Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed a district court's decision in a case involving a plaintiff, John Breuer, who sued the State of Montana for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The accident was caused by a student-employee of the University of Montana. Breuer claimed that the accident resulted in a shoulder injury that caused him significant pain and suffering, and loss of established course of life. The State admitted liability for the accident, but disputed that the accident was the sole cause of Breuer's claimed disabilities and pain. The district court excluded evidence of Breuer's pre-accident back injury and related disabilities as alternate cause evidence. The Supreme Court held that this was an error and that the district court's exclusion of this evidence materially prejudiced the State's right to a fair trial. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Breuer v. State" on Justia Law

In a wrongful death action brought by Laura Milus on behalf of herself and her minor child against Sun Valley Company, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, Sun Valley. Ms. Milus' husband died after colliding with snowmaking equipment while skiing at Sun Valley Ski Resort. Ms. Milus alleged that Sun Valley breached its duties under Idaho Code section 6-1103(2) and (6), which require ski area operators to mark snowmaking equipment with visible signs or warning implements and place a conspicuous notice at or near the top of a trail or slope when snowmaking operations are being undertaken. The district court granted Sun Valley's summary judgment motion, concluding that Sun Valley had fulfilled its duty under section 6-1103(2) by marking the snowmaking equipment with yellow padding and did not have a duty under section 6-1103(6) because the snowmaking equipment was not actively discharging snow. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed the district court's decision, finding that the question of whether the yellow padding constitutes a warning implement under section 6-1103(2) is a question of fact for the jury. The court also held that section 6-1103(6) imposes a duty on ski area operators to place a conspicuous notice at or near the top of the trail or slope when snowmaking equipment is placed on the ski run or slope, regardless of whether the equipment is actively discharging snow. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Milus v. Sun Valley Company" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals of the State of New York held that the plaintiff, a certified diesel technician, was not engaged in an activity protected by Labor Law § 240 (1) when he was injured while repairing a trailer. The plaintiff was working beneath a lifted trailer, fixing a faulty air brake system, when the trailer fell on him. He sued on the grounds that the defendant failed to provide him with adequate safety devices, as required by Labor Law § 240 (1). The court found that the statute was not intended to cover ordinary vehicle repair. The court reasoned that, while the statute protects workers from elevation-related risks in industries like construction, it does not cover every instance where a worker is injured as a result of an elevation differential. The court also noted that extending the statute's coverage to ordinary vehicle repair could lead to an overly broad interpretation that would place undue liability on car owners for injuries sustained by mechanics. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of the section 240 (1) cause of action against the defendant. View "Stoneham v Joseph Barsuk, Inc." on Justia Law

In January 2018, Dorothy Warren passed away after Dr. Nirandr Inthachak allegedly misinterpreted her CT scan. Angela Wilson, Warren’s daughter, filed a lawsuit against Dr. Inthachak. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Inthachak on two grounds. First, Wilson failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence required under OCGA § 51-1-29.5 for healthcare liability claims arising from emergency medical care. Second, Wilson couldn’t prove that the outcome would have been different if Dr. Inthachak had correctly interpreted the CT scan.Wilson appealed, and all 14 judges of the Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was improper. However, they were evenly divided on why summary judgment was incorrect under OCGA § 51-1-29.5. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the equal division, invoking the Court's equal-division jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Court of Appeals was not equally divided on the disposition of the judgment that was appealed. The Court of Appeals had unanimously agreed that the grant of summary judgment could not stand, and their disagreement was only regarding the reasons for why one of the two grounds was faulty. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that such a disagreement did not invoke its equal-division jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court returned the case to the Court of Appeals. View "WILSON v. INTHACHAK" on Justia Law

In this case, Arlene James filed a premises liability lawsuit against Brixmor New Chastain Corners SC, LLC, after she tripped on a parking bumper in a parking lot owned by Brixmor and sustained injuries. The parking bumper was not in its usual location but was instead laid out to separate the parking space from a motorcycle parking area. After the incident, Brixmor painted the parking bumper yellow. The trial court denied Brixmor's motion for summary judgment due to disputed facts about whether the structure James tripped on was a hazard and whether she had previously encountered it. The trial court also granted James's motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, barring Brixmor from arguing that the parking bumper was not a potential hazard. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment but vacated the order imposing spoliation sanctions, remanding the matter to the trial court to apply the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Brixmor's petition for a writ of certiorari but chose to address a different issue: the Court of Appeals' determination that Brixmor failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in considering the subsequent remedial measures rule in its analysis of the spoliation issue. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that once the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court applied the incorrect standard on spoliation, consideration of the remedial measure rule was unnecessary and thus dicta. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated Division 3 of the opinion to the extent that it purports to make a legal determination on the subsequent remedial measures rule and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BRIXMOR NEW CHASTAIN CORNERS SC, LLC v. JAMES" on Justia Law

