Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 1991, a group of flight attendants initiated a class action suit against several tobacco companies. The suit resulted in a settlement agreement. Subsequently, the Flight Attendant Medical Research Institute (FAMRI) was formed, and several of the flight attendants who were part of the class action became members of FAMRI’s board, including Patricia Young and Alani Blissard. Thereafter, several flight attendants filed individual suits against the tobacco companies. Steve Hunter and Philip Gerson were among the attorneys who represented the flight attendants. In 2010, a group of attorneys, including Gerson and Hunter, filed a petition against FAMRI on behalf of some of the flight attendants who were part of the original class, seeking an accounting of FAMRI’s funds and requesting that the settlement funds be dispersed directly to their clients. Young, Blissard and FAMRI moved to disqualify the attorneys on the ground of conflict of interest. The trial court entered an order disqualifying several attorneys, including Hunter and Gerson. The Third District Court of Appeals quashed the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that disqualification was warranted in this case. View "Young v. Achenbauch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against Defendant for injuries Plaintiff sustained in an altercation that occurred when Plaintiff was at a bar with Defendant and Defendant’s friend, Russell Noordhoek. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment for Defendant, holding that Defendant did not owe a duty of care to Plaintiff when Plaintiff was attacked by Noordhoek, and therefore, Defendant could not be held liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the Third District erred when it concluded that the evidence failed to demonstrate that Defendant owed a legal duty of care to Plaintiff, and, under the specific facts of this case, Defendant’s duty of care extended to the misconduct of a third party, Noordhoek. View "Dorsey v. Reider" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was rear-ended by an underinsured motorist (UM), Plaintiff requested her $100,000 UM policy limits from State Farm. Plaintiff indicated that her damages were estimated to be $3.5 million because she suffered from reflex sympathetic dystrophy syndrome. State Farm responded that Plaintiff must schedule a compulsory medical examination (CME) pursuant to the terms of the policy. Plaintiff refused to attend a CME and instead filed suit against State Farm. The trial court entered judgment against State Farm for the UM policy limits. The court of appeal affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff breached the contract when she failed to attend the CME; but (2) State Farm must plead and prove prejudice to avoid liability based on noncompliance with the CME clause, and State Farm failed to meet its burden in this case. The Supreme Court approved of the court of appeal’s decision, holding (1) the forfeiture of benefits under a UM policy will not automatically result upon an insured’s breach of a CME provision unless the insurer pleads and proves actual prejudice as an element of its affirmative defense; and (2) the undisputed facts demonstrate that State Farm was not prejudiced in this case. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Curran" on Justia Law

Michelle McCall received prenatal medical care at a United States Air Force clinic as an Air Force dependent. McCall died after delivering her son as a result of severe blood loss. Petitioners filed an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The federal district court found the United States liable under the FTCA. The court concluded that Petitioners’ economic damages amounted to $980,462 and Petitioners’ noneconomic damages totaled $2 million. However, the district court limited Petitioners’ recovery of wrongful death noneconomic damages to $1 million after applying Fla. Stat. 766.118, Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages based on medical malpractice claims. The district court subsequently denied Petitioners’ motion challenging the constitutionality of the wrongful death statutory cap. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages and held that the statute was not unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of Florida law and answered by holding the statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages provided in Fla. Stat. 766.118 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution. View "Estate of McCall v. United States" on Justia Law

This case arose from a malfunctioning HVAC system installed in a new building owned by Caduceus Properties. Caduceus sued Michael Gordon, the building architect, and Gordon initiated a third-party action against KTD Consulting Engineers and William Graney, who designed the HVAC system. The third-party claims were dismissed. After the statute of limitations governing Caduceus’ original action had expired, Caduceus successfully amended its complaint to name third-party defendants, KTD and Graney, as party defendants to the action. The trial court ruled against KTD and Graney. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the amended complaint did not relate back and was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court remanded, holding (1) an amended complaint, filed after the statute of limitations has expired, that names a party who had previously been made a third-party defendant as a party defendant, relates back under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) to the filing of the third-party complaint; and (2) for the amended pleading to be timely in this situation, the third-party complaint must have been filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff’s claims in the amended complaint must arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the third-party complaint. View "Caduceus Props., LLC v. William G. Graney, P.E." on Justia Law

