Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Raymond Tackett, an inmate with the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), suffered from Hepatitis C (HCV) and did not receive direct-acting antivirals (DAAs), a treatment that cures HCV. He died on November 29, 2019, from complications related to HCV. His daughter, Skyler Tackett, as the personal representative of his estate, filed an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a state law medical malpractice claim against the medical professionals who treated him, Wexford Health Services, and Dr. Kristen Dauss, the Chief Medical Officer of the IDOC. She later dismissed all claims except the deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Dauss.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Dauss, finding that she took reasonable steps to expand access to DAAs and was not responsible for the treatment decisions that led to Mr. Tackett’s death. Ms. Tackett appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found that Ms. Tackett presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Dr. Dauss liable in her individual capacity. The court noted that Mr. Tackett was in a treatment priority group and that Nurse Myers had requested DAAs for him, but there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions or the IDOC policy prevented him from receiving the treatment. The court concluded that while Mr. Tackett’s death was tragic, there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions amounted to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. View "Tackett v Dauss" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kandi Terry-Smith and Roy A. Smith, Jr., filed a complaint against Mountain View Hospital (MVH) and Idaho Falls Community Hospital (IFCH) alleging medical malpractice after Kandi suffered an injury while a patient at MVH. The complaint was filed on March 11, 2022, and a second, identical complaint was filed on September 8, 2022. The first case was dismissed for inactivity, but the district court granted an extension for service of process. The process server, Tony Mares, filed an affidavit claiming he served MVH, but deficiencies were later found.In the district court, MVH moved to dismiss the second case as time-barred and the first case for insufficient service of process. The district court denied the Smiths' motion to consolidate the cases and dismissed the second case. The district court granted MVH’s motion to dismiss the first case for insufficient service of process, finding that the Smiths failed to properly serve MVH. The Smiths' subsequent motions for reconsideration, to amend the complaint, and for additional extensions were denied. The district court also denied the Smiths' I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the order denying reconsideration and judgment.The Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the Smiths failed to show good cause for the failure to timely serve MVH and did not exercise due diligence. The court also found no excusable neglect and determined that the Smiths' attorney's reliance on the process server’s affidavit was unreasonable. The court denied MVH’s request for attorney fees in the district court due to the lack of a cross-appeal but granted attorney fees and costs on appeal, finding the Smiths' appeal frivolous and without foundation. View "Smith v. Mountain View Hospital, LLC" on Justia Law

Talos ERT, L.L.C. (Talos) hired DLS, L.L.C. (DLS) to remove corroded piping from an oil-and-gas platform off the Louisiana coast. During the project, a 129-pound pipe fell and struck Walter Jackson, a DLS employee, resulting in his death. Jackson’s widow, Vantrece Jackson, and his son, Y.J., represented by his mother, Anika Warner, sued Talos for wrongful death. The suits were consolidated, and the case proceeded to trial.The jury found Talos 88% at fault for Jackson’s death and awarded significant damages to both plaintiffs. Y.J. was awarded $120,000 in special damages and $20,000,000 in general damages. Mrs. Jackson was awarded $987,930 in special damages and $6,600,000 in general damages. Talos filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and alternatively moved for a new trial or remittitur. The district court denied the JMOL and new trial motions but granted a partial remittitur, reducing Y.J.’s general damages to $4,360,708.59 and Mrs. Jackson’s to $5,104,226.22. Plaintiffs declined a new trial on damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Talos’s renewed JMOL motion, finding sufficient evidence to support both theories of liability: vicarious liability and independent negligence. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial on liability, noting the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence.Regarding damages, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the maximum recovery rule for Y.J.’s award, using a factually similar case, Rachal v. Brouillette. However, the court vacated Mrs. Jackson’s general damages award and remanded for redetermination of remittitur, as the district court’s comparison case, Zimko v. American Cyanamid, was not factually similar. The court found no plain error in the alleged prejudicial statements made by Plaintiffs’ counsel during the trial. View "Warner v. Talos ERT" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Francisco Lorenzo and Angelina Nicolas sued Core/Related Grand Avenue Owner, LLC, Tishman Construction Corporation of California, and Calex Engineering, Inc. for wrongful death after their daughters were killed by a dump truck driven by Stanley Randle, an employee of a subcontractor. The truck was traveling from an unpermitted off-site staging area to a construction project in downtown Los Angeles. Plaintiffs argued that the defendants' decision to use an unpermitted staging area was negligent and led to the accident.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they did not owe a duty of care to the decedents. The court found that the defendants' actions were not the proximate cause of the accident and that the defendants did not have a duty to ensure the safety of the decedents under the circumstances.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did owe a duty of care to the decedents. The court reasoned that Civil Code section 1714 establishes a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others, and the defendants' decision to establish an unpermitted staging area foreseeably created a risk of harm. The court also found that the Rowland factors did not justify an exception to this duty. The court further rejected the defendants' argument that their conduct did not proximately cause the accident, concluding that there were triable issues of fact regarding causation. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lorenzo v. Calex Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

