Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc., d/b/a Sovereign Health of San Clemente, and its owner, Tonmoy Sharma, (collectively Sovereign) appealed the trial court's denial of Sovereign's motion to compel arbitration of claims asserted by Allen and Rose Nelson for themselves and on behalf of their deceased son, Brandon. The Nelsons alleged a cause of action for wrongful death, and on behalf of Brandon, negligence, negligence per se, dependent adult abuse or neglect, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. According to the complaint, despite concluding that 26-year-old "Brandon requires 24 hour supervision ... at this time" after admitting him to its residential facility following his recent symptoms of psychosis, Sovereign personnel allowed him to go to his room alone, where he hung himself with the drawstring of his sweatpants. The trial court denied Sovereign's motion to compel arbitration because: (1) the court found Sovereign failed to meet its burden to authenticate an electronic signature as Brandon's on Sovereign's treatment center emollment agreement; and (2) even assuming Brandon signed the agreement, it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable, precluding enforcement against Brandon or, derivatively, his parents. Sovereign challenged the trial court's authentication and unconscionability findings. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center" on Justia Law

Relator Gilbert Ellinger brought a qui tam suit on behalf of the People of the State of California against Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich), ESIS, Inc. (ESIS), and Stephanie Ann Magill, under Insurance Code section 1871.7, a provision of the Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA). In January 2016, Ellinger injured his back while working, and he immediately informed his supervisor. The following month, Ellinger reported to his employer’s human resources manager that he had sustained a work-related injury and had told his supervisor about it. The human resources manager created a “time line memorandum” summarizing the conversations she had with Ellinger about the injury. She placed the memorandum in Ellinger’s personnel file. Ellinger filed a workers’ compensation claim. Magill worked as a senior claims examiner for ESIS and was the adjuster assigned to investigate Ellinger’s claim. ESIS denied Ellinger’s claim on an unspecified date. Magill later testified that she denied the claim because of a written statement from Ellinger’s supervisor in which the supervisor claimed that Ellinger had not reported the injury to him. When the human resources manager was deposed in November 2016, she produced the time line memorandum, which Ellinger’s counsel in the workers’ compensation action did not know about until then. Nearly eight months after that disclosure, in July 2017, ESIS reversed its denial of the claim and stipulated that Ellinger was injured while working, as he had alleged. Contrary to Magill’s testimony, her email messages showed that the human resources manager had emailed Magill the time line memorandum in March and April 2016, and Magill thanked the manager for sending it. Ellinger alleged that Magill’s concealment of or failure to disclose the time line memorandum violated Penal Code section 550 (b)(1) to (3). On the basis of those alleged violations, Ellinger alleged that defendants were liable under section 1871.7. Against each defendant, Ellington sought a civil penalty and an assessment of no greater than three times the amount of his workers’ compensation claim. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend, concluding defendants could not be held liable under section 1871.7 for any failures of Magill in the claims handling or review process. Finding no reversible error in sustaining the demurrers, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California ex rel. Ellinger v. Magill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s, two patients at an acute psychiatric hospital, obtained judgments against the hospital and its parent company under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (“the Elder Abuse Act”).On appeal, Defendants claimed that the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (“MICRA”) applied to Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants contend that under MICRA, Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.The Second Appellate District explained that MICRA is “designed to discourage medical malpractice lawsuits,” whereas the Elder Abuse Act permits “interested persons to engage attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons and dependent adults. The legislative intent is clear that professional negligence and the Elder Abuse Act are separate and distinct. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Elder Abuse Act were not time-barred.The otherwise court affirmed the lower court’s rulings over Defendants’ objections. However, on Plaintiffs’ appeal, the court ordered a new trial on the issues of respondeat superior and ratification. View "Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar" on Justia Law

Quintero sued Weinkauf asserting the torts of stalking, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and domestic violence, alleging that after Quintero ended their romantic relationship, Weinkauf shot arrows and discharged a firearm through the windows of Quintero’s law office under cover of darkness. Quintero had identified him on surveillance video footage. Weinkauf, also an attorney, pled guilty to stalking with an enhancement for the personal use of a dangerous and deadly weapon and conceded that he had shot a crossbow at Quintero’s window once but denied involvement in the other shootings.The jury found in favor of Quintero on the stalking, IIED, and domestic violence claims and in favor of Weinkauf on the assault claim; awarded Quintero $1.3 million in compensatory damages; and found that Weinkauf had engaged in conduct with malice, oppression, or fraud. The court determined Weinkauf’s net worth to be $1.5 million. The jury then awarded Quintero $6,000 in punitive damages. After denying Weinkauf’s post-trial motions, the court awarded Quintero $869,688.79 in attorney fees and $60,565.25 in costs.The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the admission of audio clips from a pretext telephone call between the parties recorded by police and video clips of the surveillance footage from the shootings. The court also rejected challenges to jury instructions, to modification of a protective order, and to the calculations of the awards. View "Quintero v. Weinkauf" on Justia Law

