Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, E. Jean Carroll encountered Donald J. Trump at the Bergdorf Goodman department store in Manhattan. Carroll alleged that Trump sexually abused her in a dressing room. In 2022, Trump made public statements denying the allegations and calling Carroll a liar. Carroll sued Trump for defamation and sexual assault, seeking damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a nine-day trial. The jury found that Trump sexually abused Carroll and defamed her in his 2022 statements. The jury awarded Carroll $5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Trump appealed, arguing that the district court made several evidentiary errors, including admitting testimony from two women who alleged past sexual assaults by Trump and a recording of a 2005 conversation where Trump described kissing and grabbing women without consent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case for abuse of discretion. The court found that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. The testimony of the two women and the 2005 recording were deemed admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 415, which allow evidence of other sexual assaults in cases involving sexual assault claims. The court also found that Trump did not demonstrate that any claimed errors affected his substantial rights.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the evidentiary rulings were within the range of permissible decisions and that any potential errors were harmless. The court upheld the $5 million award to Carroll. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law

In 2017, Samantha Braun was rear-ended by Radena Wollman in a car accident. Wollman admitted fault, and the case proceeded to a jury trial to determine damages. Braun claimed various injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, and sought significant damages. During the trial, the circuit court admitted several of Braun's medical records over her objections, citing the business records hearsay exception. The jury awarded Braun $125,000, which was significantly less than she requested. Braun appealed, arguing that the admission of her medical records was an abuse of discretion and prejudiced her right to a fair trial.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit admitted the medical records, finding sufficient foundation and applying the business records hearsay exception. Braun objected, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay. The court overruled most of her objections and admitted the records. The jury awarded Braun $125,000 in damages, which she appealed, claiming the court's admission of the records was erroneous and prejudicial.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred in admitting the medical records under the business records exception without proper foundation. However, the court determined that Braun's statements in the records were admissible as non-hearsay, and some statements were admissible under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception. Despite the errors, the court concluded that Braun did not demonstrate substantial prejudice affecting the jury's verdict. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, upholding the $125,000 damages award. View "Braun v. Wollman" on Justia Law

A physician sexually assaulted a twelve-year-old boy during a medical examination that required touching the child's genitals. The child's parents filed a medical malpractice complaint, including a negligent-credentialing claim against the hospital employing the physician. After settling with the hospital, the family sought excess compensation from the Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that neither the sexual assault nor the hospital’s negligence fell within the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). The trial court denied the motion.The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The appellate court held that the defendants could challenge the MMA’s applicability post-settlement, that a negligent-credentialing claim must be based on an underlying act of medical malpractice, and that the physician’s sexual misconduct did not constitute medical malpractice. One judge dissented, arguing that the negligent-credentialing claim need not rest on underlying medical malpractice and that the physician’s misconduct did constitute malpractice.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment. The court held that the Fund could challenge whether a claim falls within the MMA after a settlement. It also held that a negligent-credentialing claim falls within the MMA only if the credentialed physician commits an act of medical malpractice. Finally, the court concluded that claims based on sexual assault by a physician during an authorized medical examination can fall within the MMA if the misconduct stems from an inseparable part of the health care being rendered. The court found that the physician’s sexual misconduct in this case fit within this narrow category, and thus, the defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Department of Insurance v. Doe" on Justia Law

A nurse at a Missouri Department of Mental Health facility assaulted Vernell Beach, a non-verbal, developmentally disabled patient. The nurse was charged with second-degree assault and armed criminal action. Beach's legal guardian sued the nurse, who did not respond to the lawsuit, resulting in a default judgment. The nurse later pleaded guilty to third-degree assault, and the attorney general withdrew from representing her. A second default judgment awarded Beach $8 million plus interest. When the state refused to pay from the State Legal Expense Fund, Beach sought a writ of mandamus in the Cole County circuit court.The Cole County circuit court granted a permanent writ of mandamus directing the state to release the funds to satisfy the judgment. However, the court did so without first issuing a preliminary order in mandamus, which is required to initiate responsive pleadings and allow the state to contest the facts and raise defenses.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and found that the circuit court's failure to issue a preliminary order in mandamus materially affected the merits of the action. The preliminary order is essential for initiating responsive pleadings and ensuring a fair process. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Beach v. Zellers" on Justia Law

Jeromy McCrackin filed a wrongful death action against Tynan Mullen for the death of McCrackin’s son, who was shot and killed outside a pool hall in 2019. Safeco Insurance Company of America had issued a homeowners insurance policy to Mullen’s grandmother, with whom Mullen allegedly lived at the time. Mullen was indicted for first-degree murder and armed criminal action but pleaded guilty to first-degree involuntary manslaughter and armed criminal action. McCrackin offered to settle the wrongful death claim against Mullen in exchange for Safeco’s agreement to pay the total liability coverage limits, which Safeco declined, stating the policy excluded coverage for intentional acts.The Circuit Court of Jackson County overruled Safeco’s motion to intervene in the wrongful death action for the purpose of seeking a stay until a separate federal declaratory judgment action could be resolved. Safeco had filed the federal action to determine whether it had a duty to defend or indemnify Mullen. The circuit court held a bench trial in the wrongful death action, overruled Safeco’s motion to intervene, and entered a judgment against Mullen, awarding McCrackin $16.5 million in damages.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and held that Safeco had a right to intervene in the wrongful death action pursuant to Rule 52.12(a)(2) for the limited purpose of seeking a stay. The court found that Safeco had an interest in the wrongful death action and that the disposition of the action could impair or impede its ability to protect that interest. The court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not direct how the circuit court should rule on the motion to stay, leaving that decision to the lower court. View "McCrackin vs. Mullen" on Justia Law

