Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Adam P. Harrington was injured on February 15, 2018, while using a swing rope to transfer from an offshore gas platform to a transport vessel. Harrington, employed by Skelton's Fire Equipment, Inc., was inspecting fire-suppression equipment on Exxon's platform. Due to rough seas, Harrington mistimed his swing and fractured his leg. His medical expenses were covered by Skelton's workers' compensation insurer.Harrington sued Exxon for maritime negligence and wantonness in the Mobile Circuit Court. Before trial, the court granted Harrington's motion to exclude evidence of his medical expenses being paid by the workers' compensation insurer. The jury found Exxon liable for $1,500,000 in damages, reduced by 10% for Harrington's fault, resulting in a $1,350,000 judgment. Exxon's postjudgment motion for a new trial, arguing the exclusion of evidence was erroneous, was denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. Exxon argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the workers' compensation payments, citing Alabama Code § 12-21-45. However, the court held that substantive maritime law, which includes the collateral-source rule, applied. This rule prevents the reduction of damages by amounts received from third parties, such as insurance. The court found that applying § 12-21-45 would conflict with maritime law.Exxon also claimed that Harrington's expert witness opened the door to admitting evidence of the workers' compensation payments. The court disagreed, stating that the expert's testimony did not justify introducing such evidence under the doctrine of curative admissibility.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Harrington and dismissed Harrington's conditional cross-appeal as moot. View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Betty Callens, an 81-year-old woman, underwent left-hip-replacement surgery on September 23, 2019, at Grandview Medical Center. After her discharge on September 27, 2019, she was transferred to Brookdale Skilled Nursing Facility for rehabilitation. Callens alleged that she received poor nursing care at Brookdale, leading to a fall on October 3, 2019, which resulted in another fracture of her left hip and a fractured left femur. She was readmitted to Grandview for further surgeries and was later diagnosed with Clostridioides difficile. On October 15, 2019, Callens was transferred to St. Martin's for rehabilitation. On October 21, 2019, while being bathed by a nurse at St. Martin's, Callens alleged that the nurse applied excessive pressure to her healing hip, causing another dislocation.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of St. Martin's, concluding that Callens failed to provide medical-expert testimony to establish a breach of the standard of care or causation of her injuries. Callens's motion to strike the affidavit of St. Martin's expert, Michael Britton, R.N., was denied. The court found that Britton was qualified as a similarly situated health-care provider.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Callens's case did not fall under the "layman" exception, which allows for the absence of expert testimony in cases where the lack of skill is apparent to a layperson. The court determined that the care provided to Callens involved complex medical procedures beyond the understanding of an average layperson, thus requiring expert testimony. The court also upheld the qualification of Britton as a similarly situated health-care provider, noting that he had provided hands-on care in the relevant field during the year preceding Callens's injuries. Consequently, the summary judgment in favor of St. Martin's was affirmed. View "Callens v. Episcopal Foundation of Jefferson County" on Justia Law

In late 2019, a hospital sent letters to over a thousand patients, including Linda Gierek, informing them of potential exposure to infectious diseases due to a technician's failure to fully sterilize surgical instruments. Gierek filed a class-action complaint against the hospital, asserting claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and medical malpractice. She sought class certification for similarly situated patients and their spouses. The trial court consolidated Gierek’s action with a similar class-action claim filed by Cheyanne Bennett.The Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund intervened, arguing that the claims sounded in ordinary negligence and thus the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) did not apply. The hospital argued the opposite. The trial court ruled in favor of the hospital, stating the MMA applied, and denied the motion for class certification, citing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction while a proposed complaint was pending before a medical-review panel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the MMA’s applicability but reversed the trial court’s decision on class certification jurisdiction.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the MMA covers all claims for medical malpractice, not limited to bodily injury or death. The court also held that class certification is a proper preliminary determination under the MMA. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. View "Gierek v. Anonymous 1" on Justia Law

