Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an automobile accident that occurred in rural Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, on January 3, 2024. James Godwin, a resident of Dallas County and employee of Talton Communications, Inc., was driving a company vehicle when he was rear-ended by Desi Bernard Peoples, a resident of Fayette County. Godwin subsequently filed suit in the Dallas Circuit Court against Peoples, his employer Talton, and Penn National Security Insurance Company, which provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Godwin’s claims included negligence and wantonness, a claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits, and a workers’ compensation claim against Talton. Godwin received all medical treatment for his injuries in Dallas County, where he and his wife reside and work.After the complaint was filed, Penn National moved to sever the workers’ compensation claim and to transfer the remaining claims to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, arguing that transfer was warranted for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice under Alabama’s forum non conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1. The Dallas Circuit Court denied the motion to sever but ordered the workers’ compensation claim to be tried separately. The court also denied the motion to transfer, finding insufficient evidence that Tuscaloosa County was a significantly more convenient forum or that Dallas County had only a weak connection to the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed Penn National’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel transfer. The Court denied the petition, holding that Penn National failed to meet its burden of showing that Tuscaloosa County was significantly more convenient or that Dallas County’s connection to the case was weak. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is entitled to deference when both venues are proper and that the evidence presented did not justify overriding that choice. View "Ex parte Penn National Security Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A fatal motor vehicle accident occurred after a patron, Bailey, was served alcohol at two establishments, including one operated by the appellants. Bailey drove the wrong way on an interstate, resulting in a collision that killed himself and five members of the Abbas family. The Abbas family’s estates sued the restaurant operators (collectively “Roosters”) for dram shop liability and negligent training. At the time, Roosters held both a businessowners policy (BOP) and a commercial umbrella policy (CUP) with Grange Insurance Company. The BOP provided $1,000,000 in liquor liability coverage, which was undisputed. The dispute centered on whether the CUP also provided liquor liability coverage, particularly in light of an endorsement (CU 47) that replaced the liquor liability exclusion in the CUP.The Fayette Circuit Court found the language of the CUP and CU 47 ambiguous when considered alongside the BOP, reasoning that umbrella policies are intended to supplement underlying coverage. The court granted summary judgment to Roosters, holding that the CUP provided additional coverage. Grange appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, finding CU 47 unambiguously replaced the liquor liability exclusion and precluded coverage under the CUP. The appellate court remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment in Grange’s favor.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case de novo. It held that CU 47 unambiguously replaced the liquor liability exclusion in the CUP, leaving no basis for additional coverage. The court enforced the policy as written, declining to consider extrinsic evidence or arguments not preserved below. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the commercial umbrella policy does not provide liquor liability coverage for the claims at issue. View "GEORGETOWN CHICKEN COOP, LLC V. GRANGE INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

In February 2016, Kevin Frost kidnapped his estranged wife, Sherri Frost, during a contentious divorce. He lured her into a situation where he could seize her, forced her into his vehicle, and held her for several hours in a barn owned by a family associate. During captivity, Kevin made Sherri severely intoxicated and later delivered her to the emergency room before turning himself in. Kevin pleaded guilty to assault and kidnapping and served a prison sentence. Sherri subsequently filed a civil suit against Kevin, Frost Ranching Corporation (the Ranch), and other parties, seeking damages for injuries and emotional distress resulting from the kidnapping. She alleged that Kevin acted, at least in part, to prevent her from obtaining an interest in the Ranch during the divorce.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, dismissed claims against some defendants and granted summary judgment to Frost Limited Partnership. The court denied summary judgment to the Ranch on vicarious liability, allowing that issue to proceed to trial. At trial, Sherri presented evidence of medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other damages. The jury found Kevin liable for several torts but awarded only $20,000 in damages, which matched the lower end of medical expenses and did not account for pain and suffering. The District Court granted Sherri’s motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s award unsupported by substantial evidence, as it disregarded uncontradicted, credible evidence of pain and suffering. The court also granted the Ranch’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the Ranch could not ratify Kevin’s conduct absent acceptance of any benefit from the kidnapping.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed both rulings. It held that the jury’s damages award was not supported by substantial evidence and that a new trial on damages was warranted. The court also held that, under Montana law, ratification requires acceptance of a benefit, which was absent here, so the Ranch could not be held liable for Kevin’s actions. View "Frost v. Frost" on Justia Law

