Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Dreher had been a maintenance supervisor at an Alliance apartment complex for 74 days when he slipped and fell on concrete walkway in the complex in the rain. Dreher sustained a fractured pelvis and injuries to his neck, shoulder, leg, and knee. He suffered gait derangement, a sleep disorder, and headaches. Dreher required surgery to repair pelvic fractures, another surgery to repair a torn meniscus, and another surgery to address issues with his foot and ankle. Dreher sought compensation for a psychiatric injury. An evaluation concluded that Dreher suffered a psychiatric disability as a result of the accident, including depression, difficulty sleeping, and panic attacks. The ALJ found that Dreher sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment but denied his claim as barred by section 3208.3(d) because Dreher was employed by Alliance for less than six months and his psychiatric injury did not result from a sudden and extraordinary employment condition. On reconsideration, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board found that the injury was not barred. The court of appeal annulled the decision. Dreher’s testimony that he was surprised by the slick surface because the other walkways had a rough surface, and that the walkway was later resurfaced, did not demonstrate that his injury was caused by an uncommon, unusual, or totally unexpected event. View "Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Jose Lopez sued the national Jehovah's Witnesses organization, Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (Watchtower), alleging his Bible instructor sexually abused him in 1986 when he was a child. Lopez asserted several legal theories, including failure to warn, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring/retention. After contentious discovery disputes, the court issued two discovery orders against Watchtower: (1) compelling the deposition of an individual (Gerrit Losch) whom the court found was a "managing agent" of Watchtower; and (2) ordering the production of documents in Watchtower's files pertaining to other perpetrators of child sexual abuse. When Watchtower failed to comply with these orders, the court granted Lopez's motion for monetary and terminating sanctions, struck Watchtower's answer, and entered Watchtower's default. Watchtower appealed, challenging the validity of the discovery orders and an abuse of discretion in failing to impose lesser sanctions. After review, the Court of Appeal rejecte Watchtower's challenges to the production order, but concluded the court erred in ordering Watchtower to produce Losch for deposition and the subsequent sanctions. The Court remanded for the trial court to consider the appropriate sanctions for Watchtower's violation of the document production order. "The initial measure should be a remedy that is less onerous than a terminating sanction." View "Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a salesman for Kaiser Refractories, filed suit against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products, including Foster Wheeler, a manufacturer of industrial boilers insulated with refractory, alleging causes of action for, among other things, strict liability and negligence/failure to warn. The jury returned a verdict for Foster Wheeler and plaintiff appealed. The court agreed with plaintiff that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, because substantial evidence fails to prove, as required for the sophisticated user defense, that by virtue of his position, training, experience, knowledge, or skill, he knew or should have known of the health risks posed by working with or near the asbestos-containing products he sold and which were used in Foster Wheeler boilers. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Moran v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp." on Justia Law

Karpinski sued, alleging that Smitty’s Sausalito bar negligently allowed two intoxicated men to enter and remain in the bar, and that the men punched Karpinski in the head, causing serious injuries. After court-ordered mediation, Karpinski agreed to dismiss Smitty’s in exchange for $40,000. Karpinski moved for entry of judgment under Code of Civil Procedure 664.6. Smitty’s opposed the motion because liens had been imposed by the federal government, based on Medicare payments to Karpinski, and by the state, based on crime victim compensation payments. The court entered a default judgment against the individuals ($1,430,968.84) and granted enforcement of the settlement, reasoning that the agreement requires that Karpinski "negotiate, satisfy, and dispose of all liens," but does not state that he must do so before receiving payment, and requires Karpinski to hold Smitty’s, its attorneys, and insurer harmless with respect to lien claims. Regardless of concern over whether Karpinski will honor that obligation, there is a remedy if he does not. The court awarded Karpinski $2,200 in attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed. That there are no guarantees does not alter the fact that Smitty’s agreed to pay Karpinski $40,000 in exchange for his release and promises to satisfy all liens. View "Karpinski v. Smitty's Bar, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and appellants Rosemary Morgan and Michelle Luna (collectively plaintiffs) were the widow and daughter, respectively, of decedent Mike Morgan. Morgan suffered fatal injuries when defendant Thomas Durnin crashed head-on into Morgan's vehicle as Durnin was fleeing from a Beaumont Police Officer during a vehicle pursuit that lasted nearly 12 minutes. As relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs' operative complaint alleged a wrongful death cause of action against defendants City of Beaumont (City) and the Beaumont Police Department (BPD). The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding they were immune from liability pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17004.7. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the court erred in granting summary judgment because defendants failed to show by sufficient evidence that BPD as a matter of law promulgated a vehicle pursuit policy and provided the requisite training as required under section 17004.7. After review, the Court of Appeal was persuaded by plaintiffs' argument and agreed that defendants failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish as a matter of law that BPD promulgated its vehicle pursuit policy as required under section 17004.7. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's decision. View "Morgan v. Beaumont Police Dept." on Justia Law

