Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case revolves around the tragic drowning of a 14-year-old boy at a dam on Buffalo Creek in Erie County. The victim's mother brought a negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against the Joint Board of Directors of Erie-Wyoming County Soil Conservation District (the Joint Board), alleging that they owned the dam and were responsible for its maintenance and safety. The dam was initially constructed as part of a federal project under the Flood Control Act of 1944, after which the Joint Board was created as the local "sponsor" of the project. Two agreements between the Joint Board and the National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) in 1959 and 1984 stipulated that the Joint Board had ongoing duties to inspect and maintain the dams. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the singular question of whether the Joint Board owned the dams at the time of the accident. Both the plaintiff and the Joint Board moved for directed verdicts. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion, concluding that the Joint Board owned the dams. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision and granted the Joint Board's motion for a directed verdict, ruling that the dams were fixtures that ran with the land and could not have been owned by the Joint Board since the NRCS did not own the underlying land. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both lower courts, stating that neither the plaintiff nor the Joint Board should have been granted a directed verdict as the evidence was not conclusive enough to establish ownership of the dams as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals ordered that the case be remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings, and affirmed the dismissal of claims against other parties, including the Districts, County, and Town. View "Suzanne P. v Joint Bd. of Directors of Erie-Wyoming County Soil Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas considered a medical negligence case where a 13-year-old girl, Raynee Dunnick, was bitten by a rattlesnake and was treated by Dr. Kristy Marsillo at a local hospital. The hospital had a specific guideline for snakebite treatment, which was followed by Dr. Marsillo. This guideline recommends administering antivenom, a treatment for snakebite, only when certain clinical parameters are met. According to the guideline, the risk of side effects from the antivenom should also be considered.Raynee and her parents sued Dr. Marsillo, claiming that her adherence to the guidelines and her decision not to immediately administer the antivenom upon Raynee's arrival at the hospital was negligent and resulted in Raynee's pain, suffering, impairment, and disfigurement. The trial court granted Dr. Marsillo's motion for summary judgment on the grounds of no-evidence of breach of duty and causation. The court of appeals reversed this decision, but Dr. Marsillo appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.In its decision, the Supreme Court of Texas held that under section 74.153(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a heightened standard of proof is required for a patient's negligence claim against a physician for injuries arising out of the provision of emergency medical care. The claimant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the physician acted with willful and wanton negligence, which is at least equivalent to gross negligence.The court found that the evidence presented by Raynee did not meet this standard. Specifically, the court found that the expert affidavit provided by Raynee was conclusory and did not adequately explain why the guidelines should have been disregarded or why doing so would have posed an extreme degree of risk to Raynee. Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Dr. Marsillo. View "MARSILLO v. DUNNICK" on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Janet Palmtag, a real estate agent and general candidate for the Nebraska Legislature, against The Republican Party of Nebraska. The case stems from political mailers, sent by the Party, which stated that Palmtag had been disciplined by the Iowa Real Estate Commission for illegal activities and had lost her Iowa real estate license. Palmtag claims these statements are false and defamatory. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Party, finding a genuine issue that the statements were false but no genuine issue that the Party acted with actual malice. Palmtag appealed this decision, and the Party cross-appealed the district court’s conclusion that Palmtag did not have to plead and prove special damages.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that when the facts presented by Palmtag are viewed in the light most favorable to her, those facts are sufficient for a jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that the Party acted with actual malice. The court also rejected the Party's argument that in all public libel cases the plaintiff must prove special damages, finding that Palmtag's action involves defamation per se, for which no proof of actual harm is necessary. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Palmtag v. Republican Party of Nebraska" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, John GM Roe, a childhood sexual assault victim, filed an action against three "Doe" defendants, including his former Boy Scout leader. The Superior Court of Fresno County dismissed his complaint with prejudice, citing failure to timely file certificates of merit as required by California's Code of Civil Procedure, section 340.1, subdivisions (f) and (g). The court also claimed that the statute of limitations had expired by the time Roe filed compliant certificates.Roe appealed, arguing that Emergency rule 9, enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, tolled the statute of limitations governing his claims. This rule, he contended, meant that when the court dismissed his complaint, the limitations period had not yet expired. Therefore, he insisted that the dismissal should have been without prejudice so he could refile his complaint and certificates of merit before the limitations period ended.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District agreed with Roe. The court ruled that section 340.1, subdivision (q), which created a three-year revival period for all civil claims arising from childhood sexual assault that were barred as of January 1, 2020, is part of a statute of limitations. Consequently, Emergency rule 9, which tolled statutes of limitations for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days, also tolled section 340.1, subdivision (q)’s three-year revival period. This interpretation extended the deadline to file childhood sexual assault claims to June 27, 2023. As such, the court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing Roe's claims with prejudice, allowing him to refile his complaint and certificates of merit. View "Roe v. Doe 1" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of August 1, 2018, Gwendolyn Adams and Glenn Tyler Bolden were pursued in a high-speed chase by Michael William Becker, a peace officer employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Becker suspected Adams and Bolden of wrongdoing, although his suspicions were unfounded. The pursuit resulted in a catastrophic accident that caused severe injuries and, ultimately, the death of Adams's son, D'son Woods.Adams and Bolden filed a lawsuit against the CDCR, alleging negligence causing wrongful death, assault and battery, and violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. The CDCR sought summary judgment, arguing that Becker was not acting within the scope of his employment during the pursuit. The trial court agreed and entered judgment in favor of CDCR.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that whether Becker was acting within the scope of his employment when he pursued Adams and Bolden was a question of fact that should be decided by a jury. The court noted that Becker’s actions may have been influenced by his role as a peace officer, and it was not clear whether he was acting as a private citizen or a law enforcement officer during the pursuit. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the CDCR. View "Adams v. Dept of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

