Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Michelle Oksman sued the City of Idaho Falls after slipping and falling on a wet surface in the lobby of the West Deist Aquatic Center, a facility owned and operated by the City. Oksman alleged negligence on the part of the City. The district court initially granted the City's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City had no actual notice of a dangerous condition and did not fail to take reasonable action to remedy potential hazards. However, the court later withdrew its grant of summary judgment after Oksman identified the person who had allegedly stated that people frequently fell in the area where she had fallen. The case proceeded to a jury trial, during which the district court limited Oksman's testimony and declined to give a jury instruction Oksman requested regarding the reasonable value of necessary services. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the City, and the district court dismissed Oksman's complaint with prejudice. Oksman appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court found that the district court had erred in limiting Oksman's testimony about a statement made by the manager of the aquatic center, which was crucial to Oksman's case. The Supreme Court also provided guidance on issues likely to arise again on remand, including the use of depositions for impeachment and the use of leading questions. The Supreme Court further vacated the district court's award of costs to the City as the prevailing party. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Oksman v. City of Idaho Falls" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice claim filed by Jillyn M. Woodward, individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Brian K. Woodward, deceased, against Saint Francis Medical Center and the doctors who treated Brian. Brian was admitted to the emergency room at Saint Francis Medical Center with a swollen tongue and difficulty swallowing. He was diagnosed with angioedema, a condition causing abnormal swelling of the tongue, mouth, and airway. Despite treatment, his condition worsened, and he had to be intubated. The intubation attempts were unsuccessful, leading to a delay in securing his airway. Brian later developed right-side semiparesis, including weakness and partial paralysis, which was attributed to an anoxic brain injury due to the delay in securing his airway.The District Court for Hall County granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors and Saint Francis Medical Center. The court also struck the affidavits of two expert witnesses provided by Woodward, citing inconsistencies with their earlier deposition testimonies. Woodward appealed the decision.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that the change in testimony of nonparty witnesses is an issue of credibility for a fact finder to make, and that later testimony will normally not be struck by the trial court. The court also noted that the document provided by Saint Francis Medical Center did not conclusively establish that the doctors were not employees or agents of the hospital. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Woodward v. Saint Francis Medical Center" on Justia Law

In 2009, Leverne Brent was injured while working for the Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) in a building owned by Madated, LCC. The Mississippi State Agencies Workers’ Compensation Trust (Trust), the carrier for DHS, provided Brent with compensation and medical expenses for her injury. In 2012, Brent and her husband sued the building owner and reached a settlement of $750,000. The DHS and the Trust intervened, claiming $358,210.77 for compensation and medical expenses paid to Brent. Brent challenged this amount, arguing that it included expenses that were not legally recoverable, such as surveillance and investigation costs. The Intervenors reduced their demand to $335,216.27, and the disputed amount was held in escrow pending further order.The trial court ordered the Intervenors to produce invoices and checks for each claimed expenditure. Brent continued to dispute the accuracy of the reduced demand and filed a motion for contempt, arguing that the Intervenors had failed to provide legitimate costs and total amount requests for reimbursement. Brent specifically challenged the reimbursement of $2,887.50 for an Employer Medical Evaluation (EME) conducted by a non-treating medical provider, arguing that this was not medical treatment. The trial court granted the Intervenors' Motion to Establish and Settle Lien, finding that the EME was a medical expense within the meaning of the Act. Brent appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the statute. The court found that the EME was not a medical expense as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Law, which requires medical treatment to be necessary and reasonable. The court ruled that the EME, conducted by a non-treating medical provider for the purpose of obtaining a second opinion, did not meet this definition. Therefore, the court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and ruled in favor of Brent, finding that she was not required to repay the $2,887.50 for the EME. View "Brent v. Mississippi Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

