Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent was a party to an oil and gas lease that restricted its use of the surface estate and required it to drill from off-site locations when feasible. Briscoe Ranch, Inc. owed an adjacent surface estate and agreed that Respondent could use horizontal drilling to drill from the surface of the Ranch in order to produce minerals from Respondent’s lease. The lessee of the minerals underlying the Ranch (Petitioner) was not a party to the agreement and sought to enjoin Respondent from drilling on the Ranch and asserted claims for both trespass and tortious interference with a contract. Petitioner claimed that its consent was necessary before Respondent could drill through the Ranch’s subsurface covered by its mineral lease. The district court dismissed the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the loss of minerals Petitioner will suffer by a well being drilled through its mineral estate is not a sufficient injury to support a claim for trespass; and (2) Respondent’s drilling plans did not tortiously interfere with Petitioner’s contractual lease rights. View "Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, energy companies, owned four natural gas compressor stations and a metering station outside the town of Dish. In 2011, the town and eighteen of its residents sued the energy companies, alleging trespass and nuisance energies. However, as early as 2006, residents first complained about the noise and odor emanating from these facilities. The trial court entered summary judgment for the energy companies on various grounds, including limitations. The court of appeals reversed the trial court on limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s take-nothing judgment, holding that the two-year statute of limitations barred the residents’ claims. View "Town of Dish v. Atmos Energy Corp." on Justia Law

At issue was whether a private university that operates a state-authorized police department is a “governmental unit” for purposes of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 51.014(a)(8), which provides for an interlocutory appeal from an order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.” The private university in this case was the University of the Incarnate Word (UIW), and the case arose from an UIW officer’s use of deadly force following a traffic stop. The parents of the UIW student killed in the incident sued UIW for their son’s death. UIW raised governmental immunity as a defense and asked the trial court to dismiss the suit in a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court denied the plea. UIW took an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that UIW is a governmental unit for purposes of law enforcement and is therefore entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(8). View "University of the Incarnate Word v. Redus" on Justia Law

Laura Murphy, who at the relevant period worked as an independent practitioner under contract with West Texas OB Anesthesia, filed claims against El Paso Healthcare System, d/b/a Las Palmas Medical Center, for statutory retaliation and tortious interference with the continuation of the business relationship between Murphy and West Texas OB. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict, which found El Paso Healthcare liable on both causes of action and awarded $631,000 in damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment that Murphy take nothing on her claims, holding that Murphy failed to establish that El Paso Healthcare illegally retaliated against her or interfered with her legal rights under her existing agreement with West Texas OB. View "El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was how the harm likely to result from a malicious prosecution should be evaluated in calculating exemplary damages. The Supreme Court held that the potential harm analysis should focus only on the probable damages resulting from malicious prosecution, not the consequences of wrongful imprisonment. Defendant in this case failed to meet his burden of proving that the criminal justice system would ultimately fail to resolve this case correctly where the chances of wrongful imprisonment were essentially zero given the expired statute of limitations. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in considering imprisonment-related damages. The Supreme Court remanded the exemplary-damages award to the court of appeals for a more substantial remittitur. View "Bennett v. Grant" on Justia Law

Respondent, a Texas Tech professor and associate dean, sued Petitioner, a colleague, for defamation after he was passed over for promotion. Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Tort Claims Act’s election-of-remedies provision foreclosed suit against her in her individual capacity because she made the allegedly defamatory statements in the scope of her employment by Texas Tech, a governmental unit. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to offer evidence she was not furthering her own purposes rather than her employer’s when she made the allegedly defamatory statements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner was objectively acting within the scope of her employment when she made the allegedly defamatory statements, and therefore, Petitioner was entitled to dismissal pursuant to the election-of-remedies provision. View "Laverie v. Wetherbe" on Justia Law

The First Pentecostal Church of Beaumont entrusted over one million dollars for safekeeping to The Lamb Law Firm, P.C., and the firm deposited the money into its trust account. In just over one year, the church’s money was gone. The church sued the law firm; Kip Lamb, the firm’s owner; and Leigh Parker, one of the firm attorneys representing the church. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Parker. The church appealed, challenging the court’s rulings with respect to the claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and joint venture. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment on the church’s claims for civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and joint venture; but (2) reversed the church’s claim that it was entitled to equitable remedies as to Parker for breach of fiduciary duties he owed to the church, holding that the church did not need to prove that Parker’s breach of fiduciary duty caused actual damages as to the equitable remedies it sought, and the church did not waive its claim for equitable remedies. View "First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker" on Justia Law

D Magazine published an article that identified Janay Rosenthal as someone who “has figured out how to get food stamps while living in the lap of luxury.” Rosenthal sued D Magazine for defamation and other causes of action. The trial court granted the magazine’s motion to dismiss as to Rosenthal’s statutory claims but denied it as to the defamation claim, concluding that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of defamation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Rosenthal presented sufficient evidence in support of the defamation elements to survive D Magazine’s motion for early dismissal, and therefore, dismissal of the claim under the Texas Citizens Participation Act was not warranted at this stage of the proceedings; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to award the magazine attorney’s fees in light of its dismissal of other claims. View "D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal" on Justia Law

Travis Coleman was a terminal technician formerly employed by ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (EMPCo). Coleman sued EMPCo and his two former supervisors for defamation, alleging that the statements by his supervisors about the circumstances that led to Coleman’s termination were untrue. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) applied to Coleman’s suit. The court of appeals ruled that EMPCo did not meet its burden to show that the TCPA applied to Coleman’s suit because the communications among EMPCo employees were related to Coleman’s job performance and had only a “tangential relationship to health, safety, environmental, and economic concerns." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that EMPCo successfully established TCPA applicability. Remanded. View "ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer (Defendant), claiming assault, sexual assault, and battery, among other causes of action. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing, in part, that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act’s (TCHRA) statutory cause of action preempted Plaintiff’s common law claims. The trial court granted the motion without providing a basis for its ruling. Plaintiff appealed only the trial court’s ruling on her assault claim against Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the TCHRA preempted Plaintiff’s assault claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) where the gravamen of a plaintiff’s claim is not harassment, but rather, assault, the TCHRA does not preempt the plaintiff’s common law assault claim; and (2) because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was assault, Defendant did not establish, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the TCHRA. Remanded. View "B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc." on Justia Law