In this case, Crista Miller tripped on a vertical misalignment of less than one inch between a metal plate covering an underground utility vault, owned by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), and the surrounding sidewalk adjacent to a property owned by Hip Sen Benevolent Association (Hip Sen), resulting in an injury to her ankle. Miller filed a lawsuit against both PG&E and Hip Sen, alleging general negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the lawsuit was barred by the trivial defect doctrine.Miller appealed, but the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court concluded that the vertical misalignment was a trivial defect as a matter of law. The court stated that to recover damages for negligence or premises liability, Miller had to prove that the defendants breached a legal duty to either repair or warn about the existence of the misalignment. However, it is well-established law that landowners are not liable for damages caused by minor, trivial, or insignificant defects in property. Even considering the steepness of the sidewalk, the weather conditions, the time of the incident, and the crowded nature of the street, the court found that these factors did not render the misalignment a dangerous condition. The court also found that the city's guidelines and repair notices did not impose a legal duty to repair such minor defects.Miller also argued that the city's repair notices to PG&E and Hip Sen for their violations of the city's Guidelines rendered them liable under a theory of negligence per se. However, the appellate court found this argument to be forfeited as Miller did not raise this issue in the trial court and only presented it for the first time in her appellate reply brief.Therefore, the appellate court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find the trivial sidewalk defect posed a substantial risk of injury to a foreseeable pedestrian exercising due care and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

A minor, Freedom Morris, sought emergency treatment for appendicitis at Vidant Medical Center and was operated on by Dr. David Rodeberg. Despite complaining of severe pain after the surgery, Morris was discharged. He returned to the hospital a day later with a fever and sharp abdominal pain. A second surgery performed by a different doctor revealed that not all of the appendix had been removed during the first operation. This had caused a ruptured appendix and infection in Morris' body. Morris underwent a third surgery to drain a pelvic abscess.More than five years after the first surgery, Morris filed a lawsuit against Dr. Rodeberg and Vidant Medical Center alleging medical malpractice and medical negligence. The defendants responded with motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the lawsuit was filed outside the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims of persons who are over ten years old but under eighteen years old when their claims accrue. The trial court denied the defendants' motions, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the three-year statute of limitations barred Morris' medical malpractice claims. The Court reasoned that while the North Carolina General Assembly has recognized that individuals under certain disabilities, including being a minor, are unable to appreciate the nature of potential legal claims and take appropriate action, subsection 1-17(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes eliminates the tolling of the medical malpractice claims of minors, except in certain situations. None of those exceptions applied to Morris' case, so his claim was subject to the standard three-year statute of limitations and was therefore time-barred. The Court did not address Morris' argument that the application of the three-year statute of limitations violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because it did not have jurisdiction to review that issue. View "Morris v. Rodeberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Alabama has reversed an order by the Dale Circuit Court, which held Omni Healthcare Financial, LLC in contempt for failing to comply with a subpoena. This case arose from claims asserted by Amy Lee Walker against Eric Irvin Reese and SCP Distributors, LLC, following an automobile collision. Omni, a North Carolina-based factoring company, had purchased certain accounts receivable from a medical provider who had treated Walker. The accounts receivable are secured by an interest in any recovery that Walker obtains from her lawsuit against the defendants. The defendants had served a nonparty subpoena on Omni's registered agent in Alabama, seeking certain documents. Omni later responded with some documents but also asserted objections to the subpoena. The defendants then filed a motion asking the circuit court to hold Omni in contempt of court for failing to comply with the subpoena. The circuit court granted this motion, leading to Omni's appeal. The Supreme Court of Alabama found that the trial court erred by holding Omni in contempt, as the subpoena was invalid. It was determined that the subpoena seeking documents located in North Carolina needed to be issued by a North Carolina court and served in accordance with North Carolina law. As the defendants had not asked a North Carolina court to direct Omni to produce the documents, they had not complied with the requirements to hold Omni in contempt. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Omni Healthcare Financial, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2017, plaintiff Marcelina Barron sued the Santa Clara County Valley Transportation Authority and bus driver Bruce Arnold Gaillard for general negligence after she was injured in a bus accident. After several delays, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it had not been brought to trial within the five-year deadline defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310. Barron countered that the deadline had been extended by six months due to Emergency rule 10(a), enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic by the Judicial Council of California. The trial court granted the dismissal, interpreting the Ables v. A. Ghazale Brothers, Inc. decision to mean that the emergency rule did not extend the five-year period because it was not a statute. Barron appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the Judicial Council had the authority to enact Emergency rule 10(a), and therefore the time to bring the case to trial was legally extended by six months. The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Barron's complaint prematurely based on an incorrect interpretation of the five-year statute of limitations in section 583.310 and Emergency rule 10(a). The case was reinstated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barron v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual developed a mass under his armpit and was referred to a surgeon who had a contract with the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). The surgeon performed a biopsy, which was then sent to the pathology department at the Cortland Regional Medical Center (CRMC) for examination. Dr. Jun Wang, the Medical Director of CRMC's pathology department and a member of Cortland Pathology, examined the specimen and determined that the mass was benign. A year later, the patient was diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma.The patient initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against CRMC and others, alleging that they misdiagnosed his condition and failed to promptly diagnose or refer him for treatment. Dr. Wang sought defense and indemnification from the State, claiming that he was entitled to coverage under Public Officers Law § 17 and Correction Law § 24-a because his actions arose from treating an incarcerated individual at the request of DOCCS. The Attorney General rejected Dr. Wang's request, stating that he treated the patient through his employment arrangement with CRMC, not directly at the request of the State, and thus the State had no obligation to provide defense or indemnification.The New York Court of Appeals held that the State is not obligated to indemnify or defend Dr. Wang in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The court ruled that under the Correction Law § 24-a, the State's obligation to defend and indemnify only applies when there has been an explicit request by DOCCS for the services of a specific provider—an arrangement or understanding made in advance between DOCCS and the healthcare professional. In this case, no such express request or direct agreement existed between DOCCS and Dr. Wang, therefore, the State had no obligation to defend or indemnify him. The court also stated that the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Hence, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "In re Wang v James" on Justia Law