A fire broke out at Victor Young's property in Yazoo City, Mississippi, and spread to Kenneth Hampton's property. The Yazoo City Fire Department struggled to extinguish the fire due to a lack of tank water and difficulty connecting to a nearby fire hydrant. As a result, Young's property was completely destroyed, and Hampton's property was significantly damaged. Hampton, who was not physically injured during the fire, suffered a cardiac event and subsequent stroke three days later. Hampton and Young sued Yazoo City, alleging negligence and reckless disregard in failing to provide the necessary knowledge and equipment to fight fires, failing to properly train and supervise its firefighters, and failing to adequately maintain its fire hydrant system.The Yazoo County Circuit Court denied Yazoo City's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the questions of the city's immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for property damage and personal injury liability could not be answered without additional discovery. The city appealed this decision, arguing that it was immune from both property damage and personal injury liability under the MTCA.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Yazoo City was immune from property damage liability because the plaintiffs did not allege that the city acted with reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of any person, as required by the MTCA. The court also found that the city was immune from personal injury liability because Hampton's claim linked the property damage to his personal injury, but did not argue that the fire department acted in reckless disregard of his safety and well-being. The court concluded that Yazoo City was immune from both property damage and personal injury liability under the MTCA, and therefore, the lower court improperly denied the city's motion for summary judgment. View "Yazoo City v. Hampton" on Justia Law

The case involves a developmentally disabled woman, referred to as A.L., who was sexually assaulted by an employee of a transportation service. The transportation service was contracted by Harbor Developmental Disabilities Foundation, a regional center under the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act. The regional center's role is to assess the needs of developmentally disabled individuals and contract with service providers to meet those needs. A.L. sued the employee, the transportation service, and the regional center, arguing that the regional center had a duty to protect her from sexual assault by the transportation service's employees.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the regional center, concluding that the regional center did not have a duty to protect A.L. from sexual assault by the transportation service's employees unless the regional center had actual knowledge of the employee's propensity to engage in such conduct. The trial court's decision was based on the fact that the regional center had no such knowledge in this case.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the regional center had a duty to protect A.L. from sexual assault by the transportation service's employees only if the regional center had actual knowledge of the employee's propensity to engage in such conduct. The court concluded that imposing a broader duty on the regional center would effectively convert regional centers into insurers of all harm to consumers, which could potentially shut down these centers and deny essential services to the entire population of developmentally disabled persons. View "A.L. v. Harbor Developmental Disabilities Foundation" on Justia Law

The case involves an employee, Daniel Johnson, who had previously injured his back in 2005 while working for Furniture & Things, Inc. He continued to work for the company until 2011, managing his persistent back and leg pain with self-care treatments. In 2016, Johnson started working for Concrete Treatments, Inc., where he sustained another back injury in October 2018. He sought medical treatment for his worsening condition, which was diagnosed as a lumbar strain. In 2021, Johnson underwent surgery for severe spinal canal stenosis. He filed a workers’ compensation claim, seeking benefits for his 2005 and 2018 injuries and payment of outstanding medical expenses.The compensation judge found that Johnson had sustained a permanent work-related injury in October 2018 and that both the 2005 and 2018 injuries were substantial contributing factors to his need for medical care and surgery. The judge also concluded that Johnson was entitled to make a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses owed to his medical providers, who had not intervened in the proceedings. Concrete Treatments appealed the judge's findings on liability and conclusion regarding Johnson’s right to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses.The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed the compensation judge’s determination that Johnson sustained a permanent work-related injury in October 2018 and that the injury was a substantial contributing factor to his permanent low back condition and need for surgery. However, the WCCA held that Johnson could not assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses because his medical providers had not intervened in the proceedings.The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed in part and reversed in part the WCCA’s decision. The court held that Johnson is entitled to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses and that the compensation judge’s findings regarding the October 2018 injury are not manifestly contrary to the evidence. The case was remanded to the WCCA to determine whether further factual findings are necessary regarding Johnson’s direct claim for unpaid medical expenses. View "Johnson vs. Concrete Treatments" on Justia Law

