Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Natalie F. (Mother) and Jan F. (Father) are parents of a now six-year-old girl, M.F., and a three-year-old boy, O.F. Mother sought a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) against Father. She claimed she suffered abuse within the meaning of the DVPA as a result of Father making false police reports to the Santa Monica Police Department (SMPD) to conduct welfare checks on the children while they were in Mother’s care and sending her and her attorney over 130 harassing messages via email and the communication platform Our Family Wizard (OFW) over a 40-day period. The family court denied Mother’s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), finding Father’s actions as alleged by Mother did not constitute abuse under the DVPA. Mother argues the family court erred in denying her DVRO request because Father’s actions amounted to abuse, and the First Amendment does not protect such conduct. She further argues that regardless of whether she could seek a remedy in the custody proceedings, she was still entitled to a DVRO.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded. The court concluded that based on the limited evidence before it, the family court erred in denying the DVRO. Mother adduced evidence that Father made multiple requests for police welfare checks not for any legitimate reason but based on false information to harass her. If fully credited, that evidence alone was sufficient to demonstrate abuse under the DVPA and to require the issuance of a DVRO, and the family court erred in finding otherwise. View "Jan F. v. Natalie F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted conspiracy jurisdiction in this case in which three law firms petitioned the Court to order a judge to dismiss them from the underlying lawsuit, holding that the law firms demonstrated a "clear and indisputable right to the relief requested and a lack of other means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or to obtain he requested action."Plaintiffs sued certain cigarette manufacturers and retailers, bringing product liability, fraud, and conspiracy claims. Plaintiff also sued three law firms that counseled the tobacco companies, alleging two counts of conspiracy. The law firms each filed motions to dismiss under Haw. R. Civ. P. (HRCP) Rule 12(b)(2), claiming that Hawai'i courts lacked general and specific jurisdiction over them. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss without making minimum contacts findings or undertaking any due process analysis. The law firms subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition and, alternatively, for a writ of mandamus ordering dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court adopted conspiracy jurisdiction and granted the law firms' writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court clearly exercised jurisdiction beyond its authority, and there were no other means for the law firms to adequately address the alleged wrong or to obtain dismissal. View "Dickinson v. Kim" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were allegedly injured from a collision with an Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) Trooper. Less than three weeks after the accident, plaintiffs' lawyer sent the OHP a letter asking it to preserve any evidence relating to the incident, and to request some additional information. OHP forwarded the letter to the Oklahoma Office of Management & Enterprise Services (OMES) and OMES unilaterally determined that the request letter was the statutory notice of a governmental tort claim, triggering the time limits within the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the Act). Plaintiffs' lawyer disagreed. Less than one year after the accident, the lawyer sent a notice of governmental tort claim to OMES. Five months later, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the OHP, seeking recovery for their injuries. OHP filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the letter requesting the preservation of evidence was notice of a governmental tort claim triggering time limits which had already expired by the time plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. The trial court agreed, and dismissed the cause. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted review to determine whether plaintiffs' letter requesting the preservation of evidence constituted the required statutory notice of a governmental tort claim. The Court held that it did not. View "Ullman v. Oklahoma Highway Patrol" on Justia Law

Kenai Ironclad Corporation (“Kenai” or “Plaintiff”) alleged that CP Marine Services, LLC, breached its contract to repair and convert Kenai’s offshore supply vessel to a salmon fishing tender for use in Alaska. After Kenai expressed dissatisfaction with the work, the relationship deteriorated. Kenai alleged that, after paying its final invoice, it attempted to remove its vessel from CP Marine’s shipyard, but as it did so, CP Marine and codefendant Ten Mile Exchange, LLC (“TME”) (collectively, “Defendants”) rammed, wrongfully seized, detained, and converted Kenai’s vessel for five days before finally releasing it the district court found that CP Marine did not breach its contract with Kenai but did wrongfully seize, detain, and convert the vessel. The district court awarded punitive damages and attorney’s fees for Defendants’ bad faith and reckless behavior in ramming, seizing, and converting the vessel for five days. Defendants appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Defendants wrongfully seized and converted Kenai’s vessel in bad faith and in a manner egregious enough to warrant an award of punitive damages. The court vacated the district court’s award of damages and remanded on the limited basis of clarifying the court’s award. The court found that Kenai presented sufficient evidence and testimony to support the district court’s finding that Defendants’ conduct was in bad faith, in callous disregard for the safety of the people aboard the vessels, and in reckless disregard of Kenai’s rights. Hence, the district court did not clearly err in finding facts sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. View "Kenai Ironclad v. CP Marine Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he co-created the song “All the Way Up,” but that he has not been properly credited or compensated for his contribution. He filed this action in the district court asserting claims under the Copyright Act, as well as various tort claims. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff assigned away any rights he may have had in the song, but the agreement has never been produced, and the parties disagree about its content and effect. The district court admitted a draft version of the missing agreement as a duplicate, and then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without allowing Plaintiff to conduct discovery.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the draft admissible as a duplicate original under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, but properly admitted the draft as “other evidence of the content” of the original under Rule 1004. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s request to conduct discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment and erred in concluding that no genuine dispute of material fact existed based on the current record. View "Elliott v. Cartagena, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former tenant, appeals a judgment of dismissal following the trial court’s granting a motion in limine filed by Defendant Cachuma Village, LLC (Cachuma), her landlord. Plaintiff filed a complaint for, among other things, personal injuries from exposure to toxic mold. Defendant moved in limine to exclude Plaintiff’s medical expert from testifying about the medical causation of her illnesses due to mold.   