Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The decedent, suffering from Parkinson’s disease, dysphagia, and dementia, was admitted to Elmcrest Care Center in February 2013. On August 4, 2017, he was found nonresponsive on the floor by Elmcrest staff, who administered CPR and called 911. He was transported to a hospital and passed away four days later. The Estate of Jose de Jesus Ortiz, represented by Ericka Ortiz, filed a civil action against Elmcrest and its staff, alleging elder abuse, neglect, negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud. The trial court compelled arbitration based on an agreement signed upon the decedent’s admission to Elmcrest.The arbitrator issued a First Interim Award on March 30, 2022, finding that the Estate did not meet its burden of proof on any of its claims. The award was labeled "interim" and allowed for further submissions by the parties to address any omitted issues. The Estate filed a request to amend the First Interim Award, arguing that damages for pre-death loss of dignity were not considered. The arbitrator issued a Second Interim Award on May 26, 2022, awarding $100,000 in damages for pre-death pain and suffering, and invited the Estate to file for attorney fees and costs.The trial court initially denied the Estate’s petition to vacate the First Interim Award, ruling it was not final. However, it later vacated the Final Award and confirmed the First Interim Award, reasoning that the First Interim Award had resolved all necessary issues. The Estate appealed.The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the First Interim Award was not final as it expressly reserved jurisdiction for further proceedings. The court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority in issuing the Final Award, which included the omitted decision on pre-death loss of dignity. The trial court was directed to enter a new order confirming the Final Award. View "Ortiz v. Elmcrest Care Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Grace Gonzalez slipped and fell on oranges in the common walkway of the Ontario Mills Shopping Center, owned by Ontario Mills Limited Partnership (OMLP) and maintained by Interstate Cleaning Corporation (ICC). Gonzalez and her granddaughters did not see the oranges before the fall, nor did they know how long the oranges had been there. An employee from a nearby store helped Gonzalez after the fall, and a security guard escorted her to a family car.Gonzalez filed a premises liability lawsuit against OMLP and ICC. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they had no actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled oranges and could not have remedied the condition in time. They provided evidence of their rigorous training and maintenance regimens, including the use of an electronic tracking system called "Lighthouse" to monitor janitorial inspections. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding no triable issue of material fact regarding the defendants' lack of knowledge of the spill.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the defendants conducted reasonable and frequent inspections of the floors, including the area where Gonzalez fell. The court found that the eight- to nine-minute interval between the last inspection and the fall was insufficient to establish constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Therefore, the defendants could not be held liable for Gonzalez's injuries. The court also noted that Gonzalez did not challenge the trial court's evidentiary rulings on appeal, and thus, the excluded evidence could not be considered. View "Gonzalez v. Interstate Cleaning Corp." on Justia Law

Marites Murphy was involved in a head-on car collision in Petaluma in February 2020. Fire Department paramedics Jude Prokop and Shay Burke responded to the scene. Murphy repeatedly told the paramedics she was not injured and did not want medical assistance, even after being warned she might have a serious injury. The paramedics assessed her capacity to refuse treatment and left the scene. Hours later, Murphy suffered a debilitating stroke due to a hypertensive crisis triggered by the collision. She sued the City of Petaluma and the paramedics for medical negligence, alleging they failed to properly assess her condition and transport her to a hospital.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the paramedics did not assume a duty of care to provide the medical assistance Murphy claimed was owed. The court found that the paramedics did not initiate medical care but merely offered it, which Murphy refused.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the paramedics did not owe Murphy a duty to provide medical assistance under the negligent undertaking doctrine because she repeatedly refused such assistance. The court distinguished this case from others where first responders had undertaken to provide medical care. The court concluded that the paramedics' actions did not increase the risk of harm to Murphy and that they left her in the same condition as when they arrived. Therefore, the paramedics did not assume a duty to provide the level of medical care Murphy alleged was required. View "Murphy v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