The case involves Lori Ann Wiley, who, along with Charles Wallace Hanson, engaged in a verbal altercation at a Kern High School District (KHSD) high school. The incident began when a school employee blocked a handicap parking spot they intended to use. Wiley later submitted a written complaint about the incident to the school. Subsequently, KHSD police officer Michael Whiting recommended various misdemeanor charges against Wiley, leading to her being cited and a prosecutor filing a criminal complaint with three misdemeanor charges. After a mistrial, the court dismissed Wiley’s charges in the interest of justice.Wiley sued KHSD police officers Edward Komin, Michael Whiting, Luis Peña, and Steven Alvidrez, alleging violations of her First Amendment rights, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. She brought causes of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Bane Act, and common law torts for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer to Wiley’s causes of action in the second amended complaint on multiple grounds without leave to amend and granted a motion to strike Wiley’s punitive damages allegations without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The appellate court held that Wiley failed to adequately plead her claims under section 1983 for malicious/retaliatory prosecution and abuse of process, as well as her claims under the Bane Act. The court also found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that Wiley did not sufficiently allege facts to support her claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. However, the court granted Wiley leave to amend her section 1983 claim but denied leave to amend her other causes of action. The court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the motion to strike without leave to amend. View "Wiley v. Kern High School District" on Justia Law

Eric Woolard and Breonna Hall, residents of Greenhouse Condominiums, were involved in a physical altercation with their neighbors, Eric Smith and Stacy Thorne, in December 2019. Smith and Thorne sued Woolard, Hall, and Regent Real Estate Services, Inc. (Regent), the management company, for negligence and other claims. Woolard and Hall filed a cross-complaint against Regent and Greenhouse Community Association (Greenhouse), alleging negligence and other claims, asserting that Regent and Greenhouse failed to address ongoing harassment by neighbors, which led to the altercation.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse, finding no duty of care owed by them to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. Woolard and Hall's motions to disqualify the trial judge were denied, and they did not seek writ review of these rulings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Regent and Greenhouse had no duty to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. The court found that Woolard and Hall failed to establish a legal duty of care breached by Regent and Greenhouse. Additionally, the court noted that claims of housing discrimination were not supported by evidence and were not properly raised as a separate cause of action. The court also held that the disqualification motions were not reviewable on appeal. The judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse was affirmed, and they were entitled to their costs on appeal. View "Woolard v. Regent Real Estate Services" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a civil suit against the defendant, alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) after the defendant reported to the police that the plaintiff had sexually and physically assaulted her. This report led to the plaintiff being criminally charged, arrested, and held without bail for almost two years before being acquitted. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's report was false and made with malicious intent to harm him.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged as communications preliminary to a judicial proceeding. The court also granted the defendant's special motion to strike under Vermont's anti-SLAPP statute, 12 V.S.A. § 1041, and awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant's statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute as an exercise of her right to petition the government.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings, agreeing that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged. The Court held that public policy supports extending absolute privilege to such statements to encourage free and full disclosure to law enforcement without fear of civil liability. The Court also affirmed the trial court's application of the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the defendant's statements were made in connection with a public issue and were an exercise of her constitutional rights. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to the anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court had not adequately addressed. View "Talandar v. Manchester-Murphy" on Justia Law

In January 2019, Raymond Robinson and his son sued Emerald Homes, L.L.C., and 21st Mortgage Corporation in the Baldwin Circuit Court. Robinson had contracted with Emerald to purchase a mobile home, financed by a loan from 21st Mortgage. After tearing down his existing house in preparation for the new mobile home, the loan was not completed, allegedly due to Emerald and/or 21st Mortgage's refusal to finalize the transaction. The complaint included claims of breach of contract, misrepresentation, suppression, and negligence, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The trial court compelled arbitration for claims against Emerald and granted summary judgment in favor of 21st Mortgage on Raymond's claims. The case proceeded to a jury trial on Robinson's claims against 21st Mortgage. The jury found in favor of Robinson on promissory fraud and the tort of outrage, awarding him $2,980,000 in total damages. 21st Mortgage's post-trial motions, including for judgment as a matter of law (JML), were denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that Robinson did not present substantial evidence of promissory fraud, as he failed to prove that 21st Mortgage had no intention to perform the loan promise at the time it was made or intended to deceive him. The court also found that Robinson did not meet all the conditions required for the loan, and the failure to close the loan was not due to any fraudulent intent by 21st Mortgage.Regarding the tort of outrage, the court held that the conduct of 21st Mortgage did not meet the extreme and outrageous standard required for such a claim. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "21st Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed a premises liability suit against Waffle House, Inc. and WH Capital LLC in October 2019. In April 2021, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions due to the plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with a discovery order. In July 2021, the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit without prejudice. In September 2021, the defendants filed a motion for attorneys' fees, arguing that the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit to escape sanctions. The plaintiffs then filed a renewal action. In July 2022, the trial court awarded the defendants $101,082 in attorneys' fees in the dismissed case.The plaintiffs sought to appeal the attorneys' fees award by filing an application for discretionary appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the application, concluding that because the plaintiffs had filed a renewal action, the case remained pending below, making the fee award a non-final order. Therefore, the plaintiffs were required to obtain a certificate of immediate review. The Court of Appeals relied on the case Eidson v. Croutch in its analysis.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the renewal action was a new case, not a continuance of the dismissed case. Therefore, the dismissed case was no longer pending below. The court held that under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), the order awarding attorneys' fees was a final judgment, and no certificate of immediate review was required. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the discretionary application and remanded the case for consideration of that application. View "COOK-ROSE v. WAFFLE HOUSE INC." on Justia Law