Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Customs and Border Protection officers seized a tractor-trailer at the Columbia Solidarity Bridge Port of Entry in Laredo, Texas, which was carrying liquid methamphetamine concealed in the fuel tanks. Noe de Jesus Martinez-Montelongo was driving the vehicle, and Fidel Saldana Rodriguez was the passenger. Both were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to import and importation of methamphetamine. Saldana challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, while Martinez-Montelongo challenged the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied both defendants' motions for judgment of acquittal and sentenced them to 235 months of imprisonment each. Saldana argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove he knew about the methamphetamine, while Martinez-Montelongo argued that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court improperly considered his failure to admit guilt.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Saldana's sufficiency challenge de novo and found that the evidence, including inconsistent statements, the use of a stick to measure fuel levels, and WhatsApp messages, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Saldana knowingly participated in the conspiracy. The court affirmed Saldana's convictions.Regarding Martinez-Montelongo's sentence, the court found that the district court did not rely on his lack of remorse in its § 3553(a) analysis. The district court's references to the defendants' insistence on innocence were to explain why they were being sentenced and why they were not eligible for certain sentencing reductions. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed Martinez-Montelongo's sentence. View "United States v. Martinez-Montelongo" on Justia Law

Roy Lee Jones, Jr. was involved in a methamphetamine-trafficking organization in North-Central Louisiana. He received large shipments of methamphetamine from his California-based supplier, DeLewis Johnson IV, and redistributed them to Willie Todd Harris, who then sold them to street-level dealers. After a ten-month investigation, federal law enforcement initiated grand jury proceedings, resulting in a five-count indictment. Jones was charged under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine.Jones and Johnson were tried as co-defendants and convicted by a jury. The initial presentence report (PSR) calculated Jones' offense level as 37, recommending a Guidelines range of 210-262 months. The district court sentenced Jones to 210 months' imprisonment. Jones appealed his conviction and sentence, which were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court denied Jones' petition for a writ of certiorari.Jones filed a motion for a sentence reduction under Amendments 821 and 825 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied the motion, finding that Jones was ineligible for a reduction under USSG § 4C1.1(a)(10) because he had received an aggravating role enhancement under § 3B1.1 and had engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion, its interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, and its findings of fact for clear error. The court held that either receiving a § 3B1.1 adjustment or engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise is sufficient to disqualify a defendant from a sentence reduction under § 4C1.1(a)(10). Since Jones received an aggravating role enhancement, he was ineligible for a reduction. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Jonathan Partain left his cell phone in his 15-year-old daughter's room and remotely triggered it to record her while she was changing clothes. His daughter discovered the recording, showed it to her mother, deleted it, and confronted Partain, who admitted to his actions. The State charged Partain with Sexual Abuse of Children and Surreptitious Visual Observation or Recordation in a Residence. Partain pleaded guilty to Sexual Abuse of Children in exchange for the dismissal of the second charge and an amendment to the first charge to avoid a mandatory minimum sentence.The Fourth Judicial District Court accepted Partain's guilty plea and dismissed the second charge without prejudice. However, at sentencing, the court dismissed the Sexual Abuse of Children charge sua sponte, reinstated the previously dismissed charge of Surreptitious Visual Observation or Recordation, and found Partain guilty of that charge. The court imposed a two-year deferred sentence for the misdemeanor charge. The State appealed, arguing that the court had no authority to dismiss the guilty plea and reinstate the dismissed charge.The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the case and held that the District Court had no statutory authority to dismiss the felony charge after accepting Partain's guilty plea and to amend or reinstate the dismissed misdemeanor charge. The court found that the District Court's actions violated the separation of powers by usurping the role of the prosecutor in charging decisions. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing on the Sexual Abuse of Children conviction. View "State v. Partain" on Justia Law