Joe and Lora Killoran, along with their businesses, Maple Valley Ag Products, LLC, and Maple Valley Ag Chemicals, Inc., sued Kip Kaler for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and unlawful interference with business. The Killorans alleged that Kaler made defamatory statements during Co-op meetings, calling them "crooks and thieves" and advising others not to do business with them. These statements allegedly caused significant reputational harm, economic losses, and mental distress to the Killorans and their businesses.The District Court of Cass County dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court found that the slander claim was not well-pled, as the Killorans failed to provide sufficient factual support for the statements made by Kaler and did not adequately plead the falsity of the statements. The IIED claim was dismissed because the court determined that Kaler's conduct was not extreme and outrageous enough to permit recovery. The unlawful interference with business claim was dismissed due to the lack of an independent tort to support it, following the dismissal of the slander and IIED claims.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the IIED claim, agreeing that Kaler's conduct did not meet the threshold for extreme and outrageous behavior. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the slander claim, finding that the district court had improperly applied the pleading standards and failed to accept the allegations as true. The court also reversed the dismissal of the unlawful interference with business claim, as the potential for an independent tort (slander) existed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Killoran v. Kaler" on Justia Law

A 10-year-old student at an elementary school in Lincoln, Nebraska, was injured during a game of tag in a physical education class. The student was holding a pool noodle to tag classmates when another student, K.H., grabbed the pool noodle, causing the student to fall and hit her head. The student's mother sued the school district for negligence. The school district claimed sovereign immunity under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), arguing the claim arose from a battery.The district court overruled the school district's motion for summary judgment, finding a factual dispute about whether the pool noodle was part of the student's body. The court noted that while K.H. intentionally grabbed the pool noodle without the student's consent, it was unclear if this contact constituted a battery since the pool noodle was not necessarily part of the student's person.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court noted that public school districts are political subdivisions under the PSTCA and that if a claim falls within an exemption, the political subdivision is not liable. The court examined whether the contact with the pool noodle could be considered offensive contact with the student's body, which would constitute a battery. The court found that whether an object is part of a person's body is determined on an objective reasonable person basis and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding this question.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the factual dispute about whether the pool noodle was part of the student's body precluded summary judgment. The case was allowed to proceed to determine if the school district retained sovereign immunity. View "Scott v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001" on Justia Law

