Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff Sean Stetson and Defendant Edmonds were part of a low-speed, sideswipe vehicle accident. Although no one reported injuries on the scene, two weeks after the accident, Plaintiff sought medical treatment for injuries he claimed he sustained in the accident. With this visit, Plaintiff filed his now "plainly evident" campaign to fabricate a claim for damages. When a party to litigation seeks to intentionally deceive the court and its adversary, a district court may issue reasonable sanctions and require the deceitful party to pay attorney fees. Finding plaintiff did just that, and the district court sanctioned him with reasonable attorney fees and dismissal of his non-economic claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sanctions. View "Stenson v. Edmonds, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff took her neighbor’s dog for a walk around Dolphin’s apartment complex. Plaintiff observed that it was raining that day with thunderstorms. Before crossing, Plaintiff observed that the concrete on the North Side Gate driveway was wet, and rainwater formed a current that was running down the driveway. Plaintiff proceeded to cross, and the rainwater current knocked her down. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her right shoulder, left knee, and face. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dolphin, alleging general negligence and premises liability. Dolphin filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because the running rainwater was open and obvious, Dolphin had no duty to warn. The trial court granted Dolphin’s motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims because the rainwater current on the driveway was open and obvious. Further, the court wrote that even assuming Plaintiff did not forfeit the necessity exception to the open and obvious rule, she still cannot prevail on the merits. The court wrote that Plaintiff was in a better position to avoid the obvious danger of walking across a current of water that formed as a result of a rainstorm that began that same day. Plaintiff could have chosen to use a different entrance. The burden imposed on Dolphin to constantly monitor weather conditions and immediately install warning signals is outweighed by Plaintiff’s ability to avoid a condition she should have observed as obviously dangerous. View "Nicoletti v. Kest" on Justia Law

Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer David McNamee, Officer Cory Budaj, and Sergeant Patricio Serrant. Between May 28 and June 2, 2020, several large protests occurred on Denver streets in reaction to the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis. On May 30, then-Denver Mayor Michael Hancock declared a state of emergency and imposed a curfew; he also requested assistance from mutual aid police departments, including the Aurora Police Department. At about 9 p.m. on May 31, Plaintiff Zachary Packard was protesting near downtown Denver when a police officer threw a tear gas canister near Packard. Packard kicked the cannister“away from himself and other protesters, in the direction of a line of officers.” Packard kicked the canister about five to ten feet away from himself and other protesters. Critically, this action “did not pose an immediate threat,” the district court concluded, “because officers were equipped with gas masks that protected them from any gas from that container.” Immediately after kicking the canister, Packard was hit in the head with a beanbag round fired from a shotgun; the round knocked him unconscious and caused major injuries. One of the officers on Sergeant Serrant’s line was Defendant Officer McNamee. He fired several beanbag rounds at the time Packard was shot, but the parties disputed whether Officer McNamee was the officer who shot Packard. The district court concluded Plaintiffs raised genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Sergeant Serrant and Officer McNamee were “personally involved in the alleged violation of Mr. Packard’s rights.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the district court's judgment and affirmed. View "Duran, et al. v. Budaj, et al." on Justia Law

Jose Garcia sued Colorado Cab Company, LLC (“Colorado Cab”) to recover for severe injuries he suffered while attempting to aid one of Colorado Cab’s drivers, Ali Yusuf. Garcia discovered Yusuf being assaulted by Yusuf’s passenger, Curt Glinton. Enraged by Garcia’s interference, Glinton attacked Garcia, first with his fists and then with the cab itself. The jury determined that Colorado Cab was liable for failing to install certain protective devices and awarded Garcia damages. In a split decision, a division of the court of appeals concluded as a matter of law that Garcia’s injuries resulting from Glinton’s theft and use of the cab as a weapon were “outside the risks reasonably to be anticipated” from both Colorado Cab’s negligence and Garcia’s rescue attempt. The broader question presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was how to analyze proximate cause in the rescuer context. To this, the Court held that, to prove proximate cause, the rescuer must show that his injuries were reasonably foreseeable based on the defendant’s alleged tortious conduct and the nature of the rescue attempt. While the Court agreed with much of the appellate court majority’s analytical framework, the Supreme Court concluded that it erred by deciding the issue of proximate cause as a matter of law. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the jury’s verdict. View "Garcia v. Colorado Cab Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case, which included the estate and surviving family members of Allan Thomas George, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Rifle, Colorado (the City), Tommy Klein, the chief of the Rifle Police Department (RPD), and Dewey Ryan, a corporal with RPD, alleging that the defendants violated George’s Fourth Amendment rights by employing excessive and deadly force against him in the course of attempting to arrest him on a felony warrant. Plaintiffs also raised a Colorado state law claim of battery causing wrongful death against Ryan. Defendants moved for summary judgment with respect to all of the claims asserted against them. Defendants Ryan and Klein asserted, in particular, that they were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 excessive force claim. The district court denied defendants’ motion in its entirety. