Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Board of Review affirming an ALJ's denial of Robert Hood's application for workers' compensation benefits, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Hood was making a delivery for his employer when he felt a pain in his right knee. The employer's claim administrator denied Hood's application for workers' compensation benefits after concluding that Hood did not sustain an injury in the course of and scope of his employment. An ALJ affirmed, as did the Board of Review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Hood's injury occurred while he was working, it did not result from his employment. View "Hood v. Lincare Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded that under the continuous-trigger theory, when an insurance claim is made by alleging a progressive injury caused by chemical exposure or other analogous toxic, injurious substance, damages that are caused, continuous, or progressively deteriorating throughout successive policy periods are covered by all the occurrence-based policies in effect during those periods.This case involved claims against a standardized commercial general liability (CGL) policy alleging that long-term exposure to chemicals caused a disease to develop over a number of years before being diagnosed. The exposure to the chemicals and the development of the disease, however, happened across numerous CGL policy periods. Insurer denied coverage under its CGL policies and filed a complaint for declaratory relief. The district court granted a judgment in favor of Insured, finding that Insurer owed Insured a duty to defend and indemnify under all of its policies. The Supreme Court answered a certified question that, under the continuous-trigger theory, when a claim is made alleging a progressive injury caused by chemical exposure or other analogous harm, every occurrence-based policy in effect from the initial exposure, through the latency and development period and up to the manifestation of the bodily illness, is triggered and must cover the claim. View "Westfield Insurance Co. v. Sistersville Tank Works, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting Respondents' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint on the ground that it had not been timely filed and ruling that the two-year statute of limitations contained in the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W. Va. Code 29-12A-6(a), applied, holding that the court erred in granting the motion to dismiss.Petitioner, administratrix of the estate of Petitioner's infant son, sued Summers County Office of Emergency Management and its employee Carmen Cales (collectively Respondents), alleging wrongful death. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, ruling that the claims were governed by the Act and that Petitioner's case fell within the two-year statute of limitation set forth in section 29-12A-6(a). The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in concluding that the minority tolling provision set forth in section 29-12A-6(b) did not apply to this case; but (2) erred in granting Respondents' motion to dismiss Petitioner's claims on the ground that the statute of limitations had run on the claims. View "Trivett v. Summers County Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in this case alleging malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, and abuse of process claims against certain officials involved in Petitioner's prosecution for domestic battery and domestic assault, of which he was acquitted at trial, holding that there was no error.Petitioner Norm Launi II brought claims of malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy against West Virginia State Police Corporal Scott Nazelrod, special prosecuting attorney John Ours, and prosecuting attorney in Hampshire County Dan James and also asserted a claim for abuse of process against Nazelrod. The circuit court dismissed the claims against James and Ours on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity and found that Petitioner failed to state valid claims as to Nazelrod. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) properly dismissed the claims against James and Ours based on prosecutorial functions; and (2) did not err in concluding that Petitioner's claims against Nazelrod for malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, and abuse of process failed on their merits. View "Launi v. Hampshire County Prosecuting Attorney's Office" on Justia Law

In April 2015, federal agent Quinn shot and killed Kellom while trying to arrest him. Kellom’s estate sued Quinn under the Federal Tort Claims Act with a “Bivens” excessive-force claim. The government replaced Quinn as the defendant in the tort claims. The estate then filed an unsuccessful claim with Quinn’s employer, DHS. The FTCA requires plaintiffs to seek relief “first” from the federal agency within two years: the government notified the estate that it needed to bring a new lawsuit for its FTCA claims. Instead, in May 2018, the estate amended its complaint, asserting the same claims. The district court treated the FTCA exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the FTCA claims. The Bivens claim proceeded. A jury ruled in Quinn’s favor. Meanwhile, Kellom’s family members brought FTCA claims by joining the estate’s amended complaint, which was filed in May 2018. The family had not sought relief from DHS, so the district court dismissed those claims. In October 2018, the family filed a claim with DHS. DHS denied the claim. Rather than rejoin the estate’s lawsuit, the family filed a new one. The district court dismissed the family’s claims as untimely.