Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

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Rebecca Curtin filed an opposition to United Trademark Holdings’ (UTH) registration of the mark RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures, claiming the mark was generic, descriptive, and failed to function as a trademark. Curtin, a doll collector and mother, argued that the registration would harm consumers by reducing competition and increasing prices for Rapunzel merchandise. She also claimed it would chill the creation of new Rapunzel-themed dolls and toys.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) dismissed Curtin’s opposition, concluding she was not statutorily entitled to oppose the registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1063. The TTAB applied the Lexmark framework, which requires a plaintiff to fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute and to show a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the registration. The TTAB found that Curtin, as a consumer, did not have a commercial interest protected by the Lanham Act and that her alleged injuries were too remote and speculative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the TTAB’s decision, agreeing that the Lexmark framework was correctly applied. The court held that the interests protected by the Lanham Act in this context are commercial, and Curtin, as a consumer, did not fall within the zone of interests. Additionally, the court found that Curtin’s alleged injuries were derivative of harms to commercial actors and too remote to establish proximate causation. Thus, Curtin was not entitled to oppose the registration of the RAPUNZEL mark. View "CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. " on Justia Law

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Vetements Group AG filed applications to register two marks, "VETEMENTS" in standard characters and in stylized form, for clothing items and online retail store services featuring clothing. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Examining Attorney refused the applications, asserting that the marks were generic or merely descriptive without acquired distinctiveness, and thus barred from registration under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) affirmed the Examining Attorney's refusal, applying the foreign equivalents doctrine. The Board found that "VETEMENTS," which translates to "clothing" in English, was generic for the identified goods and services. The Board also determined that the marks were highly descriptive and that Vetements Group AG failed to establish acquired distinctiveness among U.S. consumers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Board's decision. The court agreed that the foreign equivalents doctrine was correctly applied, noting that an appreciable number of Americans are capable of translating "VETEMENTS" from French to English. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that the marks were generic, as they directly referred to the genus of goods and services in question. Consequently, the court affirmed the Board's decision to refuse registration of the marks. View "In Re VETEMENTS GROUP AG " on Justia Law

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Thomas D. Foster, APC (Foster) sought to register the trademark "US SPACE FORCE" for various goods and services. The application was filed on March 19, 2018, shortly after President Donald J. Trump announced the creation of a new military branch called the Space Force. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examining attorney refused the registration, citing a false suggestion of a connection with the United States under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal, concluding that the mark falsely suggested a connection with the United States. Foster requested reconsideration, arguing that the Board erred by not crediting the filing date of the intent-to-use application as the constructive use date and by relying on evidence post-dating the filing date. The Board denied reconsideration, maintaining that Foster was not the prior user and that there was ample evidence supporting the false connection analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appropriate timing for assessing a false suggestion of a connection includes evidence up to the time of examination, which in this case extended through the Board’s December 12, 2022 decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s findings that the mark "US SPACE FORCE" was the same as or a close approximation of a name or identity used by the United States and that it pointed uniquely and unmistakably to the United States. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the mark falsely suggested a connection with the United States and was therefore unregistrable under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act. View "In Re FOSTER" on Justia Law

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Oscar Hernandez allegedly sustained injuries from a RIDGID-branded nail gun purchased from Home Depot. The nail gun, designed and manufactured by other companies, was marketed and sold by Home Depot under a trademark license agreement with Ridge Tool Company. Hernandez filed a complaint against Ridge Tool Company and Home Depot, asserting claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty of fitness. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.The respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ridge Tool Company should not be held strictly liable as it only licensed the RIDGID trademark and did not participate in the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of the nail gun. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment on all claims except the strict liability claim, noting the lack of controlling precedent in Nevada on whether a trademark licensor can be held strictly liable under such circumstances. The court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that Nevada does not impose strict products liability on an entity whose only involvement with a defective product is licensing its trademark for marketing purposes. The court adopted the rule set forth in section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which states that a trademark licensor is not subject to strict liability unless it substantially participates in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the product. The court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that a trademark licensor cannot be held strictly liable for damages caused by a defective product if its role is limited to licensing its trademark. View "HERNANDEZ VS. THE HOME DEPOT, INC." on Justia Law

