Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals in this defamation, breach of contract, and fraudulent inducement case.After Defendant, Plaintiff’s employer, offered him an oral deal to “buy in” the business in exchange for managing two automobile dealerships, Plaintiff was falsely accused of taking illegal kickbacks on used-car acquisitions and lost his job. The jury found that Defendant defrauded and defamed Plaintiff but did not find that the parties agreed to a buy-in deal that included interests in the dealerships and their underlying real estate. The jury awarded Plaintiff $2.2 million in defamation damages and $383,150 in fraud damages. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict. The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The Supreme Court held (1) the jury’s failure to find that the parties agreed to the specific contract terms submitted in the contract question did not preclude Plaintiff from recovering the value of the disputed dealership interests as benefit-of-the-bargain damages under a fraud theory that required proof of an enforceable contract; and (2) legally sufficient evidence supported the damages awarded for loss of reputation and mental anguish in the past, but no evidence supported the existence of future damages or a finding that the kickback allegations caused any lost-income damages. View "Anderson v. Durant" on Justia Law

There is no cause of action in Texas for intentional interference with an inheritance.Richard Archer and Richard’s six children (the Archers) brought this action against Ted Anderson’s estate for intentional interference with their inheritance, alleging that Anderson influenced Jack Archer to disinherit them. The jury found in favor of the Archers. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the Supreme Court has never recognized tortious interference with inheritance as a cause of action in Texas and deferred to the Supreme Court to decide whether to do so. The court then reversed and rendered judgment for Anderson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tort of interference with inheritance is not recognized in Texas. View "Archer v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Because the workers’ compensation carrier in this case signed away its right to recover benefits it paid to an injured employee and received a high premium in exchange for assuming that risk it cannot later seek indirectly to recover the same proceeds it agreed not to pursue directly.The carrier her paid benefits to the employee and later sought reimbursement of those payments from any settlement proceeds the employee might receive from a third party. The policy, however, included an endorsement waiving the carrier’s right to recover from a third party sued by the employee. The employee moved for summary judgment declaring that the carrier had waived its right to recover any proceeds from the lawsuit, whether directly from the third party or indirectly from any settlement the third party pays to the employee. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employee, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the waiver foreclosed the carrier’s right to recover from a liable third party, and that waiver included direct recovery from the third party or indirect recovery of the same proceeds after the third party paid them to the employee. View "Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Wedel" on Justia Law

The Texas-residency exception that excludes certain claims from the forum non conveniens doctrine because the claims are prosecuted by a Texas-resident plaintiff or derivative of a Texas decedent applied to some of Plaintiffs’ underlying claims in this case.Venice Alan Cooper was killed while working on his Mahindra tractor at his home in Mississippi. The tractor was sold to the decedent in Mississippi. Plaintiffs, the decedent’s sons and Texas residents, filed a negligence and products liability action in Texas against Mahindra USA, Inc., the tractor’s vendor. Mahindra filed a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when ruling on the motion because the Texas-residency exception to the forum non conveniens doctrine applied to some of Plaintiffs’ underlying claims. View "In re Mahindra, USA Inc." on Justia Law