In 2015, the plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was rear-ended by a truck driven by the defendant, who was employed by KLS Transportation, Inc. The plaintiff experienced significant pain and underwent extensive medical treatment, including surgeries and the implantation of a spinal cord stimulator. The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant and KLS, with National Liability & Fire Insurance Company intervening on behalf of KLS.The Superior Court of Sacramento County entered a judgment awarding the plaintiff $3,299,455 in damages for past and future economic earnings and noneconomic loss. The defendants challenged the awards for past and future medical damages, lost earnings, future noneconomic damages, and the award for costs and prejudgment interest. The trial court denied the defendants' motions for a new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the awards for past and future medical expenses, finding that the trial court had improperly interpreted the scope of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) and admitted evidence of the reasonable value of services that exceeded the amounts paid by the plaintiff or his insurer. The court also found that the award for future medical expenses was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding the need for a dorsal root ganglion stimulator. The court affirmed the awards for past and future lost earnings, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusions. The award for future noneconomic damages was also upheld, as the evidence established that the plaintiff would suffer severe pain and emotional distress in the future. The court vacated the award for costs and prejudgment interest and remanded the matter for a new trial limited to the issues of past and future medical expenses. View "Yaffee v. Skeen" on Justia Law

Mark Uhlenbrock was convicted by a jury for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) by posting nude images and videos of his ex-girlfriend, YT, on Reddit, along with explicit stories written in her name. Some of the images were taken with her consent during their relationship, while others were recorded without her knowledge. Uhlenbrock's posts included personal details about YT, such as her occupation and employer, and invited men to proposition her. YT discovered the posts through a family friend and reported Uhlenbrock to the FBI.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Uhlenbrock's motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment and vagueness grounds. During the trial, the court allowed testimony about Uhlenbrock's prior similar conduct, which included a 2016 guilty plea for cyberstalking YT. The jury found Uhlenbrock guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and restitution. The court also revoked his supervised release from the 2016 case and sentenced him to an additional 12 months in prison. Uhlenbrock appealed both the new conviction and the revocation of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Uhlenbrock's posts constituted unprotected defamation and that the application of § 2261A(2)(B) did not violate the First Amendment. The court also found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Uhlenbrock's prior conduct. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Uhlenbrock intended to harass or intimidate YT and that his conduct caused her substantial emotional distress. The court also rejected Uhlenbrock's claims of constructive amendment of the indictment and double jeopardy. View "USA v. Uhlenbrock" on Justia Law

A disabled woman, T.M.B., was sexually assaulted by an employee of West Mont, a nonprofit organization contracted by the State of Montana to provide community-based services for developmentally disabled individuals. T.M.B. sued both the State and West Mont, alleging they owed her a nondelegable duty of care. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, concluding neither owed a nondelegable duty of care for the employee’s criminal acts. T.M.B. appealed.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, found that the State had satisfied its statutory obligations by contracting with West Mont to provide services and did not owe a nondelegable duty to T.M.B. because she was not under state custody or control. The court also found that West Mont did not owe a nondelegable duty, as there was no statute or rule explicitly stating such a duty existed for state contractors operating community homes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision regarding the State, agreeing that the State did not have a close, continuing relationship with T.M.B. that would impose a nondelegable duty. However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision regarding West Mont, finding that the relationship between West Mont and T.M.B. was sufficiently close and continuing to impose a nondelegable duty under Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214. The court held that West Mont had a duty to protect T.M.B. from harm due to her dependence on their care and supervision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "T.M.B v. West Mont" on Justia Law