Kia and Hyundai manufactured millions of vehicles between 2011 and 2021 that lacked engine immobilizers, a standard anti-theft device, and had ignition assemblies that were easily compromised. These design features made the cars especially vulnerable to theft, leading to a surge in thefts nationwide, particularly after a viral social media trend demonstrated how to steal these vehicles. In two separate incidents, teenagers stole such cars and, while driving them, caused accidents that resulted in severe injury to Donald Strench and the death of Matthew Moshi. Strench and Moshi’s estate brought suit against Hyundai and Kia, respectively, alleging that the companies were liable under the Ohio Product Liability Act (OPLA) for design defects that made the cars susceptible to theft and, consequently, to the resulting injuries.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the claims, holding that the plaintiffs could not establish proximate causation as a matter of Ohio law. The district court relied on Ohio precedents that generally absolve car owners of liability for injuries caused by thieves who steal their cars, applying the same reasoning to the manufacturers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio cases concerning car owners’ liability do not control product liability claims against manufacturers. The Sixth Circuit found that, under OPLA and Ohio common law, foreseeability must be assessed from the perspective of a manufacturer, who is expected to have specialized knowledge of risks, including those arising from third-party theft. The court concluded that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the manufacturers should have foreseen the risk of theft-related accidents. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the design defect and inadequate warning claims, but affirmed the dismissal of the manufacturing defect and nonconformance to representation claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the surviving claims. View "Moshi v. Kia Motors Am., Inc." on Justia Law

A woman experiencing a mental health crisis called 911 and requested that police come to her home to shoot her. Three officers responded and found her holding a bat and a pickaxe. The officers maintained a distance of about fifteen feet and attempted to de-escalate the situation, with one officer assuring her that she would not be harmed. After several minutes, and following an interaction with the woman’s mother, one officer tased her, and another officer shot her multiple times as she moved in the direction of the officers. The woman survived but suffered severe injuries.The plaintiff, acting on the woman’s behalf, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the two officers and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and also brought a negligence claim against the municipality. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, and the municipality sought judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the officers’ motion to dismiss the excessive force claims and the municipality’s motion on the negligence claim, but initially denied the municipality’s motion as to the § 1983 claim. Later, the district court granted the municipality’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the § 1983 claim as well.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged that both officers violated the woman’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by tasing and shooting her under the circumstances described. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing the municipal liability claim. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims against the officers, vacated the judgment for the municipality, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chrestman v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

