Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

When Plaintiffs were sued, they hired Attorneys to represent them. During trial, the trial judge erred, and the error required a costly appeal to correct. Plaintiffs later sued Attorney for legal malpractice claiming that the court’s error would have been immaterial and a favorable judgment would have been rendered if Attorneys had presented additional evidence and arguments. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Attorneys, concluding that the trial court’s error was the sole cause of Plaintiffs’ injury because the Attorneys pursued a winning strategy and did not contribute to the judicial error. The court of appeals reversed without addressing whether judicial error can constitute a superseding cause that negates proximate cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, any unrelated negligence by the trial attorneys was too attenuated from the remedial appellate attorney fees to be a proximate cause of those expenses. View "Stanfield v. Neubaum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, LP asserting that Crosstex had both intentionally and negligently created a nuisance. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that a compressor station built by Crosstex had greatly diminished the value of their ranch and ruined their financial investment, as well as their ability to use and enjoy their land. A jury found that Crosstex had “intentionally and unreasonably” created a nuisance as to Plaintiffs’ ranch, that the nuisance was permanent, and that the nuisance caused the ranch’s fair market value to decline by over $2 million. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was not factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding of a negligently created nuisance. The Supreme Court clarified the law and affirmed, holding holding (1) the term “nuisance” refers to a type of legal injury involving interference with the use and enjoyment of real property but does not describe a cause of action; and (2) a defendant can be liable for intentionally or negligently causing a condition that constitutes a nuisance, and neither claim requires a separate finding that the defendant unreasonably used its property when creating a nuisance. View "Crosstex N. Texas Pipeline, LP v. Gardiner" on Justia Law

After Randall Seger died while working on a hydraulic-lift drilling rig when it suddenly collapsed, his parents obtained a judgment against the drilling company. The drilling company then assigned its rights against the insurers to the parents, and the parents brought a Stowers action against the insurers. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co. The court held that, because the evidence is legally insufficient to support a jury verdict to the contrary, Randall was a leased-in worker as a matter of law. In this case, plaintiffs' claimed loss was excluded from coverage under the commercial general liability (CGL) policy and the Stowers action fails as a result. The court did not reach the damages issue addressed by the court of appeals. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, which reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment that plaintiffs take nothing, but on different grounds. View "Seger v. Yorkshire Ins." on Justia Law

After a burst of gas exploded out of a pipe and caused injury to Johannes Elmgren, a boilermaker for an independent contractor, he and his wife filed suit against Ineos and Jonathan Pavlovsky, an Ineos employee who the Elmgrens alleged was the “furnace maintenance team leader.” The court concluded that Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code applies to all categories of negligence claims, including those based on respondeat superior, but Chapter 95 does not apply to claims against an employee or agent of a property owner; plaintiffs in this case failed to present any evidence to trigger an exception to the protection Chapter 95 provides to Ineos; and thus the court: (1) affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court’s summary judgment on plaintiffs’ premises-liability claims against Ineos, (2) reversed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court’s summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligent-activity and negligent-undertaking claims against Ineos and rendered judgment in favor of Ineos on those claims, and affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court’s summary judgment on the claims against Pavlovsky and remanding those claims to the trial court. View "Ineos USA, LLC v. Elmgren" on Justia Law

The Texas Medical Board disciplined Minda Lao Toledo, a physician, for unprofessional conduct and issued a press release regarding the matter. After KBMT Operating Company aired a report of the Board’s action Toledo sued KMBT and three of its employees (collectively, KBMT) for defamation. KBMT filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, which allows for the early dismissal of a legal action implicating a defendant’s rights of free speech unless the plaintiff can establish each element of the claim with clear and specific evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Toledo established a prima facie case of defamation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the truth of a media report of official proceedings of public concern must be measured against the proceedings themselves and not against information outside the proceedings; and (2) in this case, Toledo did not meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case that KBMT’s broadcast was false, and therefore, the Act requires that Toledo’s action be dismissed. View "KBMT Operating Co., LLC v. Toledo" on Justia Law

