Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Mark Uhlenbrock was convicted by a jury for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) by posting nude images and videos of his ex-girlfriend, YT, on Reddit, along with explicit stories written in her name. Some of the images were taken with her consent during their relationship, while others were recorded without her knowledge. Uhlenbrock's posts included personal details about YT, such as her occupation and employer, and invited men to proposition her. YT discovered the posts through a family friend and reported Uhlenbrock to the FBI.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Uhlenbrock's motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment and vagueness grounds. During the trial, the court allowed testimony about Uhlenbrock's prior similar conduct, which included a 2016 guilty plea for cyberstalking YT. The jury found Uhlenbrock guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and restitution. The court also revoked his supervised release from the 2016 case and sentenced him to an additional 12 months in prison. Uhlenbrock appealed both the new conviction and the revocation of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Uhlenbrock's posts constituted unprotected defamation and that the application of § 2261A(2)(B) did not violate the First Amendment. The court also found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Uhlenbrock's prior conduct. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Uhlenbrock intended to harass or intimidate YT and that his conduct caused her substantial emotional distress. The court also rejected Uhlenbrock's claims of constructive amendment of the indictment and double jeopardy. View "USA v. Uhlenbrock" on Justia Law

A disabled woman, T.M.B., was sexually assaulted by an employee of West Mont, a nonprofit organization contracted by the State of Montana to provide community-based services for developmentally disabled individuals. T.M.B. sued both the State and West Mont, alleging they owed her a nondelegable duty of care. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, concluding neither owed a nondelegable duty of care for the employee’s criminal acts. T.M.B. appealed.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, found that the State had satisfied its statutory obligations by contracting with West Mont to provide services and did not owe a nondelegable duty to T.M.B. because she was not under state custody or control. The court also found that West Mont did not owe a nondelegable duty, as there was no statute or rule explicitly stating such a duty existed for state contractors operating community homes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision regarding the State, agreeing that the State did not have a close, continuing relationship with T.M.B. that would impose a nondelegable duty. However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision regarding West Mont, finding that the relationship between West Mont and T.M.B. was sufficiently close and continuing to impose a nondelegable duty under Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214. The court held that West Mont had a duty to protect T.M.B. from harm due to her dependence on their care and supervision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "T.M.B v. West Mont" on Justia Law

Jack Greener, a Brazilian jiu jitsu (BJJ) student, suffered a fractured neck and spinal cord injury during a sparring session at Del Mar Jiu Jitsu Club, owned by M. Phelps, Inc. Greener sued, alleging negligence by his instructor, Francisco Iturralde, and vicarious liability by M. Phelps, Inc. The defendants argued that the primary assumption of risk doctrine absolved them of liability, as BJJ is an inherently risky sport.The Superior Court of San Diego County instructed the jury using option 2 of CACI No. 471, which holds a sports instructor liable if they unreasonably increased the risks to the student beyond those inherent in the sport. The jury found in favor of Greener, awarding him $46 million in damages. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and verdict form, and in excluding certain evidence.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on option 2 of CACI No. 471, as the evidence showed that Iturralde's actions unreasonably increased the risk of injury to Greener. The court emphasized that Iturralde, as an instructor with superior knowledge and skill, should be held to a different standard than a student coparticipant. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence, as it was either irrelevant or cumulative.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly applied the increased risk standard and that the exclusion of evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court suggested that the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions consider revising CACI No. 471 to minimize confusion and avoid the need to cross-refer to other instructions. View "Greener v. M. Phelps, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa Lombardo, Daniel Bates, and James Bates sued Gramercy Court as heirs of Elizabeth Stein, alleging wrongful death, negligence, elder abuse, and gross negligence due to the care Stein received at Gramercy Court's nursing facility. Stein developed bedsores and died shortly after being transferred back to the hospital. Gramercy Court petitioned to compel arbitration based on an agreement Lombardo signed on Stein's behalf, but the trial court denied the petition.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that Stein's durable power of attorney did not grant Lombardo the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Stein's behalf. The court also determined that Stein did not give Lombardo ostensible authority through her actions. Additionally, the court ruled that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Lombardo's or the other plaintiffs' individual claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Lombardo did not have actual or ostensible authority to bind Stein to the arbitration agreement. The durable power of attorney did not explicitly grant Lombardo the authority to enter into arbitration agreements, and there was no evidence that Stein's conduct led Gramercy Court to believe Lombardo had such authority. The court also concluded that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the plaintiffs' individual claims, as Lombardo was not a party to the agreement in her individual capacity. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying Gramercy Court's petition to compel arbitration. View "Lombardo v. Gramercy Court" on Justia Law

Dustin Clover sustained injuries while removing irrigation drip tape from a seed field while working for Crookham Company in 2018. Clover filed a complaint against Crookham, alleging that his injuries fell within an exception to the exclusive remedy rule under the Worker’s Compensation statutes, which allows for a separate civil action if the employer commits an act of “willful or unprovoked physical aggression.” Crookham moved for summary judgment, arguing that Clover failed to provide evidence supporting his claim. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Crookham. Clover’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading to this appeal.The district court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho found that Clover’s injuries occurred during the course of his employment and were covered by worker’s compensation. The court concluded that Clover did not present sufficient evidence to show that Crookham’s actions fell under the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The court noted that there were no prior incidents or complaints about the drip tape lifter’s safety and that Crookham had used the equipment for nine seasons without injury.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Clover failed to demonstrate that Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge that the drip tape lifter was unsafe. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence and denying Clover’s motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that Clover did not present new facts sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. Consequently, the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration were affirmed. Crookham was awarded costs as the prevailing party on appeal. View "Clover v. Crookham Company" on Justia Law