At issue was whether Grandparents were liable to Father for assisting in their daughter’s (Mother) interference with Father’s possessory rights to his children.Mother employed “egregious and outrageous tactics” to prevent Father from seeing the parties’ two children, including coaching the parties’ young son to falsely accuse his father of sexual abuse. While the abuse allegations were under investigation, Grandparents supported Mother by helping her care for the children. Father sued Grandparents for negligence, defamation, and “aiding and assisting” Mother’s interference with his possessory rights, in violation of Tex. Fam. Code chapter 42. The trial court awarded Father more than $10.5 million in damages. The court of appeals reversed as to the defamation charge and a small portion of the Family Code damages award but otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and rendered a take-nothing judgment, holding (1) the defamation claims were unsustainable due to lack of pleadings and sufficient causation evidence; and (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to support Grandparents’ liability under chapter 42 and the tort theories alleged. View "Bos v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this libel-by-implication case, a column written by Steve Blow and published by The Dallas Morning News (collectively, Petitioners) was reasonably capable of meaning that John and Mary Ann Tatum acted deceptively and that the accusation of deception was reasonably capable of defaming the Tatums. But because the accusation was an opinion, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioners.The Tatum filed suit alleging libel and libel per se against Petitioners alleging that the column at issue defamed them. The trial court granted summary judgment for Petitioners. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the column was “reasonably capable” of defamatory meaning and that the column was not a non-actionable opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the column’s accusation of deception was “reasonably capable” of injuring the Tatums’ standing in the community but that Blow’s implicit statement that the Tatum acted deceptively was an opinion and thus not actionable. View "Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Harris County, the employer of deputy constable Kenneth Caplan, was entitled to governmental immunity on Plaintiff’s claim that the County used tangible personal property when Caplan shot Plaintiff.Caplan was off duty and used his personal firearm when he struck and injured Plaintiff. Attempting to trigger the Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of governmental immunity, Plaintiff alleged that the County’s use of tangible personal property caused the injuries she suffered when Caplan shot her. The trial court granted the County’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court of appeals found that Plaintiff failed to establish a waiver of the County’s immunity but remanded the case to allow Plaintiff to replied and conduct more discovery. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and rendered judgment for the County, holding that Plaintiff’s allegations failed to trigger the Texas Tort Claims Act’s waiver of the County’s governmental immunity, and neither further discovery nor repleading could cure this defect. View "Harris County, Texas v. Annab" on Justia Law

The court of appeals erred in holding that the commercial-speech exemption applied so Defendant could not seek expedited dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).Defendant hired Plaintiff, which provided “virtual assistant” services to businesses, to receive and fulfill customer orders placed through Defendant’s website. Defendant later accused Plaintiff of failing to follow its instructions on how to fill those orders and over-ordering products, demanding compensation for lost profits. When Plaintiff refused to pay, Defendant published statements about the parties’ dispute on various online platforms, including a personal blog, YouTube, and social media. Plaintiff sued for defamation. Defendant moved to dismiss the suit under the TCPA. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the commercial-speech exemption applied. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the TCPA’s commercial-speech exemption did not apply because Defendant’s allegedly defamatory statements did not arise out of his sale of goods or services or his status as a seller of those goods and services. Rather, Defendant’s statements constituted protected speech warning Plaintiff’s actual or potential customers about the quality of Plaintiff’s services. View "Castleman v. Internet Money Limited" on Justia Law

The Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) applied to tort claims brought by a nonclient against an attorney based in part on statements the attorney made in open court on behalf of his client, and the attorney was entitled to dismissal under the TCPA.The trial court denied Defendant-attorney’s motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the TCPA applied to the claims against Defendant, Plaintiff made a prima facie case for each element of his claims, and Defendant failed to prove his attorney-immunity defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the TCPA applies to protect an attorney’s in-court statements on behalf of his client during a judicial proceeding; and (2) assuming without deciding that Plaintiff carried his burden to make a prima facie case as to the elements of his claims against Defendant, Defendant was nevertheless entitled to dismissal under the affirmative defense of attorney immunity. View "Youngkin v. Hines" on Justia Law

At issue in this statutory-construction case was the damages-cap and election-of-remedies provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) with respect to independent contractors performing essential governmental functions.Plaintiff, the daughter of a pedestrian who was struck and killed by a public bus in Fort Worth, brought claims under the TTCA against the Fort Worth Transportation Authority (FWTA), its two independent contractors, and the bus driver. The Supreme Court held (1) the TTCA’s damages cap applies cumulatively when, as in this case, an independent contractor performed essential governmental functions of a transportation authority; (2) the TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision extends to cover an employee of an independent contractor performing essential governmental functions; and (3) the transit defendants in this case were not entitled to attorney’s fees arising out of interpleader. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s judgment in favor of FWTA with respect to issues one and two, and affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Fort Worth Transportation Authority v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law