 130-acre public space in Paramus, New Jersey, owned and operated by Bergen County. In April 2021, Andris Arias was rollerblading on a paved pedestrian path in the park when she fell into a pothole, sustaining significant injuries. Arias filed a negligence suit against Bergen County, alleging failure to maintain the path or warn visitors of hazards.The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, granted Bergen County’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Landowner Liability Act (LLA), N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2 to -10, immunized the County from liability for injuries arising from recreational activities on its premises. The Appellate Division affirmed this dismissal, finding that Van Saun Park's “dominant character” as open land for sport and recreation qualified it for protection under the LLA. The appellate court relied on precedent that the LLA’s immunity applies to properties with the dominant character of open recreational space, rather than to residential or suburban backyards.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed whether Bergen County was entitled to immunity under the LLA for the rollerblading accident. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling, holding that Van Saun Park is precisely the type of premises the Legislature intended to protect through the LLA. The Court clarified that the LLA should be liberally construed to encourage landowners to open their properties for recreational use without fear of liability, and that the “dominant character of the land” test is appropriate for determining immunity. Thus, Bergen County is immunized from tort liability for the accident under the LLA. View "Arias v. County of Bergen" on Justia Law

A woman suffered a below-the-knee amputation of her left leg after an accident involving a zero-radius-turn riding lawnmower manufactured by The Toro Company. The incident occurred when the mower, which could be disengaged from its hydrostatic braking system using "bypass pins," began rolling uncontrolled down a slope after the pins were not reset following an attempt to free the mower from a flower bed. The mower lacked an independent mechanical brake, a rollover protection system, and an ignition safety interlock that would have prevented operation with the bypass engaged. The injured woman, her spouse, and their minor child pursued damages for her injuries, claiming design defects and failure to warn.The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. During pretrial proceedings, the district court excluded all of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony as unreliable or irrelevant and granted summary judgment to Toro on all remaining theories. The court found that, without expert evidence, the plaintiffs could not establish their strict products liability or negligent design claims. It also dismissed the failure-to-warn claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed most of the district court’s evidentiary rulings but found that the district court did not address one expert’s opinions regarding the need for an independent brake. The appellate court held those opinions to be reliable and relevant, thus presenting genuine disputes of material fact regarding the absence of an independent brake. Consequently, it reversed the summary judgment for Toro on the strict products liability and negligent design claims related to the independent brake theory, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for trial. View "Hillman v. Toro Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over discovery between two companies engaged in mining operations in Peru and a group of law firms representing Peruvian plaintiffs who allege injuries from toxic exposure. The companies, seeking to defend themselves against these claims and pursuing a related criminal complaint in Peru alleging document falsification and other misconduct by a former attorney, Victor Careaga, filed an ex parte application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the Southern District of Florida. They sought discovery from Careaga, who had worked for the law firms and played a key role in recruiting plaintiffs. The law firms intervened, seeking protective orders to prevent disclosure of certain documents, asserting attorney-client privilege and work product protection.Previously, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, where the underlying personal injury cases (Reid and Collins) were pending, had denied the companies' discovery requests as to the active plaintiffs. When the companies sought discovery in Florida, the Southern District of Florida granted the application, which led to the disputed subpoena. The law firms then moved for protective orders, but the magistrate judge and the district judge found that the privilege claims were insufficiently supported—citing vague, bundled privilege logs, lack of individualized document identification, and inadequate supporting affidavits. The district court denied the motions for protective orders.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed only the Halpern law firm's appeal after the other intervenors voluntarily dismissed their appeals. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the protective order because Halpern failed to substantiate its privilege and work product claims with adequate evidence and document-specific explanations. The court also found that Halpern was not entitled to further process, such as in camera review or amendment of the privilege log, given these deficiencies. View "The Renco Group Inc. v. Napoli Shkolnik PLLC" on Justia Law

Harold Berk, while traveling in Delaware, suffered a fractured ankle and sought treatment at Beebe Medical Center, where Dr. Wilson Choy recommended a protective boot. Berk alleged that hospital staff improperly fitted the boot, worsening his injury, and that Dr. Choy failed to order an immediate follow-up X-ray, resulting in delayed treatment and the need for surgery. Berk, a citizen of another state, filed a medical malpractice suit in federal court against both the hospital and Dr. Choy under Delaware law.Delaware law requires that a medical malpractice complaint be accompanied by an affidavit of merit from a medical professional. Berk requested an extension to file this affidavit, which was granted, but ultimately failed to secure the required affidavit and instead filed his medical records under seal. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed Berk’s suit for failing to comply with Delaware’s affidavit of merit statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding the state law substantive and applicable in federal court because, in its view, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address the affidavit requirement.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Delaware’s affidavit of merit requirement does not apply in federal court. The Court reasoned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which governs the information a plaintiff must provide at the outset of a lawsuit, sets the standard for pleadings and does not require supporting evidence such as an affidavit. Because Rule 8 is a valid procedural rule under the Rules Enabling Act and regulates the manner and means by which claims are presented, it displaces the contrary Delaware law. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Berk v. Choy" on Justia Law