Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A shopper at a grocery store slipped and fell in a puddle of clear liquid in the toy aisle. She noticed water around her and observed water dripping from a ceiling rafter above the puddle. Her companion, who was nearby, initially thought the water came from the ceiling but later stated he did not actually see a drip. The store manager, responding to the incident, saw water on the floor but no evidence of a leak, and attributed the source to rain, which had ended two hours earlier. The store had experienced multiple roof leaks in the past year due to renovations, but no leaks were reported in the toy aisle before or after the incident. Surveillance footage showed no employee had walked down the aisle in the two hours prior to the fall.The trial court excluded the plaintiff’s expert report and granted summary judgment for the grocery store, finding no evidence of the store’s actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the store’s knowledge of previous leaks elsewhere in the building could raise a fact issue about its constructive knowledge regarding the puddle in the toy aisle. The appellate court also partially reinstated some expert testimony.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that to survive a no-evidence summary judgment in a premises liability slip-and-fall case, a plaintiff must present evidence of how long the dangerous condition existed. The Court concluded there was no evidence addressing the duration of the puddle’s presence. Prior leaks elsewhere in the store, the size of the puddle, or evidence about inspections were insufficient to show constructive knowledge of the puddle at the relevant time and place. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated summary judgment for the grocery store. View "H-E-B, L.P. v. PETERSON" on Justia Law

An employee of a plumbing subcontractor was injured when a trench collapsed at a residential construction site, resulting in serious physical and emotional harm. The employee had been directed by his supervisor to enter a trench that did not comply with OSHA safety regulations. The general contractor for the project was not present at the site and only learned of the accident months later, after an OSHA investigation. The subcontractor, not the general contractor, was responsible for the trenching work and the day-to-day safety of its employees.After receiving workers’ compensation and settling gross negligence claims against his co-employees, the injured worker proceeded to trial solely on a negligence claim against the general contractor. The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the general contractor’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, allowing the case to go to a jury, which found the general contractor liable and awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The court held that, as a general rule, a general contractor does not owe a duty of care to the employees of an independent contractor. The court found that neither the “retained control” nor “peculiar risk” exceptions to this rule applied. The general contractor did not retain operative control over the subcontractor’s work, either by contract or by conduct, and residential trenching work is not inherently or peculiarly dangerous as a matter of law under Iowa precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the general contractor was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reversed the lower court’s ruling. View "Kono v. D.R. Horton, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles Bunning was injured in a motor vehicle collision with Ernest Romero at an intersection in Cheyenne, Wyoming. At the time of the accident, Bunning was driving south on a through highway, exceeding the speed limit and weaving through heavy traffic. Romero, who had stopped at a stop sign on a cross street, waited for what he thought was a safe opportunity, then entered the intersection to turn left. Bunning, changing lanes and accelerating, collided with Romero’s truck as Romero crossed the highway. Both vehicles were damaged, and both drivers suffered injuries.After the incident, Bunning sued Romero for negligence. Romero counterclaimed, alleging Bunning’s negligence caused the crash, but Romero’s counterclaim was settled before trial. The District Court of Laramie County held a bench trial, concluded that both drivers breached their respective duties to operate their vehicles reasonably, and found that their negligence proximately caused Bunning’s injuries and damages. The district court found Bunning was more than fifty percent at fault, due to his speeding and unsafe driving, and under Wyoming’s comparative fault statute (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(b)), barred him from recovering damages.On appeal, Bunning argued that as the preferred driver on a through highway, Romero’s failure to yield should make Romero strictly liable, and comparative fault principles should not apply. The Supreme Court of Wyoming rejected this argument, holding that the comparative fault statute applies to all negligence actions, including those involving violations of right-of-way statutes, unless the legislature has expressly provided otherwise. The Supreme Court found the district court’s application of the statute, its findings of fault, and the bar to recovery were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the judgment. View "Bunning v. Romero" on Justia Law

