Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a plaintiff, Carol Allen, who slipped and fell on the steps of Newport City Hall while exiting the building after paying her property taxes. At the time of the incident, there was light to moderate snowfall, and the steps were covered with a slushy film. Allen suffered a severe head injury as a result of the fall, which led to multiple seizures and the loss of her ability to taste and smell. She filed a negligence lawsuit against the city and its employees, alleging they failed to properly treat the stairs for adverse weather conditions.The Superior Court ruled in favor of Allen, finding that the city and its employees had a duty to clear the steps of snow and ice, even during an ongoing storm, due to the unusual circumstances of the case. The court found that the city's failure to apply ice melt and take other protective measures exacerbated the risks inherent in using the stairs during a storm. The court also found that Allen was 35 percent comparatively negligent for her fall.The city and its employees appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the Superior Court, ruling that the city and its employees did not have a duty to clear the steps until a reasonable time after the storm had ended. The court found that the city's failure to take precautionary measures did not exacerbate the risks already inherent in traveling during a storm. Therefore, the court concluded that there were no unusual circumstances that triggered the city's duty prior to the end of the storm. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the city and its employees. View "Allen v. Sitrin" on Justia Law

A condominium resident suffered serious injuries due to a gasoline leak from an underground storage tank owned and operated by a gas station located over a mile away. The resident filed a lawsuit against the owners and operators of the gas station, alleging common-law negligence and liability based on the violation of Illinois environmental statutes and regulations governing underground storage tanks. The resident passed away during the course of the litigation, and her daughter was appointed as a special representative to continue the action.The Cook County circuit court dismissed the statutory claims, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The courts held that the statutes at issue did not create private statutory rights of action, express or implied. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that there was no express private right of action under the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Program (LUST Program) provisions of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. The court also concluded that implying a private right of action was not necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. The court noted that the plaintiff's common-law negligence claim, based on the same acts and omissions that she alleged violated the LUST Program of the Act, was a sufficient remedy. Therefore, it was not necessary to imply a private right of action. View "Rice v. Marathon Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

This case involves a lawsuit filed by Cornelius Williams against J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM), a supplier of asbestos-cement pipe. Williams alleged that he developed mesothelioma due to secondary exposure to asbestos from his brother Nathan's work with asbestos-cement pipe over a period of more than 20 years. Williams and Nathan did not live together, but had regular close contact during Nathan's employment. The jury found JMM liable under theories of design defect and failure to warn, concluding that the pipe sold by JMM was a substantial factor in increasing Williams' risk of developing cancer. JMM appealed the decision.The trial court dismissed Williams' negligence claim, but not the strict liability claim. The jury found in favor of Williams on his remaining strict liability claim, awarding him significant damages. JMM moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and, in the alternative, for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of a previous case, Kesner v. Superior Court, to preclude only the negligence cause of action. The motion was denied. JMM also appealed from the judgment and order denying its motion for JNOV.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court rejected JMM's arguments that (1) judgment must be entered in its favor because, under Kesner, strict liability does not apply to Williams; (2) the judgment must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence; or (3) a new trial is necessary because the trial court abused its discretion on certain evidentiary rulings. View "Williams v. J-M Manufacturing Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a tort action brought by the widow of a deceased worker against various entities, including the employer, Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company, and others involved in the construction project where the accident occurred. The widow alleged that these entities failed to provide proper supervision and safety protocols, leading to her husband's death. The employer, BJ's Oilfield Construction, Inc., filed a motion to dismiss a third-party petition filed against it by one of the defendants, SunPower Corporation Systems. The District Court sustained the motion to dismiss, leading to an appeal.In the lower courts, the widow's wrongful death claim was initially dismissed, leading to three separate appeals. The dismissals were based on the defendants identifying themselves with "prime contractor" status. The appellate court reversed the dismissals, stating that the defendants' assertions were unsupported. The cases were remanded back to the District Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the District Court's order dismissing SunPower's third-party petition against BJ's Oilfield. The court held that the exclusive remedy and liability language in the workers' compensation law does not prevent an employer from creating non-employer legal relationships, capacities, or roles. However, these relationships, capacities, or roles cannot create a negligence tort liability for the same physical injury used by a party for a compensable workers' compensation award. The court also held that the language of the workers' compensation law does not prohibit an employer from creating an indemnity agreement holding others harmless for the employer's intentional conduct not subject to exclusive workers' compensation remedies. The case was remanded for additional proceedings. View "KNOX v. OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO." on Justia Law