The Second Appellate District reversed, finding that the trial court erred in excluding Plaintiff’s medical expert’s evidence. The court explained that medical doctors are experts who are in the best position to determine the nature of illnesses experienced by patients. The expert witness here testified that Plaintiff’s “adverse health effects” were the result of her living at the Defendant's residence, where she was exposed to “excess mold growth.” The trial court ruled the expert was not qualified to make a diagnosis of mold as the cause of her illnesses. But the expert’s opinion was based on facts, not on a “leap of logic or conjecture.” Further, the court wrote that medical doctors who examine patients may reach the most probable diagnosis for a patient’s condition through a process of elimination. Here, the expert testified that he conducted “a differential diagnosis” to determine the cause of Plaintiff’s illness. This is a standard method doctors use to eliminate potential causes of illness to be able to reach a diagnosis. Further, the court explained that in addition to being a medical doctor, the expert is also a scientific researcher. His experience in that area provided additional support for his differential diagnosis that exposure to mold caused Plaintiff’s respiratory illness. View "Brancati v. Cachuma Village, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the "anti-abrogation clause" set forth in Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, 6 guaranteeing that the "right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated" does not extend to dram-shop actions because they were recognized after statehood.At issue was whether the anti-abrogation clause extends to rights of action created after the Arizona Constitution was ratified, such as the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 (1983). Plaintiffs sued Defendant, the owner of Jaguars Club in Phoenix, under theories of statutory and common law dram-shop liability. The jury found Defendant was liable under the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros but not liable under the dram-shop cause of action codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. 4-311(A). The jury apportioned forty percent of the fault to Defendant. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of Defendant, holding that the legislature's limitation of dram-shop liability to actions brought under section 4-311 did not run afoul of the anti-abrogation clause by abrogating the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros. View "Torres v. JAI Dining Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action, the Supreme Court held that the statutory duty to report child abuse or neglect or under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3620(A) does not encompass reporting a risk of future harm and that mental health professionals owe a duty to third parties based on their special relationship and public duty and not on foreseeability of harm.A licensed professional counselor initiated the process for involuntary court-ordered evaluation and treatment pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-523 alleging that Mother was a danger to herself and others and persistently disabled. The superior court granted the petition. After court-ordered treatment Mother was discharged, and the petition was dismissed. Five days later, Mother drowned her twin boys. Father brought this action against, among others, Crisis Preparation and Recovery Inc. The superior court granted summary judgment for Crisis Prep, finding that it had no duty to report Mother's condition given that she was undergoing court-ordered treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 13-3620(A) did not impose a duty on Crisis Prep under the circumstances; and (2) Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 58 (1989), and Little v. All Phoenix South Community Mental Health Center, 186 Ariz. 97 (App. 1996), are overruled to the extent they found a duty in such circumstances based on foreseeability. View "Avitia v. Crisis Preparation & Recovery, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Defendant for personal injuries related to an automobile accident in which Defendant’s car rear-ended Plaintiff’s car. A jury trial resulted in a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs for past noneconomic damages only, and Plaintiffs appealed. After trial on remand, a jury awarded Plaintiffs a total of $15,125 in damages. Plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.4201 on the ground Defendant had unreasonably denied several requests for admission regarding, primarily, the status of certain medical records as business records within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1271. The trial court denied the motion and awarded costs to Defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion for fees and costs and the award of costs to Defendant.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the award of costs to Defendant, reversed the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for fees and costs and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the trial court erred by denying Plaintiffs’ motion for expenses pursuant to section 2033.420. The court held that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover expenses incurred in proving the medical records were business records. Further, the court wrote that it agreed with the trial court it was unreasonable of Defendant to deny she had caused “some injury” to Plaintiff. The record contains substantial evidence that at the time of the requests for admission, Defendant knew at least some injury had been caused by the accident. View "Vargas v. Gallizzi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William Doherty appealed the grant of summary judgment to defendant Alphonse Sorrentino. On the morning of November 8, 2019, plaintiff walked a short distance from the Village Inn to the Woodstock Inn in Woodstock, Vermont. It was not precipitating at that time. He remained at the Woodstock Inn for about fifteen minutes. It began to snow as he left the Woodstock Inn to return to the Village Inn. Plaintiff slipped and fell on a sidewalk abutting 81 Central Street. Snow had lightly accumulated on the sidewalk. Defendant arrived after plaintiff fell but before an ambulance transported plaintiff to a local hospital. Defendant was also the sole owner of ACS Design Build and Construction Services, LLC, both of which had main offices at 81 Central Street. The sidewalk was owned by the Town of Woodstock. The Town had an ordinance that required owners of property abutting a [Woodstock] Village sidewalk clear accumulated snow or ice for pedestrian traffic to a minimum width of three feet, and within twenty-four hours of such accumulation. No accumulated snow had been cleared at the time plaintiff fell. Plaintiff sued, alleging that defendant, in his personal capacity, breached a duty to plaintiff to clear the sidewalk of snow, which was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. In moving for summary judgment, defendant argued that he owed no duty to plaintiff because: neither defendant nor the owner of the building, Tanglewood, owned or controlled the sidewalk on which plaintiff fell; landowners abutting public sidewalks owed no duty to the public to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition; and the municipal ordinance did not otherwise create a duty to plaintiff. The civil division awarded summary judgment to defendant concluding plaintiff did not bear his burden to show that defendant knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the sidewalk. The court determined that plaintiff failed to offer any basis to reach defendant’s personal assets as sole shareholder of Tanglewood, and that plaintiff did not allege defendant owned or controlled the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. The court found that the municipal ordinance did not create a duty of care to plaintiff. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Doherty v. Sorrentino, et al." on Justia Law