Andrew J. Scarborough, as the administrator of the estate of Timothy John Chumney, filed a lawsuit in the Montgomery Circuit Court against Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Deora Johnson, and Shari Barfield. The case involved allegations of negligence and medical malpractice following Chumney's suicide while incarcerated. The defendants initially did not object to the venue in their Rule 12 motions or answers. However, two years after the trial was first set, they moved to amend their answers to raise the defense of improper venue and filed a motion to transfer the case to Limestone Circuit Court. The Montgomery Circuit Court agreed and transferred the case.Scarborough petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the defendants had waived their defense of improper venue by not raising it earlier. The defendants contended that the transfer was mandatory under § 6-5-546 of the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA), which they claimed allowed for a venue change at any time before trial.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the defendants had indeed waived their right to challenge the venue under Rule 12(h)(1)(A) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure by not including the defense in their initial motions. The court also clarified that § 6-5-546 of the AMLA did not apply because Scarborough did not allege that the acts or omissions occurred in more than one county. Therefore, the general timing provisions of Rule 12(h)(1) remained applicable.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Scarborough's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring the case to Limestone Circuit Court. View "In re: Scarborough v. Wexford Health Sources" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Lorraine Bellmar, as the personal representative of her deceased husband Harry Bellmar's estate, filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death action against Dr. Robert Moore and his medical practice. Harry Bellmar had been Dr. Moore's patient for approximately ten years, suffering from morbid obesity, hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, and high cholesterol. In December 2006, an abnormal EKG was performed, but Dr. Moore did not order any follow-up cardiac testing over the next ten years. Harry Bellmar died in June 2016 from cardiac arrhythmia.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the seven-year statute of repose under G. L. c. 260, § 4, because the claim was based on the 2006 EKG, which occurred more than seven years before the filing of the lawsuit in December 2017. The Appeals Court affirmed the decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the statute of repose does not shield later negligent acts if the medical malpractice claim is not predicated on acts or omissions that took place more than seven years before the filing of the claim. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Dr. Moore's treatment of the decedent within the seven-year period was negligent, independent of the 2006 EKG. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. View "Bellmar v. Moore" on Justia Law

Kimberly Montoya filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Aaron Fowler, alleging that he failed to call a "code stroke" when she exhibited signs of a stroke while under his care. As a result, a CT scan was delayed, leading to severe disability. Montoya argued that immediate action would have mitigated her damages significantly. She requested a burden-shifting jury instruction, asserting that the absence of a timely CT scan made it impossible to prove the extent of damages caused by Dr. Fowler's negligence.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Montoya's request for the burden-shifting instruction, reasoning that such an instruction was not appropriate in cases involving omissions and that Montoya's ability to establish damages was not seriously impaired by the ruling. Montoya then filed a writ petition challenging this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that if Montoya could present evidence showing Dr. Fowler's negligence in failing to order a CT scan, a reasonable possibility that a timely CT scan followed by a thrombectomy would have mitigated her damages, and that the CT scan was critical to establishing causation, then public policy requires shifting the burden of proof to Dr. Fowler to show that his negligence did not cause her damages. The court emphasized that a defendant should not benefit from their own negligence when it results in the absence of critical evidence.The Court of Appeal granted Montoya's petition, directing the lower court to vacate its ruling denying the requested jury instruction. However, the appellate court did not mandate a specific instruction, leaving it to the trial court to determine the appropriate instruction based on the evidence presented at trial. View "Montoya v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Jon and Shawna Hill, along with their children, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Stuart Clive and his employer, Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A. (EMI), alleging that Clive misdiagnosed Jon Hill with vertigo when he was actually suffering from a stroke. This misdiagnosis led to severe physical and cognitive impairments for Jon Hill. The Hills claimed negligence, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, and respondeat superior liability. The district court dismissed the children's claims, ruling that Idaho does not recognize a claim for loss of parental consortium. The jury found in favor of EMI and Clive, and the district court denied the Hills' motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct.The Hills appealed the district court's dismissal of their children's claims, two evidentiary rulings, and the denial of their motion for a new trial. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the children's claims, agreeing that Idaho law does not recognize a claim for loss of parental consortium for non-fatal injuries. The court noted that creating such a cause of action involves significant policy considerations best left to the legislature.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision to allow expert testimony on "hindsight bias" by EMI's expert, Dr. Opeolu M. Adeoye, finding it irrelevant and prejudicial. The court held that this error affected the Hills' substantial rights, as the testimony improperly endorsed EMI's theme of hindsight bias, potentially influencing the jury's decision. Consequently, the judgment in favor of EMI and Clive was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The court did not address the Hills' other issues on appeal due to the remand. EMI's request for attorney fees on appeal was denied, as they were not the prevailing party. View "Hill v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A." on Justia Law