This case involves a pharmaceutical manufacturer, Gilead Life Sciences, Inc., and its development and sale of a drug, tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF), to treat HIV/AIDS. The approximately 24,000 plaintiffs allege that they suffered adverse effects from TDF, including skeletal and kidney damage. Gilead developed a similar but chemically distinct drug, tenofovir alafenamide fumarate (TAF), which could potentially treat HIV/AIDS with fewer side effects. The plaintiffs claim that Gilead delayed the development of TAF to maximize profits from TDF.The plaintiffs do not claim that TDF is defective. Instead, they assert a claim for ordinary negligence, arguing that Gilead's decision to delay the development of TAF breached its duty of reasonable care to users of TDF. They also assert a claim for fraudulent concealment, arguing that Gilead had a duty to disclose information about TAF to users of TDF.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, partially granted Gilead's petition for a writ of mandate and held that the plaintiffs could proceed with their negligence claim. The court concluded that a manufacturer's legal duty of reasonable care can extend beyond the duty not to market a defective product. However, the court reversed the trial court's decision denying Gilead's motion for summary adjudication of the plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent concealment. The court held that Gilead had no duty to disclose information about TAF to users of TDF, as TAF was not available as an alternative treatment at the time. View "Gilead Tenofovir Cases" on Justia Law

The case revolves around injury suffered by a swimmer, Dr. Jennifer Pennington, who collided with the corner of a swimming-pool wall at a health and fitness center owned and operated by Memorial Hospital of South Bend, doing business as Beacon Health and Fitness. The design and construction of the swimming pool was carried out by Spear Corporation and Panzica Building Corporation. The Penningtons filed a suit against Beacon, Spear, and Panzica, alleging negligent design, failure to warn, negligent maintenance and operation, negligent construction, and deprivation of companionship due to the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment to Panzica and Spear on all counts and to Beacon on some counts, but denied summary judgment to Beacon on the count of negligent maintenance and operation and failure to provide adequate warnings and instructions. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment on any count, except as to the single issue of the level of the water within Count III. The court affirmed summary judgment for Spear and Panzica, stating that the Penningtons failed to provide admissible evidence regarding Spear or Panzica's breach of their professional duty of care. However, the court found that there were issues of fact regarding Beacon's role in the pool’s design and its maintenance and operation that required a trial. View "Pennington v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc." on Justia Law