Houston Police Department Officers Richard Corral and C. Goodman were involved in a high-speed chase of a suspect who had solicited an undercover detective and fled in a stolen vehicle. During the pursuit, Corral's patrol car hit a curb and collided with a pickup truck driven by Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon. Corral claimed the accident occurred because his brakes did not stop him in time. Rodriguez and Okon sued the City of Houston, alleging Corral's negligent driving caused their injuries.The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Corral was protected by official immunity because he acted in good faith and that the emergency exception to the Tort Claims Act applied. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a fact issue existed regarding whether Corral knew his brakes were not functioning properly, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Corral acted in good faith as a matter of law. The Court found that Corral's statement about the brakes not working did not reasonably support an inference that he had prior awareness of any defect. The Court emphasized that the summary-judgment evidence showed Corral's brakes were functional but did not stop him in time. The Court also held that the City conclusively established Corral's good faith in making the turn during the pursuit, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue to controvert this proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case, holding that the City’s governmental immunity was not waived under the Tort Claims Act because Corral was protected by official immunity. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

A fugitive led police on a high-speed chase in Austin, during which Officer Bullock collided with Noel Powell's minivan, causing injuries. Powell, who was not at fault, sued the City of Austin for damages. The City claimed immunity under the Tort Claims Act's emergency exception, which applies if the officer was responding to an emergency and did not act with reckless disregard for safety.The trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction, and the City appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, finding a fact issue regarding whether Officer Bullock's actions were reckless, thus requiring further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the officer's conduct did not violate any specific law or ordinance applicable to emergency actions. The court also found that Powell did not raise a fact issue regarding the officer's recklessness. Consequently, the Tort Claims Act did not waive the City's immunity. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "THE CITY OF AUSTIN v. POWELL" on Justia Law

Jose Villegas, a 39-year-old inmate at Lake Correctional Institution (LCI) in Florida, died following a physical confrontation with correctional officers. The incident began when officers found Villegas unconscious in his cell. Upon regaining consciousness, Villegas resisted the officers' attempts to restrain him. The officers eventually subdued Villegas and transported him to a medical unit, but he was pronounced dead upon arrival. The autopsy reported that Villegas died from restraint asphyxia, with excited delirium as a contributing factor, and noted the presence of synthetic cannabinoids in his system.Douglas B. Stalley, representing Villegas's estate and his minor children, filed a lawsuit against the officers, their supervisors, and the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) for negligence, wrongful death, excessive force, deliberate indifference, and supervisory liability. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the constitutional claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law wrongful death claim, remanding it to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Stalley appealed the district court's decision regarding the deliberate indifference and supervisory liability claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers' decision to transport Villegas to a medical unit rather than provide on-scene care did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Consequently, the supervisory liability claim also failed, as it was contingent on the underlying constitutional violation. View "Stalley v. Lake Correctional Institution Warden" on Justia Law

In 1996, E. Jean Carroll encountered Donald J. Trump at the Bergdorf Goodman department store in Manhattan. Carroll alleged that Trump sexually abused her in a dressing room. In 2022, Trump made public statements denying the allegations and calling Carroll a liar. Carroll sued Trump for defamation and sexual assault, seeking damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a nine-day trial. The jury found that Trump sexually abused Carroll and defamed her in his 2022 statements. The jury awarded Carroll $5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Trump appealed, arguing that the district court made several evidentiary errors, including admitting testimony from two women who alleged past sexual assaults by Trump and a recording of a 2005 conversation where Trump described kissing and grabbing women without consent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case for abuse of discretion. The court found that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. The testimony of the two women and the 2005 recording were deemed admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 415, which allow evidence of other sexual assaults in cases involving sexual assault claims. The court also found that Trump did not demonstrate that any claimed errors affected his substantial rights.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the evidentiary rulings were within the range of permissible decisions and that any potential errors were harmless. The court upheld the $5 million award to Carroll. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law

In 2017, Samantha Braun was rear-ended by Radena Wollman in a car accident. Wollman admitted fault, and the case proceeded to a jury trial to determine damages. Braun claimed various injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, and sought significant damages. During the trial, the circuit court admitted several of Braun's medical records over her objections, citing the business records hearsay exception. The jury awarded Braun $125,000, which was significantly less than she requested. Braun appealed, arguing that the admission of her medical records was an abuse of discretion and prejudiced her right to a fair trial.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit admitted the medical records, finding sufficient foundation and applying the business records hearsay exception. Braun objected, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay. The court overruled most of her objections and admitted the records. The jury awarded Braun $125,000 in damages, which she appealed, claiming the court's admission of the records was erroneous and prejudicial.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred in admitting the medical records under the business records exception without proper foundation. However, the court determined that Braun's statements in the records were admissible as non-hearsay, and some statements were admissible under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception. Despite the errors, the court concluded that Braun did not demonstrate substantial prejudice affecting the jury's verdict. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, upholding the $125,000 damages award. View "Braun v. Wollman" on Justia Law