Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022.In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

A woman underwent knee replacement surgery at a hospital and soon developed respiratory distress. Shortly after the operation, she allegedly suffered a femur fracture in a fall while hospitalized, which her doctor failed to detect on an X-ray. The following day, she fell again, reportedly because a nurse fell on her while assisting her, resulting in a more severe fracture. This severe injury caused fat emboli to enter her bloodstream and led to a pulmonary embolism. She was transferred to another hospital, where her deteriorating condition was documented. She died nearly two weeks later. Her estate filed a wrongful-death lawsuit alleging that the defendants’ negligence in failing to diagnose and prevent the fracture ultimately caused her death.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the lawsuit as untimely under Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(a), which imposes a two-year statute of limitations on medical malpractice actions. The district court determined that the estate knew or should have known of the injury and its cause by February 5, 2021, the date the decedent was transferred and her injury was documented. Because the estate filed its petition on February 17, 2023, more than two years later, the court found the claims time-barred.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that, under Iowa law, wrongful-death claims based on medical malpractice are derivative of the decedent’s personal injury claims. When the injury and its negligent cause are known during the decedent’s lifetime, the limitations period begins at that time, not the date of death. Because the estate had knowledge of the injury and its cause by February 5, 2021, the wrongful-death action was untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. View "Cataldo v. RCHP-Ottumwa, LLC" on Justia Law

A property owner in Idaho allowed her adult grandson, who suffered from severe mental illness and a history of violent behavior, to reside on her rural property. She periodically employed a caretaker to perform maintenance, but did not supervise his work or control his schedule. In September 2021, the grandson killed and mutilated the caretaker, perceiving him as a trespasser. The grandson pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. The caretaker’s family sued the property owner and her limited liability company, seeking to hold them liable for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner and the LLC. The court found no duty to protect the caretaker under either a special relationship or an assumed duty theory, and rejected the emotional distress claims, holding the alleged conduct was not extreme or outrageous and that no duty was owed to the heirs. The claims against other defendants were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of the premises liability claim or claims against one family member.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the property owner’s employment relationship with the caretaker did not create a special relationship imposing a duty to protect him from the grandson, nor did her limited attempts to mediate disputes constitute a voluntarily assumed duty. The Court also concluded that the IIED and NIED claims failed as a matter of law because the owner’s conduct was neither extreme nor outrageous, and she owed no legal duty to the heirs. The Supreme Court awarded partial attorney fees to the owner, finding the IIED and NIED appeals were frivolously pursued. View "Spears v. Antelope Mountain Resort, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman visited a Huntsville shopping center in May 2021, where renovations were underway, including the installation of new sidewalks in front of a Staples store. The construction zone was marked with barricades, caution tape, signage, and fluorescent paint to warn pedestrians of uneven concrete resulting from recent work. Despite these measures, the woman tripped and fell while walking through the marked area, attributing her fall to a slight elevation change in the concrete. She later filed suit against the property owner, the general contractor, a concrete-cutting subcontractor, and Staples, alleging negligence, wantonness, premises liability, and respondeat superior.The Madison Circuit Court entered summary judgment in favor of the shopping center owner and the general contractor, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The subcontractor was dismissed by agreement, and the plaintiff later settled with Staples’ successor. The circuit court did not specify its reasoning for the decision. After her postjudgment motion failed, the plaintiff appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the summary judgment de novo, considering whether the alleged hazard was open and obvious, which would negate the defendants’ duty to warn or maintain. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, the multiple warnings—including barricades and fluorescent paint—rendered the uneven concrete an open and obvious condition to a reasonable person. Therefore, the defendants owed no additional duty to warn, and the plaintiff’s claims for negligence and wantonness failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment of the Madison Circuit Court. View "Walter v. Branch Hays Farm SC Associates, LP" on Justia Law