Arasely Soto, a public school teacher, was injured during a routine medical procedure and had to retire. She sued her medical providers for malpractice and also sought disability retirement benefits from the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). She and her husband, Raul Soto, settled with several of the medical malpractice defendants. CalSTRS brought an action against the Sotos, seeking to enforce its right to subrogation or reimbursement from the Sotos' settlement with the malpractice defendants.The trial court granted CalSTRS’s motion for summary adjudication on its declaratory relief cause of action and denied the Sotos’ motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that CalSTRS was entitled to seek reimbursement from the Sotos and rejected the Sotos’ defense that Civil Code section 3333.1 bars any subrogation claim that CalSTRS would have asserted against the malpractice defendants. The Sotos filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two to vacate the trial court’s orders.The appellate court agreed with CalSTRS’s argument that it has a statutory reimbursement claim against the Sotos, and the evidence in this case does not support application of section 3333.1 to bar CalSTRS’s claim. The court denied the Sotos' petition for writ of mandate. View "Soto v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2021, Grant and Sarah Palmquist, on behalf of their minor son, sued baby-food manufacturer Hain Celestial Group, Inc. and grocery retailer Whole Foods Market, Inc. in Texas state court. They sought damages for their son Ethan’s physical and mental decline, which they allege began when he was about thirty months old and had been consuming Hain’s Earth’s Best Organic Products, purchased from Whole Foods. The Palmquists attributed Ethan's health issues to heavy metal toxicity caused by the baby food. The case was removed to federal court, where Whole Foods was dismissed as improperly joined and judgment was granted in favor of Hain during trial.The district court dismissed Whole Foods on the grounds of improper joinder and denied the Palmquists’ motion to remand the case to state court. The court also granted Hain’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the Palmquists had presented no evidence of general causation. The Palmquists appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment denying the Palmquists’ motion to remand, vacated the final judgment of the district court, and remanded with instructions for the district court to remand the case to the state court. The court held that the Palmquists were entitled to a remand to state court because the allegations in their state-court complaint stated plausible claims against Whole Foods. The court did not address whether the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Hain. View "Palmquist v. Hain Celestial Group" on Justia Law

This case involves a wrongful death claim against San Antonio Regional Hospital, brought by Joseph Musharbash, following the death of his adult son, Michael, who was treated for a traumatic brain injury at the hospital. Musharbash alleges that the hospital provided inadequate care by failing to properly evaluate Michael's injuries and undertake appropriate courses of action. Specifically, he claims that surgical intervention was performed too late and that the nursing staff failed to adequately monitor Michael, inform his doctors of his status, and advocate for the need for earlier surgical intervention.The hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing that Musharbash's only expert, Rhona Wang, a certified registered nurse anesthetist, lacked the requisite skill or experience to opine on the standard of care or causation elements of the claim. The trial court denied the hospital's motion for summary judgment, finding that Wang's declaration demonstrated triable issues about the standard of care and causation elements of Musharbash's claim. The hospital then petitioned for writ relief.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the petition. The court found that Wang's qualifications did not establish that she had the specialized knowledge required to opine on the standard of care applicable to an intensive care unit neurosurgeon deciding whether a severe traumatic brain injury requires immediate surgical intervention, or whether that standard of care was breached. The court also found that Wang's declaration did not establish she was competent to opine on causation. As Wang was Musharbash's only proffered expert, her lack of competence to opine on the applicable standard of care and causation was fatal to his claim. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the hospital's motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion for summary judgment. View "San Antonio Regional Hospital v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves four plaintiffs who took docetaxel, a chemotherapy drug, as part of their treatment for early-stage breast cancer and subsequently suffered permanent chemotherapy-induced alopecia (PCIA). The plaintiffs allege that the manufacturers of the drug, Hospira, Inc., Hospira Worldwide, LLC, and Accord Healthcare, Inc., violated state law by failing to warn them that docetaxel could cause PCIA.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, where the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' state law failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal law. The district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was tasked with determining whether federal law preempts the plaintiffs' state law failure-to-warn claims against the defendant drug manufacturers. The court found that the district court had erred in its interpretation of what constitutes "newly acquired information" under the changes-being-effected (CBE) regulation, which allows manufacturers to file a supplemental application with the FDA and simultaneously implement a labeling change before obtaining FDA approval. The court held that the district court failed to enforce the requirement that newly acquired information must "reveal risks of a different type or greater severity or frequency than previously included in submissions to FDA."The court vacated the district court's judgment on the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims and remanded the case for further consideration of one outstanding issue: whether the Bertrand Abstract, a scientific study, constituted "newly acquired information" that revealed a greater risk of PCIA than previously known. If the Bertrand Abstract does not meet this standard, the court held that the defendants would not be liable to the plaintiffs on their state law failure-to-warn claims. View "Hickey v. Hospira" on Justia Law