Abigail Fricke filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, which required her to disclose all her assets, including any lawsuits. Three years later, she filed a lawsuit against Red Lobster, alleging she was injured due to the restaurant's negligence. However, she did not update her bankruptcy asset schedule to include this lawsuit until after Red Lobster moved for summary judgment based on standing and judicial estoppel. The trial court denied Red Lobster's summary judgment motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.Red Lobster argued that Fricke lacked standing to sue because her personal injury claim was an asset that belonged to her bankruptcy estate rather than to her. The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed, stating that Fricke had standing to sue because she alleged a demonstrable injury allegedly caused by Red Lobster. The court clarified that while Fricke was improperly pursuing the claim on her own behalf rather than on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, this meant she was not the real party in interest, not that she lacked standing.Red Lobster also argued that judicial estoppel barred Fricke's claim. The court disagreed, stating that judicial estoppel did not apply when the bankruptcy court permits a plaintiff-debtor to cure their omission by amending their asset schedule to include a previously omitted lawsuit. The court found that Fricke did not mislead the bankruptcy court and did not prevail on a position in her bankruptcy proceedings that contradicts her claim in this state court negligence action. Therefore, her representations to the bankruptcy court did not judicially estop her from pursuing her personal injury claim against Red Lobster. The court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Red Lobster Restaurants, LLC v. Fricke" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an incident that occurred on June 30, 2017, when Henry Bello, a former employee of Bronx-Lebanon Hospital (BLH), entered the hospital armed with a rifle and opened fire, killing one doctor and wounding five members of the medical staff, including Justin Timperio, a first-year resident. Bello and Timperio were strangers prior to the shooting; they never worked at BLH at the same time and had no other prior contact. Following the incident, BLH notified the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) of Timperio's injuries. Timperio also filed a negligence action in federal court against BLH and the store that sold Bello the rifle.The Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) determined that Timperio's injuries were compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law (WCL). Timperio appealed to the WCB, which affirmed the decision. However, the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the lack of record evidence establishing any employment-related animus was sufficient to rebut the presumption in WCL § 21 (1) and concluded that the claim was therefore not compensable.The New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division. The court clarified the operation of the rebuttable presumption set forth in Workers' Compensation Law § 21 (1), which provides that when an injury arises in the course of a worker's employment, it is presumed to arise out of that worker's employment and therefore is compensable, absent substantial evidence to the contrary. The court held that in cases involving assaults that occur at work, a lack of evidence as to the motivation for the assault does not rebut that presumption. The court concluded that the presumption applied and was unrebutted in this case, and the Appellate Division's contrary conclusion was error. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board was reinstated. View "In re Timperio v Bronx-Lebanon Hospital" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a ski lift accident that left a minor, Annalea Jane Miller, a quadriplegic. The plaintiff, Michael D. Miller, acting as the parent and guardian of Annalea, sued the defendant, Crested Butte Mountain Resort, alleging negligence per se based on violations of the Ski Safety Act of 1979 and the Passenger Tramway Safety Act, as well as a claim for negligence-highest duty of care. The plaintiff argued that the defendant could not absolve itself of statutory duties through private release agreements that purported to release negligence claims against it.The district court dismissed the negligence per se claim, ruling that the defendant could absolve itself of liability through private release agreements. It also dismissed the negligence-highest duty of care claim, finding that the release agreements signed by the plaintiff were enforceable and barred the claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the district court's dismissal of the negligence per se claim. It held that the defendant could not absolve itself of liability for violations of statutory and regulatory duties through private release agreements. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the negligence per se claim.However, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's dismissal of the negligence-highest duty of care claim. It found that the district court correctly applied the factors set forth in Jones v. Dressel, determining that the release agreements signed by the plaintiff were enforceable and barred the claim. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence-highest duty of care claim.The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to reinstate the plaintiff’s negligence per se claim and for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Miller v. Crested Butte, LLC" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Molitor Equipment, LLC purchased two tractors from Deere & Company. These tractors were a transitional model and did not include engine compartment fire shields as standard equipment, which were included in the subsequent 2019 model. A year after purchase, both tractors caught fire in separate incidents. Molitor had an insurance policy with SECURA Insurance Company, who paid Molitor's claim and then pursued Molitor's warranty claims against Deere. SECURA claimed the tractors were defective and unreasonably dangerous due to the absence of the fire shields and that Deere's warranty obligated them to remedy the problem or refund the purchase prices.Deere moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that its warranty only covered manufacturing defects, not design defects. The district court granted Deere's motion, dismissing SECURA's breach of warranty claim to the extent it was based on a design defect theory. The case proceeded on a manufacturing defect theory. At the close of discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. Deere argued that since the tractors conformed to their intended design, there was no manufacturing defect. The district court granted Deere's motion, holding that SECURA could not establish its breach of warranty claim because Deere's warranty covers defects only in "materials or workmanship."On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. The appellate court agreed with the district court's interpretation of Deere's warranty, concluding that it did not cover design defects. The court also agreed that SECURA could not establish a breach of warranty claim based on a manufacturing defect, as the tractors conformed to their intended design. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of SECURA's design defect claim and its grant of summary judgment to Deere on the manufacturing defect claim. View "Secura Insurance Company v. Deere & Company" on Justia Law

Five diabetic patients, Henry J. Hebert, Traci Moore, Aliya Campbell Pierre, Tiffanie Tsakiris, and Brenda Bottiglier, were prescribed the Dexcom G6 Continuous Glucose Monitoring System (Dexcom G6) to manage their diabetes. The device allegedly malfunctioned, failing to alert them of dangerous glucose levels, resulting in serious injuries and, in Hebert's case, death. The patients and Hebert's daughters filed separate product liability actions against Dexcom, Inc., the manufacturer. Dexcom moved to compel arbitration, arguing that each patient had agreed to arbitrate disputes when they installed the G6 App on their devices and clicked "I agree to Terms of Use."The trial court granted Dexcom's motions to compel arbitration in all five cases. The plaintiffs petitioned the appellate court for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its orders compelling them to arbitrate. The appellate court consolidated the cases and issued an order directing Dexcom to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted.The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred. Although a clickwrap agreement, where an internet user accepts a website’s terms of use by clicking an “I agree” or “I accept” button, is generally enforceable, Dexcom’s G6 App clickwrap agreement was not. The court found that Dexcom undid whatever notice it might have provided of the contractual terms by explicitly telling the user that clicking the box constituted authorization for Dexcom to collect and store the user’s sensitive, personal health information. For this reason, Dexcom could not meet its burden of demonstrating that the same click constituted unambiguous acceptance of the Terms of Use, including the arbitration provision. Consequently, arbitration agreements were not formed with any of the plaintiffs. The court granted the petitions and directed the trial court to vacate its orders granting Dexcom’s motions to compel arbitration and to enter new orders denying the motions. View "Herzog v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Weston Bennion was injured when his apartment deck collapsed and subsequently sued his landlord, Dale Stolrow, for negligence. The parties settled, with Bennion agreeing to release Stolrow and his insurer from all claims in exchange for $150,000. The settlement was subject to related subrogation claims and healthcare liens, and Bennion promised to indemnify Stolrow from liability for any such claims and liens. Before making the payment, Stolrow informed Bennion that he intended to distribute the payment in two checks: one payable to Bennion and the other payable to a collection agency that had a healthcare lien on the settlement funds. Bennion objected and filed a motion to enforce the parties’ agreement, arguing that its terms did not allow Stolrow to issue a portion of the settlement funds to a third party.The district court disagreed with Bennion and suggested that Stolrow issue two checks: one jointly to Bennion and the third party for the amount of the lien, and another to Bennion for the remainder of the funds. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. Bennion then petitioned for certiorari.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah granted certiorari to address whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the parties’ agreement permitted Stolrow to issue a portion of the settlement funds jointly to Bennion and the third-party collection agency. The court agreed with Bennion, stating that the plain language of the release provides for payment to Bennion in exchange for his release of claims against Stolrow and his assumption of responsibility for third-party liens. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the lower courts. View "Bennion v. Stolrow" on Justia Law