A homeowner alleged that he hired a roofing company in 2011 to install a specific type of roof on his residence. After installation, problems with roof materials became apparent, including issues with a protective layer that remained unresolved despite multiple repair attempts by both the roofing company and the manufacturer over more than a decade. The homeowner asserted that these defects persisted, and that communication from the roofing company ceased in early 2024. As a result, he filed a lawsuit in Etowah County, Alabama, alleging breach of express and implied warranties, as well as negligent or wanton installation and repair, and sought damages.The roofing company moved to dismiss the lawsuit for improper venue, arguing that a forum-selection clause in a “Service Agreement” required all disputes to be heard in Madison County, Alabama. The company attached an unsigned and undated sample agreement to its motion, but did not produce a copy signed by the homeowner or any evidence that the homeowner had agreed to such a clause. The homeowner responded that he had never signed, nor was he aware of, the agreement submitted by the company and also challenged the clause’s reasonableness. The Etowah Circuit Court denied the company’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the company’s petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to compel the lower court to dismiss the case or transfer it to Madison County. The Supreme Court held that the company failed to meet its burden of proving that the forum-selection clause applied, as it did not present evidence linking the blank agreement to the parties’ actual contract. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition, concluding that the circuit court did not clearly err in refusing to dismiss or transfer the case. View "Ex parte Continental Roofing Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose among four adult brothers regarding the division of their parents’ estate. After their mother’s death, two of the brothers, Brittin and Kent, reported to the San Diego Police Department that their mother was missing, despite knowing she had died of natural causes. Their intention was to cast suspicion on their siblings, Todd and Wade, with whom they had a contentious relationship. The police briefly investigated before learning of the mother’s death and closing the matter. The phone call from the police deeply distressed Wade, a recovering alcoholic who had been sober for 15 years. Within a week, Wade relapsed, drove his motorcycle while intoxicated, and died in a crash. A psychologist testified at trial that the distress caused by the police inquiry precipitated Wade’s relapse.The Superior Court of San Diego County presided over a jury trial in which Todd, both individually and as Wade’s successor in interest, pursued claims for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligence, and conspiracy. The jury found Brittin and Kent liable for negligence and IIED, and determined their conduct was a substantial factor in causing Wade severe emotional distress and his subsequent death. Damages were awarded to both Wade’s estate and Todd, including punitive damages. The defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial were denied.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendants conceded the jury’s factual findings but argued that their actions were not, as a matter of law, the legal cause of Wade’s death. The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that under the broader scope of liability for intentional torts, the defendants' intentional infliction of emotional distress was a legal cause of Wade’s death. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and the denial of JNOV, upholding all damages awards. View "Fisher v. Fisher" on Justia Law

An employee suffered a severe workplace injury in 2013 while working for a construction company, resulting in permanent and total disability with ongoing medical needs. The employee brought a third-party tort action against entities other than his employer involved in the accident and settled for $5 million. From the settlement, over $2.1 million was used to pay attorney fees and litigation expenses, with the remainder placed in trust. By the time of settlement, the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier had already paid over $1.5 million in benefits but stopped payments after the settlement, leaving the employee responsible for his ongoing care. The value of anticipated future medical costs was estimated at over $7 million.The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially found that only past benefits paid by the employer should be included in calculating the employer’s proportionate share of the legal expenses associated with the third-party settlement, setting that share at 31.6%. On review, the Commissioner disagreed, concluding that future anticipated benefits should also be included, as the employer’s interest in the recovery included the right to offset future benefits. The ALJ recalculated, finding the employer’s proportional share exceeded the total legal expenses, and ordered reimbursement to the employee for expenses already paid. The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed these decisions. It held that when an employer or insurance carrier seeks both reimbursement for past payments and an offset against future workers’ compensation liability from a third-party recovery, both past-paid and future-anticipated benefits must be considered in calculating the employer’s proportionate share of the legal expenses associated with that recovery. The court also held that the employer must reimburse the employee for its share of legal expenses before offsetting future benefits. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Labor Commission. View "Auto Owners Insurance v. Labor Commission" on Justia Law

