Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A correctional officer employed by a city for over a decade contracted COVID-19 after close contact with an infected coworker. He was hospitalized twice and diagnosed with COVID-19, pneumonia, and related lung issues. He filed a workers’ compensation claim for occupational lung disease, asserting that his illness was work-related. The insurer denied the claim, and the officer sought administrative review. His treating physician classified his COVID-19 infection as a disease of the lung.An appeals officer reviewed the case and affirmed the denial of benefits. The officer found that, while the claimant was entitled to a statutory presumption that his lung disease arose out of and in the course of employment due to his years of service, he failed to show that his lung disease was caused by exposure to heat, smoke, fumes, tear gas, or other noxious gases, as required by the relevant statute. The Eighth Judicial District Court reviewed the administrative decision and denied the officer’s petition for judicial review, concluding that the appeals officer’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not erroneous.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that, under NRS 617.455, a claimant must satisfy both the requirement that the lung disease arose out of and in the course of employment (for which a conclusive presumption may apply) and the separate requirement that the disease was caused by exposure to heat, smoke, fumes, tear gas, or other noxious gases. The conclusive presumption does not eliminate the need to prove the exposure element. Because the claimant did not show his lung disease was caused by the required type of exposure, the court affirmed the denial of his claim. View "Holguin v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at High Desert State Prison in Clark County, Brian Caperonis was killed by other inmates. His father, William Joseph Caperonis, acting individually and as the special administrator of Brian’s estate, filed a civil complaint against the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and several of its employees. The claims included civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, and various negligence claims related to Brian’s death.NDOC moved to dismiss the state law negligence claims, arguing that the estate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243. NDOC asserted that, as the estate stands in the shoes of the decedent, it was required to file an administrative claim before pursuing litigation. William opposed, contending that the exhaustion requirement applied only to living inmates and not to the estates of deceased prisoners. The Eighth Judicial District Court denied NDOC’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plain language of the statutes and the relevant administrative regulations did not extend the exhaustion requirement to estates of deceased inmates.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed NDOC’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the administrative exhaustion requirements in NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243 do not apply to the estate of a deceased prisoner. The court reasoned that the statutory language is limited to “a person who is or was” in NDOC custody and does not contemplate survival claims by estates. The court also found that the administrative regulations provide no mechanism for an estate to pursue such remedies. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied NDOC’s writ petition, affirming the district court’s decision. View "Department of Corrections v. District Court" on Justia Law

A welder was injured while working on a launch site on the Mississippi River, operated by two closely related companies. The injury occurred when a defective hook, lacking a required safety latch, struck him during a crane operation, causing him to fall and sustain multiple injuries, including a fractured eye socket and a cervical disk injury. Over the following months, he underwent surgery and was prescribed pain medications. After his prescriptions ran out, he attempted to manage his pain with over-the-counter drugs, but ultimately died from an overdose of street fentanyl mixed with Xylazine, a non-prescribed animal tranquilizer.The estate of the deceased sued the two companies for personal injury under the Jones Act, general maritime law, and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. After a bench trial, the district court found the companies liable for vessel negligence under the LHWCA, determining that the defective hook was an appurtenance of the vessel and the proximate cause of the initial injury. The court also found the two companies to be essentially the same entity and awarded damages to the decedent’s children and mother, including for wrongful death and loss of consortium.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that while the defective hook was the proximate cause of the workplace injury, the ingestion of illegal drugs was a superseding cause of death, breaking the chain of causation from the workplace injury. The court reversed the award of damages stemming from the death and loss of consortium, concluding that the companies were not liable for the decedent’s death, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bommarito v. Belle Chasse Marine Trans" on Justia Law