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Top Tobacco, L.P., Republic Technologies (NA), LLC, and Republic Tobacco, L.P. sued Star Importers & Wholesalers, Inc., and its president, Amin Hudda, for selling counterfeit TOP® and JOB® cigarette rolling papers. Republic conducted test buys and laboratory testing, which confirmed the products were counterfeit. The police seized 704 jars of allegedly counterfeit rolling papers from Star’s warehouse. Republic alleged trademark counterfeiting, trademark infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment against Star on liability for trademark infringement and counterfeiting but not against Hudda. The remaining issues for trial were Hudda’s personal liability, whether Star’s actions were willful, and the amount of statutory damages. The jury found Star did not act willfully and awarded Republic $123,000 in damages per mark, totaling $1,107,000 for nine marks. The district court denied Star’s motion for judgment as a matter of law challenging the verdict size.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to reduce the jury verdict, as it fell within the statutory damages range permitted by the Lanham Act. The court affirmed that statutory damages need not be related to actual damages and that the jury could consider factors such as the value of the trademark, deterrence, and public safety risks. The court also found that the verdict did not violate due process, as it was not so disproportionate as to be unreasonable. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Star’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Top Tobacco, L.P. v. Star Importers & Wholesalers, Inc." on Justia Law

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PT Medisafe Technologies, a medical glove manufacturer, applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for registration of a color mark for use on medical examination gloves. The proposed mark was described as the color dark green (Pantone 3285 c) applied to the entire surface of chloroprene examination gloves. The PTO’s examining attorney found the color was not inherently distinctive and could not be registered without showing acquired distinctiveness. Medisafe attempted to prove acquired distinctiveness but was ultimately rejected by the examining attorney, who determined the mark was generic and had not acquired distinctiveness.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) reviewed the examining attorney’s decision. The Board applied a modified version of the H. Marvin Ginn test, tailored for color marks, as set out in Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Freud America, Inc. The Board defined the genus of goods as all chloroprene medical examination gloves and found the relevant public to include all purchasers of such gloves. The Board agreed with the examining attorney that the dark green color was common in the industry and could not identify a single source, thus deeming the mark generic. The Board also found Medisafe’s evidence of acquired distinctiveness unconvincing and affirmed the refusal to register the mark.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court affirmed the Board’s application of the Milwaukee test and found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s determination that the mark was generic. The court held that the dark green color was so common in the industry that it could not serve as a source indicator, making it ineligible for registration on either the principal or supplemental registers. The court did not address the issue of acquired distinctiveness, as a generic mark cannot acquire distinctiveness. View "In Re PT MEDISAFE TECHNOLOGIES " on Justia Law

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Heritage Alliance offers voter guides under the names “iVoterGuide” and “iVoterGuide.com.” In January 2019, the American Policy Roundtable (APR) filed for registration of the marks “iVoters” and “iVoters.com.” Heritage opposed APR’s registration, claiming that APR’s marks would likely be confused with Heritage’s marks, for which Heritage claimed priority of use. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) found that Heritage’s prior-use marks were not protectable because they were highly descriptive and had not acquired distinctiveness, and dismissed the opposition.The Board determined that Heritage had begun using its iVoterGuide marks well before APR’s first use date. However, the Board found that APR effectively conceded likelihood of confusion. Despite this, the Board ruled that Heritage’s prior-use marks were not protectable as trademarks because they were highly descriptive and had not acquired distinctiveness. The Board found that the marks were highly descriptive as they clearly described the service offered, and that Heritage’s evidence of acquired distinctiveness was insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court affirmed the Board’s findings that the iVoterGuide marks were highly descriptive and had not acquired distinctiveness. The court found that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, including the descriptive nature of the marks and the limited additional evidence of acquired distinctiveness. The court concluded that the Board’s decision to dismiss the opposition was correct and affirmed the dismissal. View "HERITAGE ALLIANCE v. AMERICAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE " on Justia Law