A man filed a negligence lawsuit against two relatives who operated a farm, after he suffered serious injuries from carbon monoxide exposure while repairing a furnace in their shop. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants used a portable propane heater, not designed for indoor use, to warm the shop, which created a dangerous buildup of carbon monoxide. The plaintiff claimed he was unaware of the danger and was injured as a result. Testimony at trial established that the plaintiff had a longstanding relationship with the defendants, performed occasional repairs for them, and that others present in the shop around the same time did not experience symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning. Both sides presented expert witnesses on the issue of causation.The District Court of Barnes County, Southeast Judicial District, held a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendants were not negligent, and the court entered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. The court also awarded the defendants costs and disbursements, including expert witness fees, ultimately reducing the amount requested after considering the reasonableness of the fees. The plaintiff did not file any post-trial motions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the plaintiff could not raise for the first time on appeal the argument that the jury’s verdict was against the greater weight of the evidence, as he had not preserved this issue by a post-trial motion. The court also found no reversible error in the district court’s refusal to give plaintiff’s requested jury instructions regarding duty of care and regulatory violations, concluding the instructions given were adequate and appropriate. Lastly, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding expert witness fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Alber v. Rodin" on Justia Law

A delivery driver employed by a large package delivery company fell from her work vehicle on February 3, 2022, resulting in injuries to her neck and back. She initially received conservative medical treatments, including physical therapy, pain management, and multiple injections, but her condition worsened. By mid-2023, her treating physician recommended and performed two surgeries. The physician continued to restrict her from working following these procedures. The parties agreed the initial injury was compensable but disputed whether the surgeries were caused by the 2022 accident or by a subsequent event in 2023, and whether her total-disability status ended in December 2023.The Industrial Accident Board first found that the surgeries were related to the 2022 accident and that her total disability ended in December 2023. After a motion for clarification, the Board reversed its finding on the disability end date, concluding that, under Delaware law, a claimant remains totally disabled if instructed not to work by a treating physician, regardless of physical improvement. The employer appealed, arguing the Board improperly construed witness testimony and exceeded its authority by revisiting its prior decision. The Superior Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the Board’s actions, found both of the employer’s arguments unpersuasive, held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings, and affirmed the Board’s decision and order.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Board’s finding that only one work-related accident occurred was supported by substantial evidence, and that the Board acted within its authority in correcting its legal error regarding the duration of the claimant’s total disability. The Supreme Court confirmed that, under controlling precedent, a claimant remains totally disabled while following a treating physician’s order not to work. View "United Parcel Service v. Smith" on Justia Law

Caroline McCall was employed for over twenty years as a Clinical Systems Coordinator at a hospital, where her responsibilities evolved to include inventory management, IT systems, and various administrative tasks. Over time, her duties increased and she began to suffer from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which medical professionals attributed to her intense hand activity at work. Despite undergoing two surgeries and being prescribed specific workplace accommodations, her employer failed to provide some of these adjustments. After her pain worsened and her responsibilities continued to grow, McCall resigned in December 2020, citing physical and mental exhaustion due to her condition.Following her resignation, McCall applied for temporary total disability benefits under the D.C. Workers’ Compensation Act. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found her testimony and the medical evidence credible, determining that her carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related and that she was unable to perform her job due to insufficient accommodations. The ALJ awarded her temporary total disability benefits. The Compensation Review Board (CRB) affirmed the ALJ’s order, agreeing that the correct legal standard was applied and that substantial evidence supported the findings. The employer challenged the CRB’s decision, arguing that the wrong time frame was used to assess her ability to perform her “usual job,” that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ failed to address whether McCall voluntarily retired for reasons unrelated to her disability.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the CRB’s decision. The court held that the CRB applied the correct legal standard by considering McCall’s job duties at the time of her resignation, that substantial evidence supported the finding of temporary total disability, and that McCall’s resignation was causally related to her work injury rather than being a voluntary limitation of income for unrelated reasons. View "Howard v. D.C. Department of Employment Services" on Justia Law