Nicholas Hull sued North Lincoln Hospital District and several medical professionals for negligence in the death of his newborn son, Eli Hull. Canessa Hull, Nicholas's wife, went into labor on August 9, 2021, and was admitted to Star Valley Health. Due to complications during labor, Eli was born with a double-knotted nuchal cord and did not survive. The Hulls were initially informed by the attending doctors that the nuchal cord was the sole cause of Eli's death. However, in April 2023, Dr. Burk, an anesthesiologist, revealed that Eli's death was preventable and due to the failure to follow safety protocols during labor.The District Court of Lincoln County dismissed Mr. Hull’s complaint, ruling that his notice of governmental claim was untimely. The court found that the two-year period for filing the notice expired in September 2023, and Mr. Hull’s notice, submitted in July 2023, was defective. Mr. Hull argued that the period should be equitably extended due to the defendants' fraudulent concealment of the true cause of Eli’s death.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Mr. Hull’s complaint did not adequately allege the elements required for equitable estoppel or equitable tolling. Specifically, the complaint failed to show that the delay in filing the notice was induced by the defendants' misinformation and that Mr. Hull acted on this misinformation in good faith, resulting in his failure to file a timely notice. Additionally, the complaint did not establish that the fraudulent concealment prevented Mr. Hull from complying with the statutory deadline, as he had over four months remaining to file a proper notice after discovering the concealment. Therefore, the court concluded that neither equitable estoppel nor equitable tolling applied, and the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "Hull v. North Lincoln Hospital District" on Justia Law

Sentinel Energy Center, LLC owns a power plant in North Palm Springs and hired DGC Operations, LLC (OPS) to manage and operate the plant. In 2017, during annual maintenance, five OPS employees failed to follow the new depressurization protocol for the fuel filter skid, leading to an explosion that killed Daniel Collins. Collins's family sued Diamond Generating Corporation (DGC), which has a 50% indirect ownership in Sentinel and is the parent company of OPS, claiming DGC's negligence in safety oversight led to Collins's death.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied DGC's request to instruct the jury on the Privette doctrine, which generally shields a hirer from liability for injuries to an independent contractor's employees. The jury found DGC 97% at fault and awarded the plaintiffs over $150 million. DGC's motions for nonsuit and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, based on the Privette doctrine, were also denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court declined to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict to DGC, citing unresolved factual questions about whether DGC retained control over the plant and negligently exercised that control. However, the court found that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the Privette doctrine and its exceptions, which could have led to a more favorable outcome for DGC. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial with instructions to include the Privette doctrine and its exceptions. View "Collins v. Diamond Generating Corp." on Justia Law

A woman sued her father, alleging childhood sexual abuse, and supported her claims with expert testimony on the accuracy of "recovered" memories. The abuse allegedly began when she was three years old and stopped in 1992. By 1995, she no longer recalled the abuse but began to develop confusing memories eighteen years later. These memories eventually led to her filing a lawsuit against her father for human trafficking, sexual abuse, assault, emotional distress, false imprisonment, and incest under federal and state law. She claimed her lawsuit was timely because she had repressed the memories of the abuse.In the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the court allowed Dr. James Hopper to testify as an expert on repressed and recovered memories, despite objections from the defendant, Ronald A. Cohen. The court aimed to balance the testimony of Dr. Hopper with that of Dr. Deryn Strange, who testified that there is no scientific support for the theory that trauma victims can repress and later recover memories with clarity. The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding for the plaintiff on five state law counts and awarding her $1.5 million in damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to properly analyze Dr. Hopper's qualifications and the reliability and fit of his testimony. The appellate court concluded that Dr. Hopper's testimony lacked the necessary scientific support and relevance to the case. The court determined that the admission of this testimony was prejudicial and affected the jury's verdict. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Cohen v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Robert Trentham slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge at the Venue at Cool Springs apartment complex in Franklin, Tennessee, owned by Mid-America Apartments, LP (MAA). The incident occurred on a rainy morning, and Trentham sustained serious injuries. He filed a premises-liability lawsuit against MAA, alleging negligence in maintaining the bridge, which he claimed had microbial growth that caused his fall.The Circuit Court for Williamson County found in favor of Trentham, determining that MAA was on constructive notice of the dangerous condition due to the microbial growth. The court concluded that MAA had breached its duty of care and awarded Trentham damages. MAA appealed the decision, arguing that it was not on constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the evidence supported the finding that MAA was on constructive notice of the microbial growth on the bridge. The appellate court upheld the trial court's conclusions regarding MAA's duty, breach, and the resulting damages.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that MAA was on constructive notice of the dangerous condition on the pedestrian bridge. The court referenced Blair v. West Town Mall, which allows for constructive notice to be established by showing a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, or a general or continuing condition. The court found that the microbial growth on the bridge constituted a general or continuing condition, making it reasonably foreseeable to MAA. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that MAA breached its duty of care to Trentham. View "Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP" on Justia Law