Alana, three years old, was camping with her family in Portola Redwoods State Park when a tree fell on their tent and hit her head, resulting in brain damage. Alana sued. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the state. The court of appeal affirmed, citing Government Code section 831.2, which provides no public entity “is liable for an injury caused by a natural condition of any unimproved public property.” The tree that caused her injury was a “natural condition” and the tree was on “unimproved public property.” Improvement of a portion of a park area does not remove the immunity from the unimproved areas. The nearest man-made object to the tree before it fell was a picnic table at Campsite 42, which was about 30 feet away. There is no evidence of any artificial physical change in the condition of the tree that injured Alana or of the land within 24 feet of the tree. Nor is there any evidence suggesting artificial improvements or human conduct contributed to the danger of the tree. View "Alana M. v. State of California" on Justia Law

In March 2013, George Fenimore, Jr. fell and suffered an injury as a patient at Resnick Neuropsychiatric Hospital and never recovered. George died in July 2013. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Hospital, alleging claims for elder abuse, negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, and wrongful death. The trial court sustained the demurrer of the hospital to the causes of action for elder abuse and negligent hiring and supervision. The court concluded that the first amended complaint stated at least one viable theory of elder abuse based on recklessness. Because the trial court should not sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory, and it may not sustain a demurrer to only a part of a cause of action, the trial court should enter a new order overruling the demurrer to the elder abuse cause of action. To the extent the trial court ruled general damages were not recoverable for elder abuse, that part of the order should be reversed. View "Fenimore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal." on Justia Law

This suit was brought on behalf of twin minors. They alleged Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation knew or should have known physicians prescribed its asthma medication to pregnant women for the off-label purpose of preventing or inhibiting preterm labor. They alleged studies available to Novartis before it sold the rights to its brand-name product in 2001 showed the drug was not effective for tocolysis (inhibiting preterm labor), it could cross the placenta, and it could interfere with fetal development. The twins allegedly sustained neurological injuries in utero as a result of their mother having been prescribed the medication. The minors contended on appeal to the Court of Appeal that despite Novartis having sold its interested in the medication six years after the medication was prescribed, Novartis had a duty to revise the label warnings while it still owned the drug to indicate a risk to fetal development and its failure to do so contributed to their injuries years later. The Court of Appeal concluded the minors demonstrated the could amend their complaint to state a claim under California law for negligent failure to warn and negligent misrepresentation based on acts or omissions by Novartis prior to 2001, which allegedly caused the twins' injuries in 2007. The Court reversed the trial court which held to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings. View "T.H v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Honeywell, presenting expert testimony at trial in support of her claim that her father's exposure to asbestos in Bendix brake linings that he used when performing brake jobs in the 1960s and 1970s was a substantial factor in contributing to his risk of developing mesothelioma. On appeal, Honeywell contends that this opinion testimony – which commonly is referred to as the “every exposure,” “any exposure,” or “any fiber” theory – should have been excluded under Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, because it is speculative and devoid of evidentiary and logical support. The court concluded that the theory is the subject of legitimate scientific debate. Because in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony the trial court “does not resolve scientific controversies," it is for the jury to resolve the conflict between the every exposure theory and any competing expert opinions. The court therefore held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing plaintiff’s medical expert to testify. The court further concluded that the issue of causation was adequately covered by the jury instructions given and thus the trial court did not err by refusing to give Honeywell's proposed supplemental jury instruction based upon language in Rutherford regarding factors that may be relevant in determining whether a plaintiff’s exposure to a particular asbestos-containing product should be deemed a substantial factor in causing the cancer at issue. View "Davis v. Honeywell Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against CalPortland after his father (Dan Toste) died after Paul Michaelson, an employer of V&J, backed up a construction truck and hit Toste during a road paving project. V&J was providing truck hauling services for CalPortland. The jury found that Michaelson was negligent but that his negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the harm suffered. The court concluded that plaintiff makes no showing that the verdict is unsupported by the evidence or that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. The court rejected plaintiff's claims of negligence per se - plaintiff's principle theory of liability. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury when it instructed that state law prohibits a person from driving a vehicle under the influence of any drug, Veh. Code, 23152. Plaintiff makes no showing that, but for the Vehicle Code section 23152 instruction, he would have obtained a more favorable verdict. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the vicarious liability of CalPortland was not decided by the jury. The court was satisfied that plaintiff received a fair trial and there was no juror misconduct. The court rejected the argument that CalPortland's $15,000 offer to compromise and Michaelson's and V&J's second offer to compromise for $750,001 failed to comply with Code Civ. Proc., 998. The court held that the section 998 amendment, as amended, applies to cases pending on appeal. The judgment awarding CalPortland $25,341.44 costs, which includes $17,034.20 expert witness fees, is affirmed. The court reversed the cost award with respect to Michaelson and V&J. Plaintiff's remaining claims are without merit. View "Toste v. CalPortland Construction" on Justia Law