Elisabeth Koletas, who was four months pregnant, requested a pat-down instead of passing through a body scanner at Southwest Florida International Airport due to concerns about radiation. During the pat-down, Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Sarno conducted a prolonged probe of Koletas’s vaginal area, focusing on material in her underwear. Koletas explained it was toilet paper used to stem pregnancy-related bleeding. Sarno, skeptical, moved Koletas to a private room and brought in Supervising TSO Shane, who further probed Koletas’s underwear and vaginal area. Shane directed Koletas to lift her dress and ultimately removed the toilet paper, finding no prohibited items. Koletas experienced psychological and physical distress from the encounter.After exhausting administrative remedies, Koletas filed suit against the United States in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The United States moved to dismiss, arguing that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception preserved sovereign immunity for the alleged battery and false imprisonment. The district court agreed, relying solely on an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that TSOs are “officers of the United States” empowered by law to execute searches under the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso, which waives sovereign immunity for certain intentional torts committed by such officers. The court found the statutory language unambiguous and joined five other circuits in this interpretation. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "Koletas v. USA" on Justia Law

A mass shooting occurred at a Florida high school in 2018, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. The Sheriff’s Office, which employed a school resource officer at the school, faced 60 lawsuits from victims alleging negligence in failing to secure the premises. The Sheriff’s Office held an excess liability insurance policy with Evanston Insurance Company, which required the Sheriff to pay a $500,000 self-insured retention (SIR) per “occurrence” and a $500,000 annual aggregate deductible before coverage would be triggered. The central dispute was whether the shooting constituted a single “occurrence” under the policy, or multiple occurrences—one for each victim or gunshot.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case after the Sheriff filed a declaratory judgment action. The district court denied Evanston’s motion to dismiss, finding that the policy’s definition of “occurrence” was ambiguous under Florida law, and that ambiguity should be construed in favor of the insured. The court determined that the Parkland shooting was a single occurrence, meaning only one SIR applied. The court also found that the Sheriff had satisfied both the SIR and the deductible through legal expenses and other covered claims, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the Sheriff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that a justiciable controversy existed, as the Sheriff had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of future injury and had satisfied the policy’s prerequisites for coverage. The court further held that, under controlling Florida law, the term “occurrence” was ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured, resulting in the Parkland shooting being treated as a single occurrence. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the Sheriff. View "Sheriff of Broward County v. Evanston Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A group of former coal miners brought products liability lawsuits against several manufacturers and distributors of respirators, alleging that the devices failed to protect them from dust exposure and caused them to develop occupational lung diseases. Each plaintiff had used specific respirators during their mining careers and claimed that the products were defective. The cases were consolidated for discovery due to common factual and legal issues. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by West Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.The Circuit Court of McDowell County granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that each plaintiff knew or should have known of their injury and its possible connection to the respirators more than two years before filing suit. The court used certain “triggering” dates—such as the date of medical diagnosis, receipt of disability benefits, or application for federal black lung benefits—to determine when the statute of limitations began to run. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly resolved factual disputes and applied an incorrect standard for latent disease cases. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s decision, concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of the claims.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. The Court held that, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations in products liability cases begins when a plaintiff knows or should know of their injury, the identity of the product’s maker, and the product’s causal relation to the injury. The Court found no genuine dispute of material fact as to when each plaintiff was on notice of their injury and its possible cause, and rejected arguments for tolling based on fraudulent concealment. The summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Hardy v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

In May 2023, a partial collapse of the Davenport Hotel apartment building resulted in three deaths and multiple injuries to individuals and property. Numerous lawsuits were filed against various parties, including the building’s owners, engineers, and the City of Davenport, as well as two city employees. These cases were consolidated in the Iowa District Court for Scott County. The City defendants sought dismissal of the claims against them, arguing that the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act’s qualified immunity provisions shielded them from liability and that the plaintiffs’ petition did not meet the Act’s heightened pleading requirements. They also asserted that the public-duty doctrine barred the claims, as any duty owed was to the public at large rather than to the individual plaintiffs.The Iowa District Court for Scott County denied the City defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court determined that the qualified immunity provisions of Iowa Code § 670.4A applied to common law tort claims but found that the plaintiffs’ petition satisfied the heightened pleading requirements. The court also rejected the City defendants’ argument that the public-duty doctrine barred the suit. The City defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity under the immediate appeal provision in § 670.4A and separately sought interlocutory review of the public-duty doctrine issue, which was denied.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed only the qualified immunity issue, concluding that the protections of Iowa Code § 670.4A do not apply to common law tort claims such as negligence and nuisance. The court held that the statute’s language, borrowed from federal law, was intended to apply only to constitutional or statutory claims, not to common law torts. As a result, the appeal was dismissed because the qualified immunity provisions did not apply to the claims asserted. View "In re Davenport Hotel Building Collapse" on Justia Law