A man filed suit in 2017 against three individuals and a club, alleging that he was sexually abused as a child between 1993 and 2000. He claimed that the abuse caused him numerous injuries but asserted that he did not learn of the connection between the abuse and his injuries until 2014, after receiving psychotherapy. The defendants argued that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations, contending that he was aware of the connection between the abuse and his injuries before reaching adulthood, based on deposition testimony and documents such as statements the plaintiff made to police.The Circuit Court of Sussex County considered deposition transcripts and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, with no live testimony presented at the hearing. The circuit court found that the plaintiff knew of the causal relationship between the abuse and his injuries before he reached the age of majority in 2002. Thus, the court determined that his claims accrued when he became an adult, and were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that expired in 2004. The court granted the defendants’ pleas in bar, dismissing the claims.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed this decision, holding that, since only documentary evidence had been presented, the circuit court’s factual findings were not entitled to deference. It reviewed the matter de novo, found disputed material facts, and concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review. The Supreme Court clarified that factual findings based on deposition evidence are entitled to substantial deference unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the claims were time-barred. View "Stevens v. Jurnigan" on Justia Law

Yerano Martinez was seriously injured in a car accident after he drove through a stop sign at an intersection. Martinez alleged that an overgrown bush, located on property owned by Jeffrey Smith, obscured the stop sign. The bush extended from Smith's property into the county's right-of-way, which is a strip of land adjacent to the roadway. Martinez argued that Smith failed in his duty to maintain his property so as not to obstruct the stop sign for passing motorists.The Marion Superior Court granted summary judgment to Smith, finding that, under the Indiana Supreme Court’s previous decision in Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., Smith owed no duty to motorists unless a hazardous condition actually extended onto the paved portion of the roadway. The Indiana Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, interpreting Reece to mean that a landowner’s duty to motorists is limited to conditions that extend onto the roadway itself, not merely into the public right-of-way or county easement.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case on transfer. The Court held that a landowner’s common-law duty under Reece to refrain from creating hazardous conditions for passing motorists on adjacent highways includes traffic-control devices, such as stop signs, located within the public right-of-way. The Court clarified that the duty is not confined to the paved part of the road but extends to conditions that obstruct traffic-control devices within the right-of-way. Because Smith admitted the bush encroached into the public right-of-way and created a visual obstruction, the hazardous condition was not wholly contained on his property. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Smith and reversed the lower court’s decision. View "Martinez v. Smith" on Justia Law

A San Diego family suffered a significant mistake after the sudden death of their relative, Jose Gonzalez, Jr., in Texas. Due to a mix-up at the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office, the body of Mr. Gonzalez was confused with another individual who died a day later. As a result, the family received the wrong body for burial, while Mr. Gonzalez’s remains were mistakenly cremated in Texas. The widow, Celina Gonzalez, contracted with a California mortuary to arrange for Mr. Gonzalez’s body to be transported and prepared for funeral services in California. However, due to the error, the family discovered the mistake only at the viewing and could not bury their loved one as intended.Following these events, two lawsuits were filed in the Superior Court of San Diego County: one by the extended family and one by Celina and her daughter Edna. The cases were consolidated. The operative complaint alleged breach of contract and negligence. At trial, the mortuary asserted the affirmative defense of impracticability of performance, which the trial judge submitted to the jury. The jury found for the mortuary on both negligence and breach of contract, concluding that performance was excused due to impracticability. The trial court also granted nonsuit to the mortuary, ruling that only Celina, as the contracting party, had standing to sue for breach of contract, and that the extended family were not intended third-party beneficiaries.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the defense of impracticability of performance is equitable and must be decided by the judge, not a jury. The appellate court reversed the judgment on the breach of contract claim as to Celina, remanding for a bench trial on the impracticability defense and, if necessary, a trial on damages. The court affirmed the dismissal of the extended family’s contract claims, finding they lacked standing. View "Gonzalez v. Community Mortuary" on Justia Law

William Johnson drowned while swimming at a recreation center pool owned and operated by the City of Cleveland. At the time, the lifeguard on duty, Nieemah Hameed, was seated in a folding chair on the pool deck rather than in an available elevated lifeguard chair, citing discomfort as her reason for not using the elevated chair. After Johnson failed to resurface while swimming, Hameed and another lifeguard attempted resuscitation, but Johnson died. The cause of death was determined to be drowning due to a seizure.The executor of Johnson’s estate filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the city and the lifeguard. The city asserted political subdivision immunity under Ohio law and argued Johnson had signed a waiver of liability. The plaintiff countered that an exception to immunity applied under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), claiming the use of a folding chair instead of the elevated lifeguard chair constituted a “physical defect” on the pool grounds. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas denied Cleveland’s motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of material fact. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on its own precedent that the use of a low chair could create a material factual dispute as to whether a physical defect existed.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the choice to use a folding chair rather than an elevated lifeguard chair does not amount to a “physical defect” under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). The court found no evidence of a tangible imperfection in the lifeguard chair or pool area that would remove the city’s immunity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and ordered the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the City of Cleveland. View "Hoskins v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

