Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Carlton Curry was appointed as superintendent of Lawrence Utilities, the City of Lawrence’s municipally owned water and sewer utility. Just over two years later, Dean Jessup was elected as mayor of the City in the general election. Mayor Jessup terminated Curry after their differences in policy became apparent. Curry filed a complaint against the City, claiming he was wrongfully discharged under the utility superintendent statute, he was owned unpaid wages under the Wage Payment Statute, and the mayor tortiously interfered with his employment contract. The trial court (1) granted summary judgment in favor of Curry on the wrongful discharge claim, (2) granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the Wage Payment Statute claim, and (3) denied summary judgment on the tortious interference claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects, holding (1) Mayor Jessup lacked authority to remove Curry as the utility service board superintendent; (2) Curry was not entitled to wages under the Wage Payment Statute; and (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Curry’s claim for intentional interference with an employment relationship. View "City of Lawrence Utilites Service Board v. Curry" on Justia Law

Angela Martin and Brian Brothers co-hosted a house party at which alcohol was served. As the party was winding down, Brothers and two guests, Jerry Chambers and Paul Michalik, got into a fistfight. Martin found Michalik lying motionless on the basement floor and Chambers with blood on his face. The police later found Michalik dead outside the home. The personal representative of Michalik’s estate and Chambers’s bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint against Martin, alleging, in part, that she negligently caused Michalik’s injuries and that she furnished alcohol in violation of Indiana’s Dram Shop Act. The trial court granted Martin’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment on the negligence claim was improper, as there remained a question of fact as to whether Martin breached the landowner-invitee duty to exercise reasonable care for Michalik’s protection while he was on her premises; and (2) summary judgment was appropriate on Plaintiffs’ Dram Shop Act claim because Martin jointly paid for and possessed the same beer, and therefore, Martin could not “furnish” it to Brothers under the Act. View "Rogers v. Martin" on Justia Law

After a shooting that occurred at a bar, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the bar alleging negligence. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the bar, concluding that the shooter’s criminal acts were unforeseeable, and therefore, the bar had no duty to anticipate and take steps to prevent the shooter’s conduct. The court of appeals reversed, declaring that reasonable foreseeability was not part of the analysis with respect to the bar’s duty. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court in this case employed a now-discarded analytical tool in determining the question of foreseeability; (2) in a negligence action, where foreseeability is an element of duty, this necessarily means the court must determine the question of foreseeability as a matter of law and must engage in a general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence; and (3) the trial court properly granted summary judgment in the bar’s favor because a shooting inside a neighborhood bar is not foreseeable as a matter of law. View "Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc" on Justia Law

Defendant negligently struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing Plaintiff injuries that required medical treatment. Defendant admitted she was liable for the accident but contested the reasonable value of Plaintiff’s medical care. Before a trial on damages, Plaintiff moved to prevent the jury from hearing evidence that her providers accepted a reduced amount as payment in full. The trial court concluded that the payments were not permitted by Stanley v. Walker, in which the Supreme Court interpreted Indiana’s collateral-source statute to permit a defendant in a personal-injury suit to introduce discounted reimbursements negotiated between the plaintiff’s medical providers and his or her private health insurer, so long as insurance is not referenced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the rationale of Stanley v. Walker applies equally to reimbursements by government payers; and (2) the trial court misinterpreted Stanley by holding that the collateral-source statute required the exclusion of accepted reimbursements from government payers. Remanded. View "Patchett v. Lee" on Justia Law

Carol Jakubowicz and her two minor sons were involved in a car accident with Ronald Williams that resulted in injuries to the Jakubowiczs. Jakubowicz filed suit on behalf of herself and her sons against Williams. More than three years after the accident, Jakubowicz filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint and add an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against State Farm, the Jakubowiczs’ insurer, stating that she believed Williams’ insurance policy would be insufficient to cover her damages. The trial court granted Jakubowicz’s motion for leave to amend. State Farm moved for summary judgment on the UIM claim, claiming it was barred because it was filed after the three-year limitation period in Jakubowicz’s insurance policy. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the provision in the policy requiring an insured to bring suit within three years is in direct conflict with the policy’s requirement that State Farm will only pay if the underinsured motorist’s insurance has been exhausted, the policy is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured. Remanded. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jakubowicz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell and injured herself when she stepped into a hole on one of the streets in Beech Grove City, Indiana. Plaintiff subsequently filed a negligence complaint against the City. The City asserted that it was immune from liability under the Indiana Tort Claims Act’s (ITCA) discretionary function immunity provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on a review of the designated evidence and the Court’s existing precedent, the City was not entitled to summary judgment on the question of discretionary function immunity under the ITCA because the City did not demonstrate that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by consciously balancing risks and benefits. View "City of Beech Grove v. Beloat" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two separate couples, brought suit seeking damages stemming from asbestos-caused diseases. Several Defendants in each case moved for summary judgment. In the first lawsuit, which led to two interlocutory appeals, the trial court denied Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In the second lawsuit, the trial court entered summary judgment for Defendants as a final judgment. At issue in each appeal was the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment asserting the ten-year statute of repose included in Indiana’s Product Liability Act. In all three appeals, which the Supreme Court consolidated, Plaintiffs requested reconsideration of the Court’s prior holding in AlliedSignal v. Ott. The Supreme Court (1) declined to reconsider Ott’s holdings with respect to statutory construction due to the principles of stare decisis and legislative acquiescence; but (2) concluded that the Product Liability Act’s statute of repose did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims, as the Act’s statute of repose does not apply to cases such as these where the plaintiffs have had protracted exposure to inherently dangerous foreign substances. View "Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Div. of Cooper Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought several claims against multiple defendants arising out of his incarceration for a probation violation that occurred after his term of probation had expired. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff sought transfer, contending that his claim against four individual probation officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was incorrectly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed dismissal of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the individually-named probation officers, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim for relief under section 1983 against these defendants. View "Thornton v. State" on Justia Law

Davis Security Systems, LLC hired Donnell Caldwell as a security guard for the West Calumet Complex. Before his employment, Caldwell had been romantically involved with Stacy Knighten, a resident of the Complex. While on duty, Caldwell and Knighten were involved in an altercation, and Caldwell shot Knighten in the back, paralyzing her from the waist down. Knighten filed a complaint for damages against, among others, Davis Security under the theory of respondent superior. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Davis Security on all claims. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Davis Security based on Knighten’s respondent superior claim, holding that the scope of Caldwell’s duties as an employee of Davis Security and the issue of whether in discharging his weapon Caldwell engaged in conduct consistent with his duties were matters that could not be resolved by summary disposition. Remanded. View "Knighten v. E. Chicago Housing Auth." on Justia Law