Allied provided security guard services at UCSF medical facilities, hiring security guards and assigning them to particular locations. UCSF was responsible for supervising the security guards. Villegas worked 11:00 p.m.-7:00 a.m., five nights per week. Allied did not require Villegas to use her car for work and did not dictate how she traveled to and from work. She frequently requested extra shifts and often worked six shifts per week. On August 21, Villegas began her fourth straight day of work. When her shift ended the following morning, Villegas’s mother picked Villegas up in Villegas’s vehicle. Villegas dropped her mother off at work, then began driving home. About an hour after finishing her shift, near her home, Villegas fell asleep and drove into oncoming traffic, hitting and severely injuring Feltham, who was riding a motorcycle.In a negligence action, the court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Allied. Allied was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Villegas was not acting within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident, and the accident was not a foreseeable consequence of Villegas’s employment. View "Feltham v. Universal Protection Service, LP" on Justia Law

The District appealed a judgment entered following a jury's finding that the District's employees were 54 percent responsible for injuries sustained by plaintiff when another student shot him in the stomach with a shotgun. This allocation of fault and the jury's findings as to damages resulted in a judgment holding the District vicariously liable for approximately $2 million.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the specific acts and omissions identified by plaintiff's expert as below the standard of care for conducting a threat assessment are properly characterized as administrative and not as a mental examination. Thus, those negligent acts and omissions fall outside the scope of Government Code section 855.6 immunity. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cleveland v. Taft Union High School District" on Justia Law

An employer has an affirmative duty to provide employees with a safe place to work. This duty does not include ensuring that an off-site meeting place for coworkers and business associates like an employee's private residence is safe from third party criminal harm.The Court of Appeal granted the writ petition challenging the trial court's order denying summary judgment and directed the trial court to enter a new and different order granting summary judgment. In this case, a young man suffering from a mental health condition suddenly fired a handgun at family members and guests inside his family home. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Colonial and Defendant Holaday for personal injury damages, alleging negligence claims stemming from their injuries. The court concluded that Colonial owed no duty to protect plaintiffs because Colonial did not control Holaday's home. Furthermore, Colonial owed Plaintiff Dominguez no duty to protect based on the employer-employee relationship. Finally, the Rowland factors counsel against imposing a duty to protect; plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress against Colonial fails as a matter of law as there are no triable issues (1) Colonial knew or reasonably should have known that the young man posed a danger to plaintiffs—his deadly misconduct was unforeseeable, and (2) Colonial had no ability to control him; and respondeat superior liability is inapplicable here as a matter of law. View "Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by plaintiff after she was assaulted at a residence for the disabled. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that suggested that defendants knew that the perpetrator was a problem. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in ruling that the residence owed no duty to plaintiff and similarly erred in concluding that plaintiff could not establish breach and causation. Rather, there was a material factual dispute about whether keeping the perpetrator at the residence breached this duty and caused plaintiff's injuries. Furthermore, there are disputed material facts about the extent to which the individual defendants knew or reasonably should have known about the hazard the perpetrator posed. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Brightstar Residential Inc." on Justia Law

Claude Rogers, a former resident of a residential care facility for the elderly known as Meadow Oaks of Roseville, died after experiencing heatstroke. His wife and successor-in-interest Kathryn and sons Jeffrey, Phillip and Richard sued Meadow Oaks of Roseville, Roseville SH, LLC, CPR/AR Roseville SH Owner, LLC, DCP Investors Roseville SH, LLC, DCP Management Roseville SH, LLC, Westmont Living, Inc., Tanysha Borromeo, Ana Rojas, and Andrew Badoud for elder abuse, fraud, and wrongful death. Defendants appealed an order denying their petition to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement that was part of the Residency Agreement Richard signed as Claude’s representative. Although defendants filed a notice of appeal, the appellate briefs were filed on behalf of Roseville SH, LLC only. Roseville SH, LLC contended that in denying the petition to compel arbitration: (1) the trial court erroneously believed defendants had to show that Claude lacked mental capacity to consent before they could prove that Richard had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement for Claude; (2) the trial court erred in concluding that Richard did not act as Claude’s actual or ostensible agent when he signed the arbitration agreement on Claude’s behalf; and (3) the trial court’s order violated the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Roseville SH, LLC misconstrued the trial court’s analysis; (2) the trial court did not err in denying the petition to compel arbitration; and (3) the trial court’s order did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Rogers v. Roseville SH, LLC" on Justia Law

The San Francisco Police Department allowed officers to carry secondary firearms when on duty, and to carry loaded handguns when off duty. A Department bulletin stated officers are responsible for ensuring that firearms under their control are secure at all times and provided specific guidelines for securing firearms in an unattended vehicle.Officer Cabuntala regularly carried an approved secondary firearm on duty and regularly transported it in his vehicle. On August 11, 2017, the city assigned Cabuntala to a training session in a different county. He drove his personal vehicle to the site, with his personal firearm in the vehicle. Firearms were not allowed at the training session. When the training was over, Cabuntala drove home but failed to follow his usual practice of securing his personal firearm inside his house. He left it unsecured inside his vehicle. Cabuntala’s vehicle was broken into. The firearm was stolen and was used to kill Plaintiff’s son. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding Cabuntala was not acting within the scope of his employment. The court of appeal reversed. In the context of policing, a jury could reasonably find the officer’s failure to safely secure his weapon is “not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” View "Perez v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law