Jeane Whitfield filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dennis Schimpf and Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC, alleging negligence in performing breast augmentation-mastopexy surgery and in post-operative care. Whitfield experienced complications post-surgery, including severe pain and wound issues, leading her to seek further medical attention and additional surgeries. She claimed Schimpf's negligence caused her injuries and inadequate post-operative care exacerbated her condition.The jury in the Circuit Court of Charleston County found in favor of Schimpf and Sweetgrass, determining that Whitfield did not prove the defendants deviated from the standard of care. Whitfield appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Whitfield then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, challenging two evidentiary rulings: the exclusion of evidence to show bias of Sweetgrass' office manager, Vicky Tolbert, and the admission of testimony from Schimpf's expert witnesses based on their Rule 35 examinations of Whitfield.The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the admission of the expert testimony but erred in affirming the exclusion of evidence of Tolbert's bias. The Supreme Court held that evidence of Tolbert's sexual relationship with Schimpf, her salary, and the free cosmetic procedures she received was relevant to show potential bias and should have been admitted. The Court determined that excluding this evidence was prejudicial to Whitfield's case, as it impacted the jury's ability to assess Tolbert's credibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Whitfield v. Schimpf" on Justia Law

In 2018, Gary Washington was released from prison after serving 31 years for murder, following a writ of actual innocence. Washington filed a civil lawsuit against the police officers involved in his case, alleging they coerced a witness into providing false testimony, which was later recanted. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, dismissing Washington's claims of due process violations, malicious prosecution, detention without probable cause, failure to intervene, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court found Washington was collaterally estopped from relying on the witness's recantation because a prior state court had found it incredible. The district court also dismissed Washington's alternative due process Brady claim and his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on independent grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state court decision granting Washington a writ of actual innocence was inconsistent with the prior post-conviction ruling that the recantation was incredible, precluding the application of collateral estoppel. The court also found that applying collateral estoppel to prohibit Washington from litigating the alleged misconduct was incompatible with equitable principles. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal of Washington's alternative due process Brady claim but reversed the dismissal of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding that wrongful incarceration for 31 years could constitute severe emotional distress.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in part and affirmed it in part, allowing Washington's claims of due process violations, malicious prosecution, detention without probable cause, failure to intervene, and intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed. View "Washington v. Pelligrini" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Steven Luppold, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit after an above-the-knee amputation of his left leg. He alleged that the negligence of three healthcare providers—Susan Hanlon, a registered nurse; Charles Loucraft, a physician assistant; and Carlos Flores, a nurse practitioner—led to his injury. Luppold visited the emergency department at Lowell General Hospital twice in March 2015, complaining of severe foot pain and discoloration. Despite these symptoms, he was discharged without proper diagnosis or treatment, leading to the eventual amputation.In the Superior Court, a jury awarded Luppold $20 million in damages, finding Hanlon, Loucraft, and Flores negligent. Hanlon moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to set aside the verdict, or for remittitur, arguing that the trial judge erred in not allowing cross-examination about a high-low settlement agreement between Loucraft and Flores, and that the jury instructions on factual causation were incorrect. The trial judge denied her motion, and Hanlon appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision to exclude cross-examination about the high-low settlement agreement, as Hanlon failed to demonstrate how the agreement caused bias or changed testimony. The court also upheld the jury instructions on factual causation, determining that they correctly conveyed the "but-for" causation standard required by law. Additionally, the court rejected Hanlon's argument that she was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding sufficient evidence that her actions fell below the standard of care and contributed to Luppold's injury.Finally, the court affirmed the assessment of prejudgment interest on the entire damages award, including future pain and suffering, as required by Massachusetts law. The judgment and the order denying Hanlon's posttrial motions were affirmed. View "Luppold v. Hanlon" on Justia Law