Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Ron Strahan stayed at a hotel owned by McCook Hotel Group, LLC, and slipped while using the shower tub in his room. He claimed the shower floor was not slip-resistant and thus presented an unreasonably dangerous condition. Strahan sued the hotel for negligence, seeking damages for his injuries.The District Court for Red Willow County granted summary judgment in favor of the hotel. The court found that Strahan could not establish a material element of his premises liability claim. Specifically, the court concluded that there was no evidence to support a reasonable inference that the shower tub without a slip-resistant floor was an unreasonably dangerous condition. The court also applied the open and obvious doctrine, reasoning that the hotel could not have expected Strahan to fail to protect himself from the open and obvious danger of a wet shower tub.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Strahan failed to provide evidence showing that the shower tub presented an unreasonably dangerous condition. The court noted that the mere fact of slipping in a wet shower tub does not, by itself, establish negligence. Strahan did not present any evidence of industry standards, safety codes, or expert testimony to support his claim that the shower tub was unusually slippery or unsafe. Consequently, the court concluded that Strahan could not prove an essential element of his premises liability claim, and the hotel was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Strahan v. McCook Hotel Group" on Justia Law

Meghan Faxel was injured while riding an inflatable tube down the "Black Hole" water slide at the Wilderness Hotel in Wisconsin Dells. Her tube became stuck and flipped over, causing a shoulder injury. Meghan and her husband, Mike Faxel, sued Wilderness for negligence, common-law premises liability, and loss of consortium. Wilderness filed a cross-claim against ProSlide Technology, Inc., the slide's manufacturer, seeking contribution if found liable. The Faxels missed the deadline to disclose their liability expert and sought an extension, which was denied by the magistrate judge. Wilderness then moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The magistrate judge agreed and entered judgment for Wilderness.The case was initially filed in the Northern District of Illinois, which transferred it to the Western District of Wisconsin due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. The Faxels filed an amended complaint adding ProSlide as a defendant, but the claims against ProSlide were dismissed as time-barred. The Faxels also missed the deadline to disclose an expert witness and their motion to extend the deadline was denied. Wilderness moved for summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care required of water-park operators.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The court held that the hotel’s duty of care regarding the safety protocols, inspection, and maintenance of water slides required specialized knowledge and expertise. Without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The court concluded that the safety measures taken by Wilderness appeared reasonable on their face and that jurors could not determine the standard of care without expert testimony. Therefore, summary judgment for Wilderness was appropriate. View "Faxel v. Wilderness Hotel & Resort, Inc" on Justia Law

In January 2019, Ashley Franklin, an inmate at the Franklin County Regional Jail, was transported to a hospital by Jail Sergeant Brandon Price due to illness. During the transport, Price sexually assaulted Franklin. Franklin filed a lawsuit against Price, Franklin County, and two other Jail employees, asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law claims. She alleged that Price and his superior, Captain Wes Culbertson, were deliberately indifferent to her safety and that Franklin County had inadequate policies and training to prevent such assaults.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Franklin’s motion for summary judgment on her Eighth Amendment claim against Price but denied her other claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the other defendants, finding no evidence that Culbertson or Franklin County were deliberately indifferent or that the County’s policies were inadequate. The court also found that the County’s previous incidents of misconduct did not establish a pattern of unconstitutional behavior. Franklin’s negligence claims against Culbertson and Jailer Rick Rogers were dismissed, with the court ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity under Kentucky law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Franklin County was not liable under § 1983 because Franklin failed to show a direct causal link between the County’s policies and her assault. The court also found that Culbertson and Rogers were entitled to qualified immunity, as their actions were discretionary and performed in good faith. Franklin’s claims of gross negligence were deemed forfeited due to lack of development in her arguments. The court concluded that Franklin had not established that the County’s policies or training were constitutionally inadequate or that there was a pattern of similar constitutional violations. View "Franklin v. Franklin County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who worked at the Clark County Government Center (CCGC), alleged injuries from exposure to toxic chemicals. They claimed that toxic chemicals were released on Union Pacific property, which later became the CCGC site. After the CCGC opened in 1995, workers began experiencing illnesses and noticed black soot accumulating in workstations and air vents. Despite these concerns, Clark County assured workers that the property was safe. Plaintiffs argued that they could not have discovered the link between their illnesses and the toxic exposure until 2020, when experts established the connection.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County dismissed the plaintiffs' first amended complaint, ruling that the discovery rule did not apply to the two-year statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(4)(e). The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred because the statute did not explicitly reference discovery-rule tolling.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that the discovery rule could apply to NRS 11.190(4)(e) despite the statute's lack of explicit language. The court emphasized that fairness and justice require that a claim should not accrue until the claimant is aware or should be aware of the claim through reasonable diligence. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had raised issues of fact regarding their awareness of the cause of action and the defendants' alleged concealment of information. Additionally, the court found that the district court erred by not considering equitable tolling. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "ADKINS VS. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY" on Justia Law