Jack Greener, a Brazilian jiu jitsu (BJJ) student, suffered a fractured neck and spinal cord injury during a sparring session at Del Mar Jiu Jitsu Club, owned by M. Phelps, Inc. Greener sued, alleging negligence by his instructor, Francisco Iturralde, and vicarious liability by M. Phelps, Inc. The defendants argued that the primary assumption of risk doctrine absolved them of liability, as BJJ is an inherently risky sport.The Superior Court of San Diego County instructed the jury using option 2 of CACI No. 471, which holds a sports instructor liable if they unreasonably increased the risks to the student beyond those inherent in the sport. The jury found in favor of Greener, awarding him $46 million in damages. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and verdict form, and in excluding certain evidence.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on option 2 of CACI No. 471, as the evidence showed that Iturralde's actions unreasonably increased the risk of injury to Greener. The court emphasized that Iturralde, as an instructor with superior knowledge and skill, should be held to a different standard than a student coparticipant. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence, as it was either irrelevant or cumulative.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly applied the increased risk standard and that the exclusion of evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court suggested that the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions consider revising CACI No. 471 to minimize confusion and avoid the need to cross-refer to other instructions. View "Greener v. M. Phelps, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa Lombardo, Daniel Bates, and James Bates sued Gramercy Court as heirs of Elizabeth Stein, alleging wrongful death, negligence, elder abuse, and gross negligence due to the care Stein received at Gramercy Court's nursing facility. Stein developed bedsores and died shortly after being transferred back to the hospital. Gramercy Court petitioned to compel arbitration based on an agreement Lombardo signed on Stein's behalf, but the trial court denied the petition.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that Stein's durable power of attorney did not grant Lombardo the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Stein's behalf. The court also determined that Stein did not give Lombardo ostensible authority through her actions. Additionally, the court ruled that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Lombardo's or the other plaintiffs' individual claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Lombardo did not have actual or ostensible authority to bind Stein to the arbitration agreement. The durable power of attorney did not explicitly grant Lombardo the authority to enter into arbitration agreements, and there was no evidence that Stein's conduct led Gramercy Court to believe Lombardo had such authority. The court also concluded that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the plaintiffs' individual claims, as Lombardo was not a party to the agreement in her individual capacity. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying Gramercy Court's petition to compel arbitration. View "Lombardo v. Gramercy Court" on Justia Law

Dustin Clover sustained injuries while removing irrigation drip tape from a seed field while working for Crookham Company in 2018. Clover filed a complaint against Crookham, alleging that his injuries fell within an exception to the exclusive remedy rule under the Worker’s Compensation statutes, which allows for a separate civil action if the employer commits an act of “willful or unprovoked physical aggression.” Crookham moved for summary judgment, arguing that Clover failed to provide evidence supporting his claim. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Crookham. Clover’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading to this appeal.The district court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho found that Clover’s injuries occurred during the course of his employment and were covered by worker’s compensation. The court concluded that Clover did not present sufficient evidence to show that Crookham’s actions fell under the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The court noted that there were no prior incidents or complaints about the drip tape lifter’s safety and that Crookham had used the equipment for nine seasons without injury.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Clover failed to demonstrate that Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge that the drip tape lifter was unsafe. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence and denying Clover’s motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that Clover did not present new facts sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. Consequently, the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration were affirmed. Crookham was awarded costs as the prevailing party on appeal. View "Clover v. Crookham Company" on Justia Law

Houston Police Department Officers Richard Corral and C. Goodman were involved in a high-speed chase of a suspect who had solicited an undercover detective and fled in a stolen vehicle. During the pursuit, Corral's patrol car hit a curb and collided with a pickup truck driven by Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon. Corral claimed the accident occurred because his brakes did not stop him in time. Rodriguez and Okon sued the City of Houston, alleging Corral's negligent driving caused their injuries.The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Corral was protected by official immunity because he acted in good faith and that the emergency exception to the Tort Claims Act applied. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a fact issue existed regarding whether Corral knew his brakes were not functioning properly, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Corral acted in good faith as a matter of law. The Court found that Corral's statement about the brakes not working did not reasonably support an inference that he had prior awareness of any defect. The Court emphasized that the summary-judgment evidence showed Corral's brakes were functional but did not stop him in time. The Court also held that the City conclusively established Corral's good faith in making the turn during the pursuit, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue to controvert this proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case, holding that the City’s governmental immunity was not waived under the Tort Claims Act because Corral was protected by official immunity. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law