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The government did not waive or forfeit its exhaustion defense in the estate’s case by failing to oppose a motion to amend. The estate did not cure its failure to exhaust by filing an amended complaint. The family’s claims were untimely. View "Kellom v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured in an auto accident and brought product liability claims against the vehicle’s manufacturer. In the course of litigation, the manufacturer moved to exclude Plaintiffs’ two liability experts, moved for a new trial and a judgment as a matter of law, and objected to the denial of a jury instruction regarding the presumption of nonliability (“the presumption”). Ultimately, the manufacturer was found liable and ordered to pay nearly $5 million in damages.On appeal, the manufacturer argued the district court erred in denying the motions and rejecting the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs’ experts based their opinions on reliable methodologies and provided relevant, helpful testimony. View "Kim v. American Honda Motor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the determination of the district court granting Hill County, Montana, and Blaine County, Montana summary judgment on the standalone claims brought by the Estate of A.J. Longsoldier, Jr. for negligence and denying its cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.Longsoldier died in 2009 while in Hill County's custody. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the determination that neither Blaine County, where Longsoldier was arrested, nor Hill County discriminated against Longsoldier on the basis of race or disability. In the second appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling that Hill County could be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the hospital where Longsoldier was treated during his detention. In this third appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the district court (1) erred in determining that the Estate's negligence claim against Hill County was barred by principles of issue preclusion; (2) erred in ruling that the Estate may not pursue a negligence claim against Blaine County; and (3) did not err in denying the Estate's motion for partial summary judgment on liability. View "Stricker v. Blaine County" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States on Petitioner's claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and to the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department (SCSD) on Petitioner's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act (RHA), 29 U.S.C. 794, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Petitioner's FTCA claims.Petitioner filed this action setting forth FTCA claims against the United States based on the treatment to which he was allegedly subjected while he was in immigration custody, as well as claims brought under the RHA and the ADA based on the alleged discrimination against him owing to his disability during his detention. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to the United States as it pertained to Petitioner's FTCA claims; but (2) did not err in awarding summary judgment to SCSD on Petitioner's RHA and ADA claims. View "Thiersaint v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to answer the first portion of a certified question and answered the second portion of the certified question that a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim is not a collateral source under Fla. Stat. 768.76(2)(a)2.Plaintiff, who was injured in a car crash, sued Defendant for vicarious liability based on Defendant's co-ownership of the other car involved in the crash. Plaintiff further sued his uninsured motorist insurance carrier, seeking to recover policy benefits and statutory bad faith damages. Plaintiff and his insurer settled for $4 million. After a trial against Defendant, the jury returned a $30 million verdict for Plaintiff. Defendant sought to set off the $4 million insurance settlement against the damages award, but the motion was denied. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the setoff request. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant did not ask the trial court for a setoff under section 768.041(2); and (2) a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim is not a collateral source within the meaning of Fla. Stat. 768.76(2)(a)2. View "Ellison v. Willoughby" on Justia Law

Douglas Byrne appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Vera Fisk regarding Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim against Fisk. On December 8, 2018, Byrne was a mail carrier working for the United States Postal Service. That evening, Byrne was responsible for a delivery route different from his usual route. Byrne attempted to deliver mail to Fisk's residence. Although Fisk's home was not on his usual delivery route, Byrne had likely delivered mail there before, including within the preceding year. It was dark outside, and it was raining. Fisk's porch lights were not turned on, but Byrne was wearing a headlamp, which was on at the time. Byrne was also wearing slip-resistant boots, as required by his employer. Byrne crossed the five tiled steps leading to Fisk's tiled front porch, where her mailbox was located, "holding the handrail and being careful." However, Byrne slipped and fell backward down the steps. Byrne suffered three fractures in his right femur and a fracture in his hip socket. He was hospitalized for nine days, underwent multiple weeks of rehabilitation, and returned to work in May 2019. In December 2020, Byrne filed suit against Fisk and fictitiously named parties, alleging there were defects in Fisk's premises about which Fisk knew or should have known and that Fisk should have remedied the defects or should have warned him about or guarded him from the defects. Byrne's complaint asserted a negligence claim and a "wantonness/recklessness" claim. Fisk answered Byrne's complaint, moved for and received a summary judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether a defect or unreasonably dangerous condition existed on Fisk's premises; whether Fisk had knowledge of the alleged defect; whether the alleged defect proximately caused Byrne's injuries; and whether the darkness of Fisk's premises or the rainfall present there constituted open and obvious hazards. View "Byrne v. Fisk" on Justia Law