David Schaffner, Jr. and Theresa Sue Schaffner filed a lawsuit against Monsanto Corporation, alleging that Monsanto violated Pennsylvania law by failing to include a cancer warning on the label of its weed-killer, Roundup. The Schaffners claimed that this omission caused Mr. Schaffner to develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma due to his exposure to Roundup. The case was initially filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and was later removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) then transferred the case to the Northern District of California for consolidated pretrial proceedings.In the Northern District of California, the MDL Court had previously ruled in similar cases that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not preempt state-law tort duties to include a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Following this precedent, the MDL Court denied Monsanto’s motion for summary judgment on preemption grounds. The case was subsequently remanded to the Western District of Pennsylvania, where the parties stipulated to a judgment in favor of the Schaffners, reserving Monsanto’s right to appeal the preemption issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether FIFRA preempted the Pennsylvania duty to warn. The court held that FIFRA’s preemption provision, which prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements different from those required under federal law, did preempt the state-law duty to include a cancer warning. The court reasoned that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning, and FIFRA regulations require pesticide labels to conform to the EPA-approved label. Therefore, the Pennsylvania duty to warn was not equivalent to the federal requirements and was preempted by FIFRA. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court. View "Schaffner v. Monsanto Corporation" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against a defendant, alleging that the defendant's negligence caused a car accident resulting in significant injuries. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant ran a red light and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle. The defendant denied the allegations, arguing that the light was green and that the plaintiff was at fault for the accident.The trial court, a state district court, heard the case and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages. The defendant appealed the decision to the state court of appeals, arguing that the trial court made several errors, including improper jury instructions and the exclusion of certain evidence that could have supported the defendant's case.The state court of appeals reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision, finding that the jury instructions were appropriate and that the exclusion of evidence did not prejudice the defendant's case. The defendant then appealed to the state's highest court, the State Supreme Court, seeking further review.The State Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its jury instructions or in its evidentiary rulings. The court emphasized that the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence and that the trial court's actions were within the bounds of its discretion. The Supreme Court's decision effectively ended the defendant's appeals, leaving the jury's award to the plaintiff intact. View "State v. Chadwick" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Robert V. Bolinske, Sr., filed a defamation claim against Dale V. Sandstrom and Gail Hagerty, alleging that defamatory statements were made and published online on October 18, 2016. Bolinske served a demand for retraction on January 14, 2017, but Sandstrom did not respond. Bolinske commenced the action on February 26, 2019, beyond the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims.The District Court of Burleigh County initially dismissed Bolinske’s defamation claim, citing the statute of limitations. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision in part, noting that the statute of limitations defense was not specifically pled by answer, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, Sandstrom answered the amended complaint, including the statute of limitations defense, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, finding the defamation claim time-barred. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to Sandstrom, deeming Bolinske’s claims frivolous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the defamation claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations, as the action was commenced more than two years and 45 days after the publication of the alleged defamatory statements. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, agreeing with the lower court’s assessment that Bolinske’s claims were frivolous and that the fees requested were reasonable. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. View "Bolinske v. Sandstrom" on Justia Law

Samuel Hickman was electrocuted while working on a construction site when a boom crane contacted overhead power lines. Hickman and his wife filed a personal injury lawsuit against Boomers, LLC, its owner Michael Landon, and employee Colter James Johnson, alleging negligence and recklessness. Boomers moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law. Hickman argued that the accident fell under the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The district court granted summary judgment for Boomers and denied Hickman’s motion for reconsideration.The district court applied the 2020 amended version of Idaho Code section 72-209(3), which clarified the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception, and concluded that Boomers did not intend to harm Hickman or have actual knowledge that injury was substantially likely. Hickman appealed, arguing that the district court should have applied the pre-amendment version of the statute and the standard from Gomez v. Crookham Co., which interpreted the exception to include conscious disregard of knowledge that an injury would result.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the pre-amendment version of section 72-209(3) and the Gomez standard should apply. The court found that the additional evidence submitted by Hickman in his motion for reconsideration created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Johnson consciously disregarded the known risk of injury from the power lines. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hickman v. Boomers, LLC" on Justia Law

Greg Phillips died on October 11, 2019, after receiving medical care from Dr. Anna Robbins at Logan Health. On April 22, 2021, Phillips' estate filed a medical malpractice claim with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP), which issued a decision on December 9, 2021. Subsequently, on January 5, 2022, Phillips filed a complaint in the District Court alleging wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, a survivor’s claim, and respondeat superior. However, the complaint was not served on Logan Health. On February 10, 2023, Phillips filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) adding claims of common law negligence and negligent misrepresentation, which was served on Logan Health on February 20, 2023.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court dismissed the FAC with prejudice on April 28, 2023, because Phillips failed to serve the original complaint within the six-month period required by § 25-3-106, MCA, and the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims under § 27-2-205, MCA, had expired. Phillips' motion to alter, amend, or set aside the dismissal was denied on June 13, 2023, as the court found that the statute of limitations resumed running after the six-month service deadline passed and that the FAC did not relate back to the original complaint.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the six-month period for serving the complaint and that the FAC was filed outside the two-year limitations period. The court also determined that Logan Health's motion to dismiss did not constitute an appearance under § 25-3-106, MCA, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phillips' post-judgment motion. View "Phillips v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing their minor son, sued a hospital and a doctor for medical malpractice after their baby suffered birth injuries during delivery. They sought $6,000,000 in damages. Under Puerto Rico law, damages would be capped at $150,000 if the doctor was a faculty member at the hospital at the time of the birth. The defendants claimed the doctor was a faculty member, but could not produce a contract to prove it. The district court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing and concluded that the doctor was a faculty member, thus applying the statutory cap on damages.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico adopted a magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation, which stated that the applicability of the statutory cap was a matter of law. The district court found that the doctor was a faculty member based on testimony and letters from the medical school, despite the absence of a contract. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the applicability of the statutory cap was a factual question that should have been decided by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that whether the doctor was a faculty member at the time of the birth was a factual question requiring a jury's determination. The court found that the evidence was not one-sided enough to compel the district court's conclusion and that the district court improperly took the question from the jury. The First Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Perez-Perez v. Hospital Episcopal San Lucas Inc." on Justia Law