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Dyson Technology, Ltd., a UK-based company, filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against multiple e-commerce stores for selling counterfeit Dyson products. Dyson sought remedies under the Lanham Act, which allows trademark holders to recover profits, damages, and costs from infringing parties. The defendants did not appear in court, leading to a default judgment in Dyson's favor. However, the district court awarded only $1,000 in statutory damages and denied Dyson's request to recover the infringing sellers' profits, stating that Dyson had only provided evidence of revenue, not profits.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, handled the initial case. The court's decision to limit Dyson's award was based on its interpretation that revenue and profits are not the same, and it declined to assume that all revenue equaled profits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Lanham Act. According to the Act, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to the defendant's profits, and the defendant bears the burden of proving any costs or deductions. The appellate court found that Dyson's evidence of revenue was sufficient to establish profits, as the defendants did not provide evidence to the contrary. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the district court to adjust the award if deemed just based on the case's circumstances. View "Dyson Technology Limited v David 7 Store" on Justia Law

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Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (DFG) has operated loan financing and check cashing businesses under the name MONEY MART since the 1980s. In 2010, DFG began expanding its services to include pawn brokerage and pawn shop services, using the MONEY MART mark in commerce for these services starting in 2012. DFG registered two marks in 2013, which were officially registered in 2014. Brittex Financial, Inc. (Brittex) has operated pawn shops in Texas under the names MONEY MART PAWN and MONEY MART PAWN & JEWELRY since the 1990s and has common law rights in these marks.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) initially denied Brittex’s petition to cancel DFG’s registrations, concluding that DFG had priority due to its earlier use of the MONEY MART mark for loan financing services. Brittex appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s decision, finding that pawn services are not covered by loan financing services. On remand, the TTAB held that Brittex had priority for pawn services and that DFG could not rely on the zone of natural expansion doctrine to claim priority. The TTAB also found a likelihood of confusion between the marks and partially granted the petition for cancellation, requiring the deletion of "pawn brokerage and pawn shops" from DFG’s registrations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the TTAB’s decision. The court held that the zone of natural expansion doctrine is purely defensive and cannot be used to establish priority offensively. The court also found that DFG’s tacking argument was forfeited as it was not raised before the TTAB. Additionally, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the TTAB’s findings on the likelihood of confusion, including the similarity of the marks and the strength of Brittex’s mark. The court affirmed the TTAB’s partial cancellation of DFG’s trademark registrations. View "DOLLAR FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. v. BRITTEX FINANCIAL, INC. " on Justia Law

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Westmont Living, Inc., a California corporation operating retirement communities and assisted living facilities, filed a lawsuit against Retirement Unlimited, Inc. (RUI), a Virginia corporation, alleging trademark infringement. Westmont Living claimed that RUI's use of the name "The Westmont at Short Pump" for its new facility in Virginia created a likelihood of confusion with Westmont Living's federally registered "Westmont Living" trademarks, violating the Lanham Act and related laws. Westmont Living sought an injunction and damages.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of RUI, concluding that consumer confusion was impossible because the parties operated in entirely distinct geographic markets. The court relied on the Second Circuit's decision in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., which held that no likelihood of confusion exists when parties use their marks in separate and distinct markets.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by relying solely on the geographic separation of the parties' physical facilities without considering other relevant factors that might bear on the likelihood of confusion. The court emphasized that modern advertising and the national scope of both parties' marketing efforts necessitate a broader analysis. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the various factors relevant to determining the likelihood of confusion, including the parties' competitive marketing, the locations from which they solicit and draw customers, and the scope of their reputations. View "Westmont Living, Inc. v. Retirement Unlimited, Inc." on Justia Law