ICI Homes, Inc. (ICI) had a general liability insurance policy with General Fidelity Insurance Company. In 2007, Katherine Ferrin, the owner of a residence constructed by ICI, was injured while using stairs installed by Custom Cutting, Inc. Ferrin filed suit against ICI. ICI, in turn, sought indemnification from Custom Cutting. The parties agreed to a $1.6 million settlement of Ferrin’s claim. ICI accepted $1 million from Custom Cutting’s insurer to settle its indemnification claim, which it paid to Ferrin. ICI and General Fidelity then claimed the other was responsible for paying Ferrin the remaining $600,000. Both parties paid $300,000 to Ferrin to settle Ferrin’s claim. ICI then filed suit against General Fidelity seeking return of the $300,000 ICI paid above the $1 million indemnification payment. General Fidelity counterclaimed seeking return of the $300,000 it had paid to Ferrin. The district court entered judgment for General Fidelity. The court of appeals certified two questions to the Supreme Court for resolution. The Supreme Court answered (1) the General Fidelity policy allowed ICI to apply indemnification payments received from Custom Cutting’s insurer towards satisfaction of its $1 million self-insured retention; and (2) the transfer of rights provision in the policy did not abrogate the made whole doctrine. View "Intervest Constr. of Jax, Inc. v Gen. Fidelity Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice wrongful death action against Cedars Healthcare Group, a facility at which Plaintiff’s father was a patient when he died, and other health care providers. Plaintiff sought records of adverse medical incidents from Cedars pursuant to Fla. Const. art. X, 25, which guarantees patients the right to “have access to any records made or received in the course of business by a health care facility or provider relating to any adverse medical incident.” The trial court overruled Cedars’ objection to the discovery request. Cedars subsequently petitioned the district court for a writ of certiorari. Citing to Fla. Stat. 381.028(7)(a), the district court granted the petition on the ground that the request to produce asked for “records of adverse medical incidents involving patients other than the plaintiff” but did not limit the production of those records to the same or substantially similar condition as the patient requesting access. Prior to the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court, in Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, declared section 381.028(7)(a) invalid. Accordingly, the Court quashed the decision of the district court in this case and remanded for reconsideration pursuant to Buster. View "Ampuero-Martinez v. Cedars Healthcare Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when his chair collapsed at the offices of Defendant. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence on the grounds that Defendant had negligently failed to warn Plaintiff of the chair's dangerous condition. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff and issued a final judgment against Defendant. The court of appeal reversed and ordered that a directed verdict be entered in favor of Defendant because Plaintiff had not established causation. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of appeal, holding that the court impermissibly reweighed the testimony of expert witnesses during trial when reaching its judgment. Remanded for reinstatement of the trial court's final judgment. View "Friedrich v. Fetterman & Assocs., P.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued defendant, seeking recovery for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile collision. This case concerned the proper standard of review and the appropriate remedy when an appellate court reviewed a trial court's order granting a new trial on the ground that the jury verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, where the trial court's order was premised, at least in part, on an error of law. The court held that an appellate court properly applied a de novo standard of review to a trial court's conclusions of law in an order granting a new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence, giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Although a trial court's conclusions of law were not entitled to deference, its findings of facts and determinations of credibility were still entitled to deference because of the trial court's superior vantage point of having been present during the entire trial. Although the court concluded that the First District was correct in reversing the trial court's order, the court quashed the First District's decision because it concluded that reinstatement of the jury verdict was not the proper remedy in this case. Accordingly, the court remanded for reconsideration. View "Van, Sr., et ux., v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

After Insured sustained injuries in a car accident he sought MRIs from Virtual Imaging Services. Virtual Imaging obtained an assignment of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under Insured's policy with GEICO and billed GEICO $3600 for the MRIs. GEICO paid the bill but limited its reimbursement to eighty percent of 200 percent of the applicable Medicare fee schedule in accordance with the formula described in Fla. Stat. 627.736(5)(a). This statutory provision became effective on January 1, 2008 as part of Florida's PIP statute. Virtual Imaging subsequently sued GEICO, alleging that GEICO's reimbursement was insufficient. The county court granted Virtual Imaging's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed then certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered by holding that GEICO was required to give notice to Insured by electing the permissive Medicare fee schedules in its policy before taking advantage of the Medicare fee schedule to limit reimbursements. View "Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Virtual Imaging Servs., Inc." on Justia Law