Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A Maryland county brought a lawsuit against several pharmacy benefit managers, mail-order pharmacies, and retail pharmacies, alleging that they worked with opioid manufacturers to deceptively market opioids and facilitated opioid abuse by placing these drugs on preferred formularies with few restrictions. The county claimed that this conduct created a public nuisance by causing widespread opioid misuse, which resulted in increased public health and safety costs for the county. The county sought a finding of public nuisance, an injunction, abatement costs, damages to compensate for public services, and attorney’s fees.Prior to review by the Supreme Court of Maryland, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified two questions to the state high court. The questions asked whether, under Maryland’s common law, the licensed dispensing of, or administration of benefit plans for, a controlled substance can constitute an actionable public nuisance, and what elements and forms of relief are available for such a claim if so. The county argued that Maryland common law supported these claims, relying on language from prior cases and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, while defendants maintained that Maryland had never recognized such a broad public nuisance doctrine, especially for lawful and licensed conduct.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the licensed dispensing of, or administration of benefit plans for, a controlled substance does not constitute an actionable public nuisance under Maryland common law. The court explained that Maryland’s public nuisance doctrine historically allowed government entities only to seek criminal prosecutions or injunctive relief—not damages—and has not been expanded to cover lawful, regulated conduct such as the licensed dispensing of opioids. The court further found that the county’s complaint failed to meet a key requirement of public nuisance: interference with a common public right. Even if it did, the court stated that judicial restraint was appropriate given the extensive federal and state regulation of this area, making common law public nuisance an unsuitable remedy. View "Express Scripts v. Anne Arundel Cnty." on Justia Law

Jenna Sondag underwent hip surgery performed by Dr. John Hoffman at Orthopaedic Specialists, P.C. in February 2017. She filed a medical malpractice action in January 2019, agreeing to designate expert witnesses by a deadline set under Iowa Code section 668.11. Sondag missed this deadline due to a combination of her attorneys’ involvement in a lengthy trial, a medical emergency affecting one attorney, and a calendaring error by their docketing software. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the missed deadline, while Sondag sought an extension to name her expert witnesses.The Iowa District Court for Scott County held a hearing on both motions, and in 2019, found good cause for Sondag’s delay due to the circumstances described. The court denied summary judgment and extended the expert designation deadline. The defendants did not seek interlocutory appeal at that time. Nearly four years later, days before trial, the district court revisited its prior order after the defendants filed a motion in limine to decertify Sondag’s expert. The court reversed its earlier finding, excluded the expert, and dismissed the case for failure to timely designate an expert witness.Sondag appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, siding with the district court’s 2023 decision. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted further review. The Supreme Court held that while a district court may correct an erroneous ruling before final judgment, its 2019 order extending the deadline was not an abuse of discretion, but its 2023 order excluding the expert and dismissing the case was an abuse of discretion. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for trial. View "Sondag v. Orthopaedic Speciatists, P.C." on Justia Law

The appellant arrived at the emergency room of a medical center with severe lower back pain, right flank pain, and numbness and weakness in her left leg. Initial evaluations suggested symptoms consistent with sciatica, but further testing revealed profound anemia and a herniated disk, which did not warrant surgery. Imaging also showed a nonoccluding thrombus in her aorta. She was discharged after several days, with recommendations for follow-up. About two weeks later, she returned to the hospital with ischemic symptoms in her left leg, which led to an above-the-knee amputation due to advanced ischemia.The matter was initially heard in the Houston Circuit Court, where the appellant sued the medical center and a physician for negligence, alleging that improper evaluation and failure to initiate anticoagulant therapy resulted in limb loss. The physician was dismissed as a defendant, leaving the case against the medical center. After discovery, the medical center moved for summary judgment, arguing the appellant lacked substantial evidence of causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that causation could not be established.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the standard that summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court found that the appellant failed to present expert testimony establishing a proximate causal connection between the alleged breach and her injury. The medical expert's causation testimony was deemed speculative, as it relied on hypothetical actions by a vascular surgeon outside the expert’s specialty. The medical center’s expert, a vascular surgeon, testified that no different treatment would have been provided. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Armour v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were injured when their car was struck by a vehicle driven by a deputy sheriff responding to an emergency call. The accident occurred at an intersection where the deputy, traveling westbound, proceeded against a red light while the plaintiffs, traveling southbound, had the green light. Although the deputy activated her emergency lights and slowed down, coming to a complete stop at least once and waiting for northbound traffic to yield, it was disputed whether she used her air horn or siren, and whether she looked for or could see southbound traffic due to possible obstructions. It was also undisputed that she did not notify dispatch as required by departmental policy.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the defendants had established entitlement to summary judgment by showing Deputy Fong had not acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others, and that the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The appellate court observed that the deputy took several safety precautions before entering the intersection. Two justices dissented, reasoning that a jury could find recklessness based on the evidence.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence did not support a finding that the deputy acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104. The court emphasized that police vehicles are statutorily exempt from the requirement to use audible signals when exercising emergency driving privileges and that violations of internal policies exceeding statutory requirements do not establish liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the complaint. View "Granath v Monroe County" on Justia Law

