Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was seventeen years old when he and his friends entered certain property reputed to be haunted. As Plaintiff and his companies were attempting to exit the building, a bottle containing sulfuric acid broke and splashed some of its contents onto Plaintiff, severely burning Plaintiff. Plaintiff conceded that he was a trespasser but sued the State under the doctrine of attractive nuisance. After a jury-waived trial, the superior court entered judgment for the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) finding that the attractive-nuisance doctrine did not apply under the circumstances of this case; and (2) not finding that the State shared some comparative fault for Plaintiff's injuries. View "Burton v. State" on Justia Law

After an automobile accident that occurred between Camella Martin and Michael Coyne, Camella suffered a number of injuries. Camella died two years after the accident. Dennis Martin, as executor of the estate of Camella, filed this negligence action against Coyne. After a jury trial, judgment was entered for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in granting Defendant's motion in limine to exclude a document from being submitted as evidence because the document was inadmissible hearsay; and (2) the trial justice did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial, as the evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Martin v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence after the vehicles the parties were driving collided in an intersection. A jury found that Plaintiff had not proven, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant was negligent. The trial court subsequently granted Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, concluding that, based on the testimony of the independent fact witnesses and other evidence, the court's instructions were not properly understood or applied by the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed the order granting Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, holding that the trial justice had a sufficient basis to find that the jury's verdict did not respond to the evidence, did not overlook or misconceive material facts, and was not clearly wrong in granting Plaintiff's motion for a new trial View "Gomes v. Rosario" on Justia Law

A stone wall demarcated the boundary between Plaintiff's and Defendant's property. After Plaintiff discovered that a large portion of the stone wall had been destroyed and a significant number of trees on his property were missing, Plaintiff sought to recover damages from Defendant for the unauthorized removal of his trees and the theft of portions of the stone wall. After a jury trial, the trial court granted judgments as a matter of law in Defendant's favor. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial justice abused her discretion in precluding expert testimony on the subject of historic stone walls, and the exclusion constituted reversible error; and (2) the trial justice committed prejudicial error in granting a judgment as a matter of law in Defendant's favor. View "Morabit v. Hoag" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was allegedly injured when he tripped and fell on a public sidewalk that was uneven and filled with cracks. Plaintiff sued the owner of the property that abutted the sidewalk and the property's tenants (collectively, Defendants), alleging negligence. The trial justice granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact and had failed to demonstrate that Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of care or a duty to warn. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendants did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care because (1) Plaintiff's injuries occurred on a public sidewalk that was not within Defendants' control or possession; and (2) a property owner who owes no duty of care to an individual also owes no duty to warn those individuals. View "Wyso v. Full Moon Tide, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell and was injured on a sidewalk in the City of Providence. Plaintiff filed suit against the City and the State, alleging that it negligently failed to maintain or repair the sidewalk. The City moved for summary judgment, alleging that it did not owe a duty to Plaintiff because the State was responsible for the maintenance and repair of the sidewalk. In response, the State argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the State or the city bore responsibility to maintain the sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the State did not assert a cross-claim against City, it was not sufficiently aggrieved by the entry of summary judgment in favor of the City on Plaintiff's claim to appeal from the superior court's judgment. View "Lombardi v. City of Providence" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, one of his former law partners, after that law practice was dissolved. Plaintiff's complaint alleged intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, defamation, and corporate opportunity doctrine. The trial justice entered judgment against Plaintiff , finding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove damages arising from the alleged tortious conduct of Defendant. The court subsequently denied Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err (1) in concluding that damages for loss of reputation in a claim for tortious interference with a contract must be properly quantified; (2) in finding that the term "smoking gun" was not slanderous per se; and (3) in failing to submit Plaintiff's claim of breach of fiduciary duty to the jury. View "Bossian v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Buyers purchased real estate and retained Attorneys in connection with their purchase. Buyers sued Attorneys, alleging that, due to Attorneys' negligence, they overpaid Seller by more than $1,700,000. Attorneys filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint naming Agents as third-party defendants, alleging that Agents had a fiduciary duty to both Seller and Buyers and that if Buyers were entitled to recover for their alleged damages, then Agents would be liable for all or part of Buyers' claims against Attorneys. The superior court granted the motion. A motion justice subsequently granted Agents' motions to dismiss the third-party complaint, finding that the third-party complaint failed to plead a duty owed by Agents to either Buyers or Attorneys. The Supreme Court disagreed and vacated the superior court's subsequent denial of Attorneys' second motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, holding that Attorneys' second proposed third-party complaint fell within the scope of R.I. R. Civ. P. 14, which governs impleader. View "Wampanoag Group, LLC v. Iacoi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this negligence action against Defendant, a medical doctor, seeking damages for injuries she sustained after she fell on an entrance ramp to Defendant's podiatric officers during a winter storm. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding (1) there was no dispute that the storm on the day of Plaintiff's fall included snow; (2) Defendant was justified to wait until the storm ended before taking action to treat his office entrance; and (3) Defendant did not owe Plaintiff or other invitees a heightened duty of care. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded, holding (1) because the parties disagreed as to the extent of the storm on the day of Plaintiff's fall, additional factual findings were required to determine whether Defendant was under a duty to treat his entranceway before the storm had ended, and thus, the grant of summary judgment was improper; and (2) Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a heightened duty of care. View "Sullo v. Greenberg" on Justia Law

In 1995, Elizabeth Meyer, the sole shareholder and CEO of Greensleeves, Inc., orally agreed to buy six dock slips from Philip Smiley. Smiley subsequently entered into a purchase and sale agreement with Eugene Friedrich for the sale of those same dock slips. When Smiley refuse to convey the dock slips to Greensleeves, Greensleeves filed suit against Smiley. Friedrich intervened and moved to dismiss the complaint. The superior court granted judgment in favor of Smiley and Friedrich, finding no enforceable contract between Greensleeves and Smiley. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding that there was an enforceable contract between Greensleeves and Smiley. Friedrich subsequently relinquished his ownership of the dock slips and conveyed them to Greensleeves. Greensleeves then sought an accounting of the rental income that had been collected from the dock slips from the date of the originally-scheduled closing between Greensleeves through the 1999 boating season. Ultimately, the trial court concluded (1) Friedrich had tortiously interfered with the contract between Smiley and Greensleeves, and (2) Greensleeves was entitled to lost rental profits of $61,258 plus interest and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error in its findings and judgment. View "Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley" on Justia Law