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s ruling. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that where, as here, a police officer’s employment of deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officer’s use of force cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed to be in “conscious disregard of the danger.” The Court therefore concluded the district court erred in denying summary judgment to the defendant officers, and reversed with respect to all defendants. View "Estate of Allan George, et al. v. Ryan, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Octavi Perez appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Roman’s Restaurant, LLC, d/b/a Roman’s Night Club, on claims for damages under Alabama’s Dram Shop Act. In July 2019, 18-year-old Edgar Perez had been a patron of the nightclub and was killed when the vehicle he was driving left the roadway and hit a tree. An autopsy indicated Edgar was intoxicated at the time of his death. Plaintiff filed suit against Roman’s alleging it served alcoholic beverages to a minor, and Edgar’s subsequent intoxication precipitated Edgar’s death. Roman’s moved for summary judgment, arguing in relevant part that: (1) Plainitff lacked standing to sue on Edgar’s behalf because Plaintiff was neither Edgar’s parent nor stood in loco parentis; and (2) Plaintiff could not maintain an action under the Dram Shop Act because plaintiff had not been “injured in person, property or means of support.” The court record reflected Plaintiff was Edgar’s uncle, and Edgar contributed to the household expenses in the apartment he shared with Plaintiff and his father, Rigoberto Perez. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in Roman’s favor and affirmed. View "Perez v. Roman's Restaurant, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents, the owners of electrical and communication lines that electrocuted Eugene Boyce (Petitioner), in this negligence action brought by Eugene and his wife Kimberly Boyce, holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioner was attempting to make a delivery in the course of his employment when he attempted to move overhead communication lines by climbing on top of his truck and wrapping shrink-wrap around the communication lines. The lines were in close proximity to an energized electrical line, which Petitioner contacted and was electrocuted. The circuit court found that Petitioner's actions were negligent and served as the only proximate cause of the incident. The court further found that, even if a issue of fact existed as to Respondents' negligence, Petitioner's actions constituted an intervening and superseding cause of the incident and injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that Petitioner's actions were (1) the sole proximate cause of the incident, and (2) constituted an intervening cause. View "Boyce v. Monongahela Power Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Board of Review affirming an ALJ's denial of Robert Hood's application for workers' compensation benefits, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Hood was making a delivery for his employer when he felt a pain in his right knee. The employer's claim administrator denied Hood's application for workers' compensation benefits after concluding that Hood did not sustain an injury in the course of and scope of his employment. An ALJ affirmed, as did the Board of Review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Hood's injury occurred while he was working, it did not result from his employment. View "Hood v. Lincare Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded that under the continuous-trigger theory, when an insurance claim is made by alleging a progressive injury caused by chemical exposure or other analogous toxic, injurious substance, damages that are caused, continuous, or progressively deteriorating throughout successive policy periods are covered by all the occurrence-based policies in effect during those periods.This case involved claims against a standardized commercial general liability (CGL) policy alleging that long-term exposure to chemicals caused a disease to develop over a number of years before being diagnosed. The exposure to the chemicals and the development of the disease, however, happened across numerous CGL policy periods. Insurer denied coverage under its CGL policies and filed a complaint for declaratory relief. The district court granted a judgment in favor of Insured, finding that Insurer owed Insured a duty to defend and indemnify under all of its policies. The Supreme Court answered a certified question that, under the continuous-trigger theory, when a claim is made alleging a progressive injury caused by chemical exposure or other analogous harm, every occurrence-based policy in effect from the initial exposure, through the latency and development period and up to the manifestation of the bodily illness, is triggered and must cover the claim. View "Westfield Insurance Co. v. Sistersville Tank Works, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting Respondents' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint on the ground that it had not been timely filed and ruling that the two-year statute of limitations contained in the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W. Va. Code 29-12A-6(a), applied, holding that the court erred in granting the motion to dismiss.Petitioner, administratrix of the estate of Petitioner's infant son, sued Summers County Office of Emergency Management and its employee Carmen Cales (collectively Respondents), alleging wrongful death. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, ruling that the claims were governed by the Act and that Petitioner's case fell within the two-year statute of limitation set forth in section 29-12A-6(a). The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in concluding that the minority tolling provision set forth in section 29-12A-6(b) did not apply to this case; but (2) erred in granting Respondents' motion to dismiss Petitioner's claims on the ground that the statute of limitations had run on the claims. View "Trivett v. Summers County Commission" on Justia Law