A police officer suffered severe injuries during a protest in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, when a demonstrator threw a heavy object that struck him in the face. The protest was organized in response to police conduct and was led by a prominent activist who had previously participated in similar events that sometimes turned violent. On the day of the incident, the leader was observed directing protestors, including leading them onto a highway and not discouraging violent behavior as the situation escalated. The officer’s injuries were significant, resulting in lasting physical and psychological harm and the end of his law enforcement career.The officer sued the activist, Black Lives Matter, and related entities in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, alleging negligence and other tort claims. The district court dismissed most of the claims with prejudice, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed as to the negligence claim against the activist. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated that decision, remanding for clarification of Louisiana negligence law. The Supreme Court of Louisiana confirmed that state law recognizes a duty not to negligently precipitate third-party crimes under the circumstances alleged. After further proceedings, the district court again granted summary judgment for the activist, finding no duty, lack of causation, and First Amendment protection.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to consider whether the activist’s leadership and actions breached a duty of care and were a cause-in-fact of the officer’s injuries, and that such a claim is not foreclosed by the First Amendment. The case was remanded for trial. View "Ford v. Mckesson" on Justia Law

A certified nursing assistant employed by a home health provider sustained injuries to her right shoulder and lower back during the course of her employment. She received medical treatment from several providers and was paid mileage reimbursements for traveling between patient homes. Following her injuries, the employer’s insurance carrier denied further payment of temporary disability and medical benefits, including an outstanding medical bill, and ultimately terminated her employment. The worker secured new employment at a higher wage and subsequently filed for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming entitlement to disability benefits and payment of the disputed medical bill. The employer denied liability.The Administrative Law Judge found that the worker had a compensable lower back injury with a 12% impairment rating, entitling her to temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits, but excluded mileage reimbursements from her average weekly wage and denied payment for the outstanding medical bill based on the provider’s failure to submit it within the statutory 45-day deadline. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of mileage reimbursements and dismissed the issue of the unpaid medical bill as moot after the employer voluntarily paid it during the appeal. The Court of Appeals also rejected a motion for leave to file an amicus brief, deeming it unauthorized.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the exclusion of mileage reimbursements from the wage calculation, holding such payments were reimbursements for actual expenses and not “wages.” The Court reversed the dismissal of the medical bill claim as moot, applying the “voluntary cessation” exception, and held that denial of compensability constitutes reasonable grounds to excuse noncompliance with the 45-day rule for submitting medical bills. The Court also found the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the amicus motion. The decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "HARRIS V. MERCY HOME HEALTH" on Justia Law