While investigating a leak in First Texas Bank’s roof, Chris Carpenter fell, crushing two vertebrae. Carpenter sued the Bank, alleging that its ladder was defective. In response, the Bank argued that it could not be liable for Carpenter’s injuries pursuant to Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because it did not control Carpenter’s work or know of any defect in its ladder. Chapter 95 limits a property owner’s liability to a contractor who “constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies an improvement to real property.” The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Carpenter was not a “contractor” under the statute because a contractor must have an “actual” contract to perform specific work for stated compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) in the context of Chapter 95, a contractor is simply someone who works on improvement to real property; but (2) the record in this case did not establish that the Bank had retained Carpenter to perform work covered by the statute at the time he was injured. View "First Texas Bank v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

John Sampson injured his shoulder when he tripped on an improperly secured extension cord at the University of Texas at Austin (UT) campus. Sampson filed a negligence suit alleging that UT waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 101.021. UT filed a plea to the jurisdiction, motion to dismiss, and no-evidence motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity, all of which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed Sampson’s claim for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that Sampson alleged a premises defect claim under the Tort Claims Act and failed to present evidence to show that a disputed material fact existed regarding UT’s actual knowledge of an unreasonable risk of harm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Sampson’s claim is properly characterized as a premises defect claim; and (2) Sampson failed to present evidence that UT had actual knowledge of the tripping hazard created by the extension cord. View "Sampson v. Univ. of Texas at Austin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a reservoir engineer, purported to identify ten localized areas in oil-and-gas formations in East Texas that offered optimized production. Plaintiff sued Southwestern Energy Production Company (SEPCO), an oil and gas operator, alleging that SEPCO misused the proprietary information about the ten “sweet spots” acquired under a confidentiality agreement and profited from its use. After a trial, the jury awarded $11.445 as tort damages for misappropriate and contact damages for breach of the confidentiality agreement and $23.89 million in equitable disgorgement of past profits. The court of appeals affirmed the actual damages award for misappropriation but reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment on the disgorgement and breach-of-contract awards. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the breach-of-contract and misappropriation-of-trade-secret claims and remanded for a new trial, concluding that limitations was not conclusively established and that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the entire jury award; and (2) the equitable disgorgement issue need not be addressed because the trial court must determine the issue anew on remand following a new trial. View "Southwestern Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry" on Justia Law

Union Carbide employed Martin at its Seadrift facility. Martin lost his leg in a workplace accident and recovered workers’ compensation benefits through an owner-controlled insurance program (OCIP) administered by Union Carbide’s parent company, Dow. Martin subsequently sued TIC, a subcontractor providing maintenance services at Seadrift, alleging TIC’s employees negligently caused his injury. TIC cited Labor Code section 406.123, which deems a general contractor the statutory employer of a subcontractor and its employees when the general contractor agrees in writing to provide workers’ compensation insurance to the subcontractor. TIC had a written agreement with Union Carbide that extended workers’ compensation insurance coverage under the OCIP to TIC and its employees. Martin argued, under section 406.122(b), that the exclusive-remedy provision did not apply because TIC was an independent contractor and had a written contract with Union Carbide under which TIC “assume[d] the responsibilities of an employer for the performance of work.” The court denied TIC’s summary-judgment motion; the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Texas entered judgment for TIC, reasoning that the independent contractor provision (406.122(b)) is a general rule, and 406.123, which confers statutory-employer status on general contractors who provide workers’ compensation insurance to their subcontractors, is a permissive exception. The record established that, under section 406.123, TIC is Carbide’s deemed employee for purposes of the exclusive-remedy defense. View "TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin" on Justia Law

J.B. Hunt’s tractor-trailer traveling on I-10 in Waller County struck a disabled vehicle that had entered the tractor-trailer’s lane. The vehicle’s occupants were injured; one ultimately died. J.B. Hunt sued the occupants in Waller County to recover property-damage costs. Days later, the occupants sued J.B. Hunt in Dallas County to recover personal-injury damages. The occupants of the car claimed, and the Dallas County court agreed, that exceptions to the first-filed rule applied, so the Dallas County court had dominant jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Texas agreed with J.B. Hunt that the Waller County court has dominant jurisdiction. The occupants do not dispute whether their claims in the Dallas County suit were the subject of a pending action at the time of the Waller County petition, nor that the subject matter of the claims in the two suits otherwise satisfies the compulsory-counterclaim rule. Even if J.B. Hunt’s conduct was inequitable, the occupants failed to allege that the conduct caused their delay, if any, in filing suit. It would be odd and premature to require a potential litigant sit on his hands because his claim, viable though it may be, could be countered by an equally viable claim. View "In re J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc." on Justia Law