Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff appealed from a partial final judgment of the district court dismissing his Connecticut state law claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract against Defendant, who accused Plaintiff of sexual assault in 2015 while the two were students at Yale University. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding (1) Defendant to enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity for statements made at the 2018 Yale disciplinary hearing that resulted in Plaintiff’s expulsion from the university and (2) Plaintiff’s tortious interference claims based on Defendant’s original 2015 accusations to be untimely. On preliminary review, the Second Circuit was unable to determine whether Connecticut would recognize the Yale disciplinary hearing at issue as a quasi-judicial proceeding supporting absolute immunity in this case. Accordingly, the court certified questions pertinent to that determination to the Connecticut Supreme Court. That court responded that absolute immunity does not apply in this case because Yale’s disciplinary hearing was not a quasi-judicial proceeding in that it lacked procedural safeguards associated with judicial proceedings.   In response, The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that while the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the possibility for participants in such a hearing to be shielded by qualified immunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Defendant is not presently entitled to dismissal on that ground because Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleads the malice necessary to defeat such immunity. With this guidance as to Connecticut law, the court concluded on this appeal that Plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed against Defendant except as to his tortious interference claim based on 2015 statements, which is untimely. View "Khan v. Yale Univ." on Justia Law

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The parents of Elliott Williams created their individual wills and joint trust after Elliott died. A wrongful death lawsuit was filed on Elliott's behalf, and the Williamses were statutory beneficiaries to proceeds from the lawsuit. Before they received any such proceeds, they attempted to transfer them into their trust for estate planning purposes. Both parents subsequently died before the proceeds were determined or distributed. The petitioner, the personal representative of Elliott's mother's estate, then sought to have Elliott's mother's share judicially determined to belong in the trust. The trial court determined they belonged in the trust. The personal representative of the father's estate appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. In an issue of first impression, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered whether proceeds from a wrongful death case could be transferred into a trust before they are obtained by the trust settlor. The Court held that they can, and if they were, they belonged in the trust. View "Hamilton v. Welsh" on Justia Law

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After consuming excessive amounts of alcohol, Christina Demirelli left a restaurant in the Fashion Island shopping center (Fashion Island) and walked through a nearby parking structure while engaging in “displays of nonsensical horseplay.” She found herself on an upper story of the parking structure where she seated herself on a 43-inch tall perimeter wall, lost her balance, and fell backward out of the structure to the ground several stories below. Demirelli sued The Irvine Company, which owned the parking structure, for premises liability, alleging the parking structure had a physical defect or dangerous condition. The Irvine Company filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied. The Irvine Company filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause. The Court thereafter granted The Irvine Company’s petition. In her opposition, Demirelli conceded the parking structure did not have a physical defect or dangerous condition. In the stead of her original theory, Demirelli asserted a new theory of liability: The Irvine Company assumed a duty to her by hiring a security company charged with detecting and stopping horseplay according to the Fashion Island Code of Conduct. She argued The Irvine Company was liable for the security company’s negligence in enforcing that code. The Court of Appeal found The Irvine Company’s retention of security services did not increase any risk to Demirelli and she did not rely on that undertaking to her detriment. Therefore, The Irvine Company did not owe a duty to Demirelli and summary judgment should have been granted. View "The Irvine Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Before Plaintiffs’ cases were distributed to the district court, these cases were part of MDL 2179, the multi-district litigation proceeding before United States District Court Judge Carl J. Barbier in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Judge Barbier established what is known as the “B3 Bundle” within the overall litigation. The B3 Bundle included claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil and/or other chemicals used during the response to the disaster. 85 B3 cases were assigned to District Judge Barry Ashe. Before his confirmation, Judge Ashe he was a longtime partner at the Stone Pigman law firm. A little more than two weeks after Judge Ashe began granting summary judgments following the exclusion of Dr. Cook, Street’s counsel moved to disqualify Judge Ashe in the five cases in which he had excluded Dr. Cook and in other cases where Daubert and summary judgment motions were still pending. Plaintiffs argued that Judge Ashe should have disqualified himself and, in the alternative, that he should have extended the case-management deadlines.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. If Judge Ashe erred when he failed to recuse in these cases, that error was harmless. Nonetheless, as the arguments on this appeal support, potential conflicts of interest must be taken seriously by every member of the judiciary. The litigants and the public need to be confident in the impartiality of those who will decide legal disputes. View "Lundy v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the court of appeal properly found no abuse of discretion in a jury’s award of approximately $10 million in general damages to plaintiff Henry Pete who developed mesothelioma as a result of his exposure to asbestos. Intertwined with this issue was the fundamental question of the manner by which appellate courts were to review damage awards for excessiveness; necessarily, the same rules would apply in determining whether an award was too low. Louisiana jurisprudence had a long-standing general principle that, in reviewing a general damage award, the “initial inquiry . . . is whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in assessing the amount of damages.” Thereafter, and only when a determination has been made that the “trier of fact has abused its ‘much discretion,’” will a court “resort to prior awards . . . and then only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.” Such determinations are not subject to mathematical exactitude or scientific precision. The Court held that an appellate court must consider relevant prior general damage awards as guidance in determining whether a trier of fact’s award is an abuse of discretion. Applying this principle to this case, the Court found the jury abused its discretion in awarding $9,800,00.00 in general damages. "The evidence presented at trial does not support an award that far exceeds the highest reasonable awards in cases involving similar injuries. Accordingly, based on the evidence adduced at trial, we find $5,000,000.00 to be the highest amount that could reasonably be awarded." View "Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co, LLC et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Oris Latour was injured after he tripped and fell at Steamboat Bill’s restaurant (“Steamboat”) in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Latour alleged he tripped on a concrete ledge that ran perpendicular to the end of a row of dining tables. Contending the ledge was disguised and dangerous, he filed a negligence suit against the restaurant owner. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Latour, finding Steamboat 80 percent at fault and awarding Latour damages totaling $675,053. On appeal, the court found the district court committed reversible error related to two pretrial evidentiary rulings which affected the outcome of the case. The court of appeal conducted a de novo review of the entire record and found Latour met his burden of proving negligence. The appellate court then assessed Steamboat with 85 percent of the fault and Latour with 15 percent fault. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine: (1) whether the court of appeal erred in finding Latour met his burden of proving Steamboat was negligent pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800.6; and (2) whether, after finding prejudicial error, the court of appeal erred in increasing Steamboat’s percentage of fault on de novo review, although Latour did not appeal or answer the appeal. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, the Supreme Court found Latour met his burden of proof under La. R.S. 9:2800.6. The Court also found consistent with statutory law and secondarily, jurisprudence, Steamboat could not be assessed with a greater percentage of fault than the 80 percent assigned by the jury. Because Latour did not appeal or answer the appeal, the 20 percent of fault allocated to him cannot be reduced. Therefore, on de novo review, the Supreme Court allocated fault at 80 percent to Steamboat and 20 percent to Latour. View "Latour v. Steamboats, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Dameon Baumgarner's wrongful conviction claim seeking compensation under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-5004, holding that Baumgarner was "imprisoned" for purposes of the wrongful conviction compensation statute because his sentence was controlled by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6603(g).Baumgarner was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to a ten-month prison term, suspended. After Baumgarner was released from jail, the court of appeals reversed his conviction. Thereafter, Baumgarner brought this action alleging a wrongful conviction under section 60-5004, under which he was required to establish that he was "convicted of a felony crime and subsequently imprisoned." The district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that Baumgarner had not been "imprisoned" because he was not confined in a Kansas Department of Corrections facility. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Baumgarner was imprisoned for purposes of the wrongful conviction statute because his sentence was controlled by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6603(g), which contemplates sixty days imprisonment in a county jail as a condition of probation in felony cases. View "In re Wrongful Conviction of Baumgarner" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff an electrical technician, was injured when a broken hatch providing access to the roof of a commercial building slammed shut on his back, herniating several of his discs. He sued the building’s owner and management company for negligence and premises liability, contending that defendants had failed either to repair a dangerous condition of which they were aware or to warn him of it. A jury returned a special verdict for Acosta and awarded him damages in excess of $12.6 million.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that a property owner who hires an independent contractor may be liable to the contractor’s employee for injuries sustained on the job only if the owner exercises retained control over any part of the contractor’s work in a manner that affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injuries, or the employee is injured by a concealed hazard that is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable by the contractor. In the present case, Plaintiff does not contend that defendants exercised any retained control over the work site, and the undisputed evidence established that Plaintiff and his employer could reasonably have ascertained the hazardous condition of the site—i.e., that the mechanism designed to hold the roof hatch open was broken and the ladder that provided access to the hatch did not reach all the way to the roof. View "Acosta v. MAS Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Breanne Martin alleged she was injured when a large metal gate fell on her while she was on a residential rental property located in Alpine, California. Martin initially filed claims for negligence and premises liability against the owners of the property. But upon learning that the owners had previously filed a bankruptcy petition, Martin amended her complaint to add the court-appointed bankruptcy trustee, Leslie Gladstone, as a defendant. Gladstone demurred to Martin’s complaint, asserting that application of federal statutory and common law demonstrated that Martin could not state a cause of action against her. The trial court rejected Gladstone’s argument regarding application of the "Barton" doctrine, but accepted her argument regarding the abandonment of the property at issue; the court sustained Gladstone’s demurrer on this ground and entered judgment in favor of Gladstone. On appeal, Martin contended the trial court erred in concluding that Gladstone’s abandonment of the relevant property after the accident prevented Gladstone from being held liable for Martin’s injuries. Martin further argued the trial court correctly determined it could not conclude as a matter of law that the Barton doctrine applied to divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over Martin’s claims. The Court of Appeal agreed with Martin’s appellate contentions and reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "Martin v. Gladstone" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff’s son spent several months at a medium-security facility in St. Louis called “the Workhouse.” None of the guards saw Plaintiff’s son receive or take fentanyl, the drug that killed him. Inmates tried to help by rubbing ice on him once he lost consciousness. Upon arriving a few minutes later, three Officers radioed for medical assistance. In the meantime, rather than try to resuscitate Plaintiff’s son themselves, they stood by and watched as two inmates tried to help him. When trained medical personnel finally arrived four minutes later, it was too late: they were unable to revive Plaintiff’s son, who died from an overdose. Surveillance footage captured some, but not all, of these events. Plaintiff’s mother sued the City of St. Louis, the three responding officers, and two supervisors for their deliberate indifference. The district court denied summary judgment to the responding officers.   The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court misstated the burden and relied on allegations from an unverified complaint to deny summary judgment. The court wrote that the district court erred in how it dealt with the gaps in the video footage. Instead of relying on other evidence to fill in the missing details, the findings mirrored what the plaintiff’s unverified complaint said. The court wrote that unsworn allegations are no substitute for evidence at summary judgment. The court explained that the district court tilted the scales too far in the Plaintiff’s favor by raising the summary-judgment burden on the officers and allowing unsworn allegations to rebut evidence. View "Janice Washington v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law