In 1982, William Clark was convicted of eight counts of sexual intercourse without consent and was designated a dangerous offender, receiving a 30-year prison sentence for each count, to run concurrently. After being paroled, Clark sought relief from the sex offender registration requirement in 2005, which was denied by the district court. The court found that Clark was not eligible for relief under the 2005 Sexual and Violent Offender Registration Act (SVORA) because the victim was compelled to submit by force. This decision was affirmed on appeal.Clark again petitioned for relief in 2024, citing the Montana Supreme Court's decision in State v. Hinman, which held that the 2007 SVORA amendments were punitive and could not be applied retroactively. The State opposed, arguing that Clark remained subject to the 2005 SVORA requirements, which mandated lifetime registration. The Ninth Judicial District Court denied Clark's petition, maintaining that he must continue to register for life under the 2005 SVORA.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court's decision. The Court held that the 2005 SVORA, which was determined to be a civil regulatory scheme and not punitive, could be applied retroactively. Since Clark's offenses occurred before the 2007 amendments, he remained subject to the 2005 SVORA, which required lifetime registration due to the nature of his offense involving force. The Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that there was no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law

Livorio Loera was charged with felony vehicular homicide while under the influence after a two-vehicle accident on Interstate 90 resulted in the death of Jerome Socheath. Loera drove the wrong way on the highway and collided with an SUV, causing it to roll and eject Socheath, who died three days later. Loera was found intoxicated and with a blood alcohol content of .124 several hours after the crash. Evidence found in Loera's car included open and unopened alcohol containers and self-help books on addiction.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, excluded evidence regarding Socheath's seat belt use, deeming it irrelevant to Loera's conduct. The court also admitted evidence of unopened alcohol and self-help books found in Loera's trunk, considering it relevant to Loera's negligence. Loera appealed these decisions, arguing that the seat belt evidence was necessary for his causation defense and that the trunk evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the seat belt evidence, as it was irrelevant to determining Loera's conduct and causation. The court also found that the transaction rule did not apply to the seat belt evidence. However, the Supreme Court determined that the District Court erred in admitting the trunk evidence, as it was irrelevant to Loera's negligence and intoxication. Despite this error, the court concluded it was harmless due to the overwhelming admissible evidence proving Loera's guilt. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed Loera's conviction. View "State v. Loera" on Justia Law

Leslie Dean Ernst pleaded guilty to five felony counts of Privacy in Communications in violation of Montana law. He later sought to withdraw his guilty pleas and reduce two of the felony convictions to misdemeanors, which the District Court denied. Ernst appealed the decision.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court initially sentenced Ernst to 25 years in prison with a 15-year parole restriction. Ernst appealed, and the case was remanded for resentencing due to a missing transcript. Before resentencing, Ernst moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutional based on a prior court decision. The District Court denied his motion, finding that Ernst had not shown his prior convictions were unconstitutional. Ernst was resentenced to the same 25-year term with a 15-year parole restriction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Ernst was charged, convicted, and sentenced under the constitutional portion of the Privacy in Communications statute. The court found that the charging documents, plea agreement, and sentencing did not rely on the unconstitutional prima facie provision. The court also determined that Ernst's guilty plea colloquy was sufficient to establish his intent to harass, annoy, or offend his victims, as required by the statute.Additionally, the court held that Ernst failed to provide direct evidence that his prior convictions were unconstitutional. The presumption of regularity attached to his prior convictions, and Ernst did not meet his burden to show they were invalid. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court's denial of Ernst's motions and upheld his sentence. View "State v. Ernst" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was involved in an incident where he confronted two men spraying herbicide in a park, attempted to disable their equipment with a knife, and resisted arrest when police arrived. He was charged with multiple misdemeanors, including obstructing, resisting arrest, criminal mischief, disorderly conduct, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant pleaded not guilty and was released on the condition that he appear at all scheduled hearings.The Municipal Court warned the defendant that failure to appear at the final pretrial hearing would result in a waiver of his right to a jury trial. The defendant failed to appear at the final pretrial hearing, and the court subsequently waived his jury trial and set the matter for a bench trial. The defendant did not object to this waiver or to proceeding with a bench trial. He was found guilty of all charges except for possession of drug paraphernalia, which was dismissed due to insufficient evidence. The defendant was sentenced to consecutive suspended sentences for the remaining charges.The defendant appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Court, arguing that the Municipal Court erred in waiving his jury trial right. The District Court affirmed the Municipal Court's decision, concluding that the defendant had been adequately informed of the consequences of failing to appear and had effectively waived his right to a jury trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the Municipal Court did not commit plain error in conducting a bench trial. The court found that the defendant had been properly notified of the waiver consequences and had not objected to the waiver or the bench trial. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the defendant's waiver of his jury trial right was knowing and voluntary. View "City of Missoula v. Charlie" on Justia Law