A woman with dementia was admitted to a memory care facility, where her family warned staff about her tendency to wander and need for supervision. Three days after admission, she was found unattended in a courtyard on a 102-degree day, suffering from severe burns and heatstroke, ultimately dying days later. Her family, acting as successors in interest and individually, sued the facility for elder neglect, negligence, fraud, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Upon admission, her niece had signed an arbitration agreement on her behalf, which the family argued should not bind their individual claims or override their right to a jury trial.The Superior Court of Sacramento County considered the facility’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. The court found a valid arbitration agreement existed for the decedent’s survivor claims but ruled that the agreement did not bind the family members' individual claims, as they were not parties to the agreement. The court also declined to compel arbitration of the survivor claims under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c), citing the risk of conflicting rulings if the family’s claims proceeded in court while survivor claims were arbitrated. The court further held that the agreement’s reference to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not expressly incorporate the FAA’s procedural provisions to preempt California law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably delegate threshold issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and that the FAA’s procedural provisions were not expressly adopted by the agreement. Therefore, California law applied, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny arbitration to avoid inconsistent rulings. The judgment was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs. View "Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove" on Justia Law

The case involved a claimant who was awarded workers’ compensation benefits for a work-related injury. The claimant’s attorney successfully secured the compensation award, and the Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) granted an attorney’s fee as a lien on the award. After the insurance carrier failed to pay the compensation within required timelines, the WCLJ imposed statutory penalties and additional amounts against the carrier, which were payable to the claimant. The attorney then sought additional legal fees based on these penalty charges assessed against the carrier for late payment.The Workers’ Compensation Board upheld the WCLJ’s denial of the attorney’s claim for additional fees based on the late payment penalties, relying on Workers’ Compensation Law § 24 (2). The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the statutory fee schedule under § 24 (2) did not authorize legal fees based on penalty charges under Workers’ Compensation Law § 25.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that Workers’ Compensation Law § 24 (2), as amended, authorizes the Board to approve legal fees only in accordance with its detailed statutory fee schedule, which does not include penalty charges assessed for late payments under § 25. The Court found the text of § 24 (2) clear and unambiguous, limiting attorney fees to specific types of compensation awards, and not extending to penalties or additional payments assessed for untimely compensation. The Court concluded that the Board properly denied the attorney’s request for fees based on late payment charges, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. View "Gonzalez v Northeast Parent & Child Society" on Justia Law

A group of former student-athletes filed suit against a university, alleging that between 2012 and 2015, they sustained serious hip injuries while participating on the university's women's rowing team. They claimed that the injuries were caused by deficient coaching, athletic training, and medical care, which they argued were influenced by systemic gender-based disparities. The athletes pursued claims under Title IX for gender discrimination and under Texas law for negligence. The university moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed with the university as to eight plaintiffs, granting summary judgment and finding their claims time-barred. For a ninth plaintiff, the district court partially granted and partially denied summary judgment, allowing some claims for compensatory damages to proceed. The plaintiffs appealed the ruling for the eight time-barred claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were indeed barred by the statute of limitations.Following summary judgment, the university sought to recover litigation costs as the prevailing party under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The district court found the university to be a prevailing party and awarded the majority of the costs requested, after reducing the amount. The plaintiffs appealed the cost award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the university was properly designated the prevailing party, that none of the factors in Pacheco v. Mineta weighed against awarding costs, and that the university had met its burden to show the necessity and amount of costs sought. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of costs. View "Clouse v. Southern Methodist University" on Justia Law

Susan Cox, a resident of Albion, Washington, died from an alleged overdose of medications prescribed by her primary care physician, Dr. Patricia Marciano. Susan’s husband, Mark Cox, and her estate initiated a wrongful-death and survivor action against Dr. Marciano and Gritman Medical Center after Susan’s death. The Coxes had lived in Washington, while Dr. Marciano and Gritman are based in Idaho, with all medical treatment having taken place in Idaho. However, at Susan’s request, her prescriptions were regularly transmitted by Dr. Marciano and Gritman to pharmacies in Washington, and Gritman engaged in marketing and accepted patients from the Washington area.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Idaho-based defendants, holding that Washington’s long-arm statute did not reach them and the exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process. The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery relating to general personal jurisdiction over Gritman, and did not address the issue of venue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dr. Marciano and Gritman Medical Center was proper under both Washington’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. The court found that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Washington, as they cultivated relationships with Washington residents and regularly transmitted prescriptions to Washington pharmacies in compliance with Washington law. The court also held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington because a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred there. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings and affirmed the dismissal only as to one defendant who was conceded to be properly dismissed. View "COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER" on Justia Law