The plaintiff underwent a vein-ablation procedure on her right leg in August 2016, performed by a physician other than the defendant. She subsequently developed an infection and was treated by the defendant, who performed several irrigation and debridement procedures over the following months. In March 2017, a 4" x 4" piece of gauze was removed from the plaintiff’s wound, raising questions about whether it had been negligently left in the wound during one of the defendant’s procedures or during subsequent wound care. The plaintiff filed a medical-malpractice complaint in July 2018, alleging that the defendant left a sponge in her body during a September 2016 surgery, which the defendant denied ever performing.The Shelby Circuit Court initially denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with her claims. After depositions and further discovery, the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to correct the date of the alleged negligent procedure from September 21, 2016, to October 26, 2016, but continued to reference a vein ablation rather than the actual irrigation and debridement procedure. The defendant moved to strike the amended complaint, arguing undue delay and lack of specificity as required by the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA). The circuit court denied the motion to strike and allowed the amendment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus. It held that the plaintiff’s delay in amending her complaint was truly inordinate and unexplained, especially given the information available to her and the defendant’s repeated assertion of his rights under AMLA § 6-5-551. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by allowing the amendment and directed it to vacate its order granting leave to amend and to strike the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. The petition for writ of mandamus was granted. View "Ex parte Taylor" on Justia Law

A train operated by Norfolk Southern carrying hazardous materials derailed near East Palestine, Ohio, in February 2023. The cleanup released toxic chemicals into the surrounding area, prompting affected residents and businesses to file suit against the railroad and other parties in federal court. These cases were consolidated into a master class action, and after extensive discovery and mediation, Norfolk Southern agreed to a $600 million settlement for the class. The district court for the Northern District of Ohio approved the settlement in September 2024. Five class members objected and appealed, but the district court required them to post an $850,000 appeal bond by January 30, 2025, to cover administrative and taxable costs. The objectors did not pay the bond or offer a lesser amount.After the bond order, the objectors filed a motion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to eliminate or reduce the bond, but did not seek a stay. The Sixth Circuit motions panel explained that, absent a separate notice of appeal, it could only address the bond on a motion to stay, which the objectors expressly disclaimed. The objectors then moved in the district court to extend the time to appeal the bond order, but did so one day after the deadline set by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A). The district court denied the motion as untimely, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the deadlines for appealing and requesting extensions are jurisdictional and cannot be equitably extended. The court dismissed the objectors’ appeal of the motion to extend for lack of jurisdiction and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the objectors’ appeals of the settlement for failure to pay the required bond. View "In re E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

A former professional football player, who played in the National Football League for 15 seasons, filed a workers’ compensation claim in California alleging cumulative injuries sustained throughout his career. He began his career with a California-based team, signing his initial contract in California, but spent the majority of his career with out-of-state teams, including the Atlanta Falcons, for whom he played his final seasons. During his employment with the Falcons, he played only a small number of games in California and spent the majority of his duty days outside the state.A workers’ compensation judge determined that both the player and the Falcons were exempt from California workers’ compensation law under specific statutory provisions, as the Falcons provided workers’ compensation coverage under another state’s laws and the player did not meet the statutory thresholds for California coverage. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB), upon reconsideration, disagreed, finding that it had jurisdiction over the claim because the player had signed a contract in California during his career, and it rescinded the judge’s decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the Falcons are exempt from California workers’ compensation law under Labor Code sections 3600.5(c) and (d), because the player did not spend enough of his career working for California-based teams or in California, and he played more than seven seasons for non-California teams. The court annulled the WCAB’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, holding that the statutory exemptions for professional athletes applied and precluded the player’s claim against the Falcons under California law. The court awarded costs in connection with the writ proceeding to the Falcons. View "Atlanta Falcons v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law