A patient underwent surgery on September 4, 2020, and died twelve days later. Her estate and children brought a medical malpractice suit against the surgeon and hospital, alleging negligence. The defendants sought dismissal, arguing the plaintiffs had not satisfied Iowa’s certificate of merit requirements under Iowa Code section 147.140(1), which mandates a supporting expert affidavit early in medical malpractice litigation. The district court denied the motion to dismiss.The defendants then sought interlocutory review from the Iowa Supreme Court. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial, finding the plaintiffs had not complied with the statutory affidavit requirement, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case with prejudice. Following the remand, the plaintiffs attempted to file dismissals without prejudice before and after the district court’s order of dismissal with prejudice. Despite these filings, the district court entered a dismissal with prejudice as directed by the Iowa Supreme Court. The plaintiffs then filed a new lawsuit asserting the same claims against the same defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss this second action, citing claim preclusion (res judicata) and the statute of limitations. The Iowa District Court for Clinton County dismissed the second action.On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The court held that its prior mandate required dismissal with prejudice, and any attempt by the plaintiffs to dismiss without prejudice was contrary to that mandate and thus ineffective. The court found that the elements of claim preclusion were satisfied: the parties and claims were identical to the prior action, and there was a final judgment on the merits. Accordingly, the second lawsuit was barred. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. View "Shontz v. Mercy Medical Center-Clinton, Inc." on Justia Law

During a period of foggy weather near Anamosa, Iowa, Margaret McQuillen was driving southbound on Highway 151 when her vehicle collided with a semitrailer operated by Clifford Takes, who was employed by West Side Transport, Inc. Takes made an unprotected left turn across Margaret’s lane, resulting in a severe underride collision that caused Margaret catastrophic injuries, including traumatic brain injuries and numerous fractures. The state patrol cited Takes for failing to yield, and he pleaded guilty. Margaret’s parents, acting as her guardians, filed suit against Takes and West Side, alleging negligence and vicarious liability.The Iowa District Court for Linn County tried the case. The jury found both parties negligent, assigning 73% of the fault to Takes and West Side, and 27% to Margaret. Margaret’s damages were assessed at over $35 million, leading to a judgment in her favor for approximately $26 million after comparative fault reduction. The defendants’ motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case after the defendants appealed, arguing errors in the plaintiffs’ closing arguments warranted a new trial, and the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming a settlement had rendered the appeal moot. The court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding the parties had not reached a full settlement disposing of the appeal. On the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion by the district court in its handling of closing arguments, finding that the arguments did not warrant a mistrial or new trial, and that any improper argument did not likely affect the trial’s outcome. The court also concluded the defendants had not preserved error regarding arguments about present value. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "McQuillen v. West Side Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman suffered serious injuries when she struck a large pothole while riding her motorcycle on a city street in Jackson, Mississippi. Her view of the pothole was blocked by a truck in front of her, and the accident resulted in a severely broken ankle requiring surgery and extensive recovery. Prior to the incident, she owned a caregiving business but was unable to resume her work due to her injuries, leading to significant financial hardship. The City of Jackson had received notice of the dangerous pothole eight days before the accident, classified it as a high priority, but did not repair it or place any warnings until months later.The case was tried in the Hinds County Circuit Court. The court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, granted the plaintiff’s partial summary judgment on liability, and after a bench trial on damages, awarded her both economic and noneconomic damages. The City appealed, arguing that it was immune from liability under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act based on discretionary-function immunity and challenged the interpretation of statutory duties as well as the denial of summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. It held that while the City’s decisions about general street maintenance may involve policy discretion, its failure to warn about or timely repair a known dangerous pothole after receiving actual notice did not qualify for discretionary-function immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The Court found that such failures were “simple acts of negligence” rather than protected policy decisions. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the judgment of the Hinds County Circuit Court, holding that the City was not immune from liability and upholding the award of damages to the plaintiff. View "City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Lawson" on Justia Law