The appellant, Hdeel Abdelhady, filed a suit against George Washington University ("the University") after being injured on the university's property. During the proceedings, the University submitted several exhibits that contained references to Abdelhady's private medical treatments and diagnoses. Abdelhady filed a motion to seal these exhibits to protect her medical privacy, but the District Court partially denied her motion. Abdelhady appealed this decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The appeals court first established its jurisdiction over the appeal by applying the "collateral order doctrine," which allows for immediate appeal of certain orders that are crucial and unreviewable after the final judgment. The court noted the high value of maintaining privacy in medical treatments and diagnoses and affirmed that an order denying a motion to seal records containing such information is immediately appealable.Turning to the merits of the appeal, the appeals court found that the District Court had erred in denying Abdelhady's motion to seal. It noted a lack of clarity in the District Court's decision and found that the lower court had relied on the incorrect assumption that Abdelhady had already disclosed in her redacted complaint all of the same information she sought to have sealed. The appeals court also found that the District Court did not adequately consider several factors that should guide such a decision, including the need for public access to the documents, Abdelhady's interest in medical privacy, and the extent of previous public access to the records.Consequently, the appeals court found that the District Court had abused its discretion and vacated the lower court's decision. The case was remanded back to the District Court for further consideration of all relevant factors and a more detailed explanation of its decision. The appeals court underscored that this remand did not imply that Abdelhady's motion to seal should have been granted in full, noting several ambiguities in her request. View "Abdelhady v. George Washington University" on Justia Law

In this California case, Gary Garner, the plaintiff, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against BNSF Railway Company, alleging that his father's exposure to toxic levels of diesel exhaust during his four-decade employment with BNSF caused his father's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and subsequent death. Garner retained several experts to opine on whether diesel exhaust and its constituents are capable of causing cancer, including non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and whether the father's workplace exposure to diesel exhaust was a cause of his cancer. However, the trial court granted BNSF's motions in limine to exclude Garner's three causation experts from trial. The trial court found that the science the experts relied on was inadequate and there was too great an analytical gap between the data and their opinions. As a result, Garner's wrongful death lawsuit was dismissed before trial.Garner appealed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Garner's experts. The court held that the trial court's gatekeeping role is not to choose between competing expert opinions, and it does not involve weighing the persuasiveness of an expert's opinion, substituting its own opinion for the expert’s opinion, or resolving scientific controversies. The court found that Garner's experts used their scientific judgment and expertise to evaluate the available data and determine whether to draw an inference of causation, which is a matter of informed judgment, not scientific methodology. The court reversed the orders and judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter new orders denying BNSF's motions in limine. View "Garner v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

In a personal injury case, Alejandro Lopez Aguilar, the appellant, had filed a lawsuit against Lucky Cab Co. and Adugna Demesash, the respondents. Before trial, Lucky Cab made an offer of judgment to Aguilar for a lump sum of $150,001, explicitly stating that this amount did not include prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs incurred to date. Aguilar accepted the offer. Lucky Cab sent Aguilar both a check for $150,001 and a stipulation and order for dismissal. However, Aguilar did not process the check or consent to the dismissal, arguing that Lucky Cab had not fully paid the offer amount as it had not yet paid any costs or prejudgment interest. The district court granted dismissal with prejudice, concluding that Lucky Cab was entitled to dismissal once it tendered payment within the stipulated window. Aguilar appealed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s decision. The high court clarified that when an offer of judgment explicitly excludes costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees, it promises two sums if accepted: (1) the principal amount for the claim(s), specified in the offer; and (2) a separate amount for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees that would be recoverable if a judgment were entered based on that offer. Consequently, under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 68(d)(2), an offeror cannot obtain dismissal unless they pay both the principal offer and the additional allowance for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees. In this case, Lucky Cab did not pay the pre-offer costs and interest that were promised and that Aguilar would be entitled to as a prevailing party. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the amount of awardable pre-offer costs and interest that Lucky Cab must pay to obtain dismissal. View "Aguilar v. Lucky Cab Co." on Justia Law