Robert J. Branson was charged with six sex crimes, including three unclassified felonies, for raping and sodomizing a child. On the day of the trial, Branson negotiated an Alford plea to one count of first-degree child molestation (class A felony) and two counts of second-degree statutory rape. The State amended the charges accordingly. During the plea hearing, Branson acknowledged he was charged with a class A felony and faced a potential life sentence. The circuit court accepted his plea and sentenced him to life imprisonment for the class A felony and consecutive seven-year terms for the two counts of second-degree statutory rape.Branson filed a Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief but did not allege a factual defect in his guilty plea or that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. The circuit court overruled the motion. On appeal, Branson claimed for the first time that the State failed to allege the necessary facts for a class A felony. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that Branson waived this argument by not raising it in his Rule 24.035 motion.Branson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging his sentence was excessive because the factual basis for his guilty plea only supported a class B felony. The circuit court denied the petition, but the court of appeals granted it. The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and denied habeas relief, holding that Branson waived his sentencing claim by not raising it in his Rule 24.035 motion. The court found no jurisdictional defect, cause and prejudice, or manifest injustice warranting habeas review of the procedurally defaulted claim. The court overruled previous cases that allowed habeas review for sentencing errors as jurisdictional defects. View "Branson v. Shewmaker" on Justia Law

Amaury Villa participated in two significant burglaries in 2011, stealing $61 million worth of pharmaceuticals from an Eli Lilly warehouse in Connecticut and $1.5 million worth of cigarettes from a warehouse in Kentucky. He was indicted by federal grand juries in Florida, Connecticut, and Kentucky. Villa pled guilty in the Florida and Connecticut cases, receiving concurrent prison terms of 140 and 98 months, respectively. In January 2016, Kentucky prosecutor Joshua Judd emailed Villa’s attorney, Donald Meier, a proposed plea agreement that did not mention concurrent sentencing. Villa later pled guilty without a plea agreement and was sentenced to 77 months, to be served consecutively.Villa moved to set aside his Kentucky sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in January 2019, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He later sought to amend his motion to add a claim that Meier failed to inform him of a potential cooperation agreement. The district court initially denied the motion as untimely. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the timeliness of the claim. The district court found the claim timely but denied it on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court found that Judd’s January 21 email did not constitute a formal plea offer but was an invitation to negotiate. The court also found that Meier had informed Villa of the January 9 plea offer, which was discussed at Villa’s change-of-plea hearing. The court concluded that Meier’s performance was not deficient and that Villa himself impeded further negotiations by refusing to provide additional information about his co-conspirator. The district court’s judgment denying Villa’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence was affirmed. View "Villa v. United States" on Justia Law

Sonya Kenette Brown, a City Council member in Albion, Michigan, was prosecuted for allegedly violating a City Charter provision that prohibits council members from directing the appointment or removal of city employees. Brown claimed that her political opponents on the City Council engaged in retaliatory prosecution and arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to violate her civil rights. She also challenged the constitutionality of the City Charter provision.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed Brown's claims of retaliatory prosecution and arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy, finding that there was probable cause for her prosecution based on her Facebook messages. The court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on Brown's claim that the City Charter provision was unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Brown's claims, agreeing that there was probable cause for her prosecution. The court found that Brown's Facebook messages provided sufficient evidence to believe she had violated the City Charter by directing the removal of a city employee. The court also held that the City Charter provision was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, as it provided clear standards and did not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech.The Sixth Circuit concluded that Brown's claims failed because she could not demonstrate an absence of probable cause, and the City Charter provision was constitutionally valid. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Brown v. City of Albion, Mich." on Justia Law