A 63-year-old man with a history of sciatica and alcohol-use disorder attempted to board a city bus in Indianapolis. Earlier that day, he had been hospitalized for intoxication but was released while still mildly intoxicated. That evening, after waiting at a bus stop, he approached a bus as it was preparing to leave. As the bus pulled away, he lost his balance and fell into the road, where he was run over and later died from his injuries. At the time of the incident, his blood-alcohol content was approximately 0.261. His mother, acting as the personal representative of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit against the public transportation corporation, alleging negligence.The Marion Superior Court presided over a jury trial in which the transportation corporation argued that the decedent was contributorily negligent, which would bar recovery. The jury viewed video footage of the incident and heard testimony regarding the decedent’s physical condition and intoxication. After deliberation, the jury found in favor of the estate and awarded damages, later reduced by statutory limits. The transportation corporation moved for judgment on the evidence and, after the verdict, for a motion to correct error, both of which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding the decedent contributorily negligent as a matter of law.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and reviewed the trial court’s denial of the motion to correct error de novo. The Court held that the evidence, including the video footage and testimony, did not establish as a matter of law that the decedent was contributorily negligent. Multiple reasonable inferences could be drawn from the evidence, so the jury’s verdict was not clearly erroneous or unsupported. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to correct error. View "Indianapolis Public Transportation Corporation v. Bush" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was indicted by a Rhode Island grand jury, along with several co-defendants, on charges related to an alleged mortgage fraud conspiracy. He filed multiple motions to dismiss the charges in Rhode Island Superior Court, arguing that the indictment was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct and the presentation of misleading or missing evidence. After evidentiary hearings, a Magistrate denied his motions, and an Associate Justice of the Superior Court, on de novo review, adopted the Magistrate’s decision and added that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient prosecutorial misconduct to justify dismissal. The plaintiff did not appeal this ruling. Later, the charges against him were dismissed by the state as part of a plea agreement with a co-defendant.Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a malicious prosecution suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against state law enforcement defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff from relitigating whether the indictment was procured by fraud or misconduct, since that issue had already been decided in state court. The plaintiff responded only that the issues were not identical, and did not contest the “final judgment” or “full and fair opportunity to litigate” elements of collateral estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff had waived his arguments regarding the “final judgment” and “full and fair opportunity” elements by failing to raise them in the district court, and that no exceptional circumstances justified excusing this waiver. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that collateral estoppel applied and barred the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. Costs were awarded to the defendants. View "Shabshelowitz v. Rhode Island Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Robin Roebuck, who had previously undergone a heart transplant, was hospitalized at the Mayo Clinic in Arizona in April 2020 for COVID-19. During his stay, an arterial blood gas test was performed as part of his treatment, which led to complications requiring surgery and resulting in significant scarring and reduced function in his right arm and hand. In January 2021, Roebuck filed a medical negligence lawsuit against the Mayo Clinic and two of its medical professionals, alleging that the test was negligently performed. He did not claim gross negligence.The Superior Court of Maricopa County initially denied Mayo Clinic’s motion to dismiss, finding that Roebuck had sufficiently alleged the test was part of his heart treatment rather than COVID-19 care. After discovery, the court determined the test was related to COVID-19 treatment and granted summary judgment for Mayo Clinic, holding that Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-516 provided immunity from ordinary negligence claims during the pandemic, requiring proof of gross negligence or willful misconduct instead. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that § 12-516’s bar on ordinary negligence claims for pandemic-related medical care violated the Arizona Constitution’s anti-abrogation clause.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that § 12-516(A) unconstitutionally abrogates the right to recover damages for injuries caused by ordinary negligence by health care providers during a public health emergency. The Court found that gross negligence is not a reasonable alternative to ordinary negligence and that the statute’s limitation impermissibly abolishes a protected right of action. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, while vacating part of the court of appeals’ reasoning and replacing it with its own. View "ROEBUCK v MAYO CLINIC" on Justia Law

A Georgia corporation operates several hospitals and clinics in west Georgia and, through an affiliated entity, also operates a small hospital and clinics in east Alabama. An Alabama resident sought treatment at the Alabama hospital and was subsequently transferred by ambulance to the corporation’s Georgia facility for a heart-catheterization procedure. The procedure was performed by a Georgia-based physician employed by the corporation, who is not licensed in Alabama and has never practiced there. The patient alleges that the physician’s negligence during the procedure in Georgia caused him to suffer renal failure and require further medical intervention. The patient sued both the corporation and the physician in the Randolph Circuit Court in Alabama, asserting claims under both Alabama and Georgia medical liability statutes and alleging the corporation’s vicarious liability for the physician’s actions.The physician and the corporation moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that venue was improper. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but denied the corporation’s motion to dismiss. The corporation then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against it.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama, as it was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business there. However, the Court found that specific personal jurisdiction existed because the patient’s treatment began at the Alabama facility operated by the corporation, and the subsequent care in Georgia was sufficiently related to the corporation’s activities in Alabama. The Court also concluded that the corporation had not demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal based on improper venue, as it had not adequately addressed whether Alabama’s venue statute applied to claims brought under another state’s law. The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

A school resource officer employed by the Lee County School District was fatally injured while directing traffic on a state highway when a speeding motorist struck his parked vehicle, causing it to hit him. At the time, a warning sign intended to alert drivers to the school zone was allegedly inoperable. The officer’s wife received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, but his two adult sons did not. The sons filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT), alleging negligence in maintaining the warning sign and failing to warn of a dangerous condition.The case was heard in the Lee County Circuit Court. MDOT moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from suit under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(l) because the decedent was a governmental employee whose injury was covered by workers’ compensation. The sons opposed, contending the statute did not bar their claims as wrongful death beneficiaries and, if it did, that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment to MDOT, finding the statute applied and provided immunity, and also upheld the statute’s constitutionality.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory interpretation and constitutional challenge de novo. The court held that wrongful death beneficiaries stand in the position of the decedent, and because the decedent could not have sued MDOT due to statutory immunity, neither could his sons. The court further held that Section 11-46-9(1)(l) does not violate the Mississippi Constitution’s remedy clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as the statute is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of protecting public funds. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment and upholding the statute’s constitutionality. View "Patterson v. State of Mississippi